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My dissertation examines the emergence of gender justice activism among second-
generation Muslim women in Britain and the United States.  This research focuses on 
activists who attempt to reclaim Islam’s ‘original egalitarian spirit,’ a position they 
argue revolutionized women’s status in the seventh century. Despite differences 
between the Muslim populations in both of these countries, I argue that similar gender 
justice campaigns reveal the significant roles that both gender and generation play in 
forming political identities.  The dissertation offers a typological theory of gender 
justice claims, categorized according to two dimensions: targets and frames.  Targets 
are classified according to whether they are representative claims in the public sphere 
or reinterpretive claims in the private sphere. Frames differentiate between claims that 
seek short-term fixes to inequitable outcomes and those that fight structural causes of 
inequality.  Through a combination of original interview data with Muslim women 
activists in both countries and content analysis of media constructions of the Muslim 
identity, I argue that second-generation Muslim women activists in both Britain and 
the U.S. construct a new Muslim political identity for the multicultural political 
project--a new egalitarian Muslim identity based on the idea that Islam promotes and 
protects women's rights. 
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CHAPTER 1  
MULTICULTURALISM AND THE MUSLIM IDENTITY: A TYPOLOGICAL 
THEORY OF GENDER-JUSTICE CLAIMS 
 
 One of the most prominent challenges the modern nation-state faces in the 
twenty first century is the just management of diverse populations.  Liberal states in 
particular face the dilemma of managing cultural difference through granting group-
specific rights, while still prioritizing the autonomy and individualism that reside at 
the heart of their political agendas. While the ‘Anglo-conformity’ model of 
immigration in Western states such as Britain and the United States predicts that 
immigrants who migrated prior to the 1960s would adapt to existing cultural norms, 
the 1970s saw a rise in pluralist policies that tolerated immigrant groups retaining 
aspects of their ethnic heritage.  This transition to a ‘politics of difference’ marked the 
commitment to a political project called multiculturalism, in which liberal states with 
increasing immigration examine how they can retain a sense of national identity and 
individualism while also respecting the diversity of group interests that new migrants 
represent.  
 The multicultural political project should be understood as a state’s normative 
commitment to managing such potential conflict.  For instance, to what extent does the 
government make diversity claims by groups an explicit part of its national policy? On 
one hand, there are states such as the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia that have 
official multicultural policies at the national level, including examples of legislation 
that explicitly promote different systems of law for members of ethnic groups, allow 
multiple citizenship for immigrants, and accept traditional dress from sending cultures.  
On the other hand, there are countries like the United States that do not have clearly 
established multicultural policies at the federal level, yet acknowledge the 
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incorporation of immigrant populations as part of a national narrative.  In the case of 
the US, then, the multicultural political project manifests itself in a decentralized 
fashion, most evidently in education, through the rise of race and ethnic studies 
programs in higher education as well as the promotion of group-specific diversity in 
primary education. Scholars of multiculturalism note that the multicultural agenda 
spread across the country through curriculum during the 1970s (Kivisto and Rundblad 
2000; Glazer 1998). Whether multiculturalism appears in federal policy or through 
decentralized arrangements, its political project reflects the state’s attempt to 
politically manage the question of difference among an increasingly diverse polity.  
  One of the strongest challenges to the multicultural political project in liberal 
countries questions how a multiculturalism government manages illiberal behavior 
within group interests, particularly when group-specific rights are thought to violate 
the liberal rights of certain group members—traditionally women and children 
members who are given little say in determining their group’s interests.  The 
contemporary challenge to multiculturalism in the West concentrates this concern 
about illiberal group behavior on immigrant Muslim populations in particular. 
Particularly after the terrorist attacks in the US on September 11, 2001 and in Britain 
on July 7, 2005 that were perpetrated by Muslim extremists, both of these countries’ 
multicultural projects sharply focused on the integration of their Muslim populations.  
National security concerns that originally focused on the clash between Western 
values and those of countries populating the Muslim world quickly translated into 
concerns about a fundamental clash in values between liberal democratic interests and 
‘Islamic values’ that accompany Muslim immigrants into Western countries.   
 Whereas multicultural diversity has traditionally referred to racial and ethnic 
groups who are visibly different from majority populations, scholars argue that such 
security concerns and the associated ‘racialization of Islam’ designate Muslims as a 
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similarly marginalized group within the multicultural project (Razack 2008; Jamal 
2008).  They argue that the Western media’s construction of the Muslim individual as 
a brown, bearded man or a brown, hijabi
1
 woman leads to this racialization, because it 
equates Muslims with particular visible characteristics in the public’s mindset that are 
then associated with certain—security-threatening—behavior. 
 Likewise, critics of multiculturalism also focus on Islam because they believe 
it to be the precise example that illustrates their concern about multiculturalism 
fostering illiberal behavior.  Indeed, strange bedfellows are found in conservative 
nationalists, on one hand, who argue that increased diversity harms a necessary sense 
of hegemonic national identity (Huntington 2004; Fish 1997) and, on the other hand, 
feminists who argue that women and children often suffer exploitation at the hands of 
minority groups’ male leaders (Okin 1999; Pollitt 1999).  In the case of Islam, 
however, both groups operate under assumptions that Islamic values clash with 
Western values, whether they are ideas about modernity and democracy in the case of 
the former, or gender-justice in the case of the latter.  Both groups ultimately argue 
that incorporating the Muslim political identity in the multicultural project is a 
dangerous endeavor and that Muslim identity and culture should be significantly 
regulated to protect the liberal rights of others in that society. 
    Feminists who argue that multiculturalism is a dangerous political project for 
minority women are particularly interesting because of the significant contradiction 
that such an argument reveals in feminist reasoning: the feminist call for women’s 
rights may disregard a woman’s right to prioritize her religious identity if that 
religious identity is deemed harmful to women. Susan Moller Okin, this argument’s 
most vocal spokeswoman, questions whether allowing cultural groups to hold onto 
                                                
1
 The hijab refers to the headscarf worn by Muslim women that covers their hair, but 
leaves the face open. Hijabi is the colloquial term used to refer to women who choose 
wear the hijab.  
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traditions from their homelands both perpetuates patriarchal practices and effectively 
holds minority women’s rights to a lower standard than their majority counterparts 
(Okin 1999).  This feminist critique of the multicultural project argues that the state 
fails to safeguard minority women’s liberal rights against mistreatment from within 
their own minority group.  Ultimately, Okin suggests that in cases where 
multiculturalism and equality may come in conflict (e.g. the ability to hold onto a 
cultural tradition of female genital mutilation vs. protecting the rights of minority 
women who do not want to practice that tradition), equality should prevail. Okin 
effectively relegates a woman’s right to her religious identity to an example of false 
consciousness.   
 Muslim women scholars and activists, however, often disagree with such 
mainstream feminist assessment. Despite the fact that Okin’s critique purports to have 
minority women’s rights in mind, Muslim women argue that by portraying misogynist 
behavior as inevitable and fundamental to Islam itself, feminist critics suffer from the 
same androcentric trappings that they claim to challenge.  Instead of conflating a 
number of men’s misogynistic behavior with the religion itself, they argue, feminist 
scholars should listen to how Muslim women characterize the Muslim identity.  Such 
arguments employ intersectionality theory to outline the importance of recognizing 
multiple, simultaneous oppressions—specifically, how a Muslim’s religious identity 
might intersect with his or her gender identity (Crenshaw 1991).  
 
 
I. THE ARGUMENT 
  In this dissertation, I argue that Muslim women scholars and activists in both 
Britain and the US reclaim Islam’s position on gender-justice, as it has been 
constructed in both public media representation and private intracommunal 
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interpretations of the faith. They do so by offering an alternative version of the 
Muslim political identity to be used in the multicultural project that is comprised of 
egalitarian principles—a new, egalitarian Muslim identity.  In doing so, such activists 
counter a popular understanding of Islam (and religion, broadly speaking) as a system 
of belief that is harmful to women’s rights.  In essence, then, my dissertation attempts 
to argue why the term ‘Muslim feminism’ is not an oxymoron and how certain 
institutional arrangements in modern societies might, in fact, heighten a sense of 
religiosity that aims to reimagine, reinvent, or reinterpret how religions may adapt to 
women’s modern lives.  
 In exploring the construction of this new egalitarian Muslim identity, I position 
my argument at the crossroads of three literatures: social movement identity politics, 
gender politics, and immigration politics. Specifically, I engage with three central 
questions that illustrate the intersection between these three literatures:  
 
• 1-Under what circumstances will Muslim women emerge as activists 
defending their religious identity to feminists rooted in a more secular 
tradition, while at the same time reclaiming how the Muslim identity has been 
constructed in the West by their male religious contemporaries?  
• 2- How do Muslim women reconcile their gender and religious identities when 
they conflict, particularly when the multicultural political project in Western 
liberal democracies might protect group rights made in the name of religion 
that violate the liberal rights of the group’s female members?   
• 3- How do second generation Muslim women activists challenge our 
assumptions about linear, unidirectional assimilation and the incorporation of 
diversity in Western mainstream cultures?  
 
  6 
 I address the first and second questions largely in the next two chapters where I 
demonstrate that gender-justice activism in both countries shares important 
similarities. I tackle the first question by describing how activists emerge to construct 
an alternative Muslim identity.  Beginning with chapter two, I explain that the 
misrepresentation of Muslim women in the mainstream media prompts activists to 
publicly assert the intersection of their gender and religious identities in alternative 
media outlets.  This is followed by chapter three, where I demonstrate how activists 
emerge in reaction to the misinterpretation of Islamic teachings on gender-justice 
within Muslim communities themselves.  
 I tackle the second question by describing the different forms of rebuttals that 
activists’ claims take in reconciling both their gender and religious identities. In the 
next two chapters, in addition to describing why activists emerge to construct an 
alternative Muslim identity, I also sort activists’ claims by their arenas of discourse. 
The project to reimagine an egalitarian Islam counters the claim that Islam is 
fundamentally injurious to women’s rights, and adopts different strategies according to 
where the claims are made.  Chapter two describes representative claims that activists 
make in the public sphere, engaging the media’s public misrepresentation of the 
Muslim woman. Chapter three demonstrates reinterpretive claims that activists make 
within the private sphere of Muslim communities themselves, arguing that 
misogynistic practices are the result of misinterpreted Islamic teachings.  
 I address the third question about assimilation theory primarily in chapter 
three, because this chapter focuses on intergenerational relationships within the private 
area of discourse (the Muslim community). It should be no surprise that Muslim 
women activists oppose the androcentric version of Islam that has become normalized 
in the public and private spheres, given that they claim using the minority male as a 
point of reference obscures the minority female’s experience. However, in chapter 
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three, I argue that the same activists also oppose the primocentrism of this version of 
Islam in the private sphere.  As androcentric (andro-, male) is used to refer to 
perspectives that use the male as the point of reference, I use primocentric
2
 (primus-, 
first) to refer to a perspective that uses the first generation migrant as the point of 
reference.  Considering that an overwhelming number of activists who make these 
rebuttals are second generation Muslim women, this terminology gives analytical 
traction to their complaint that a Muslim identity that uses their first generation parents 
as a point of reference obscures the experience of second generation Muslims.  
Similarly, they argue that primocentric understandings of Islam that only acknowledge 
first generation Muslim immigrants in discussions of representation and group rights 
in the multicultural political project incorrectly assume that the second generation’s 
attachment to the ethnic identity will dissolve as it assimilates into the mainstream.  In 
actual fact, however, my respondents represent a group of vocal activists who suggest 
that the second generation might be engaged in reconstructing the composition of their 
minority identity group, distinct from the first generation’s construction. 
 Next, I use chapter four to explore how rebuttals are formulated by classifying 
these rebuttals in a typology constructed from the intersection of the targets of 
activists’ gender-justice claims and the frames with which they make these claims.  
While the typology is briefly introduced at the end of this chapter, chapter four 
presents the typological theory in depth and describes how the framing dimension 
helps clarify how activists might formulate similar rebuttals in different ways. This 
chapter explains the difference between affirmative and transformative frames, taking 
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 According to the author’s knowledge, the term ‘primocentric’ has thus far only been 
used by Leonhard Praeg (2007) in his analysis of violence in Africa.  He uses the term 
in conjunction with the prefix phalo (phalo-, masculine) to describe a logic as phalo-
primocentric if it “always already (and threateningly still) violates the rights and the 
very being of woman and children” (Praeg 2007: 141).  I employ this term in a similar 
way, to describe concentration on the ‘first’ generation, or parents.  
  8 
its cue from Nancy Fraser’s (1997) typology of justice struggles that differentiates 
between struggles that seek superficial fixes to inequitable outcomes (affirmative) and 
those that fight structural causes of inequality (transformative).   
 The fifth and final chapter attempts to tackle an interesting observation that the 
typology reveals—namely, that while affirmative frames appear in both countries, 
transformative frames seem to emerge only in the US. I suggest that the variation we 
see in frames is due to the fundamental differences in each country’s treatment of 
religion, which plays a distinct historic role in each country. Its role in Britain has 
made the British state suspicious of religious leadership, while its role in America 
encourages the American state to refrain from intervening in religious community 
affairs as much as possible.  For example, while radicalizing clerics have been allowed 
into both countries, the US largely abstains from censoring their abilities; its security 
concerns focus on defunding terrorist resources abroad by, sometimes mistakenly, 
prohibiting Muslim organizations from sending charitable funds overseas.
3
  
 Britain, in contrast, has tried to limit the effects such clerics might have on 
British Muslims—particularly young British Muslims—by engaging in a system of 
religious corporatism, where the state chooses ‘moderate’ Muslims to represent the 
Muslim community and tries to regulate the Muslim identity through these 
appointments.  Because these leaders are almost exclusively male, this system 
effectively edges Muslim women out of constructing the Muslim identity in Britain, 
which, I argue, keeps their frames from developing into transformative ones.  They are 
more concerned with remedying outcomes immediately, and need to keep frames 
affirmative to garner enough support to even generate some semblance of a collective 
voice.   
                                                
3
 It is important to note that there is considerable opposition to such measures from 
with the Muslim activist community.  As one of the five pillars of Islam is giving alms 
to the poor, many Muslims consider it unjust for the state to inhibit their giving. 
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 I suggest that the US state elevates Constitutional protections of individual 
rights, particularly the right of religious freedom, to such importance that it enables a 
form of free market religious interpretation; instead of lionizing certain religious 
leaders as representatives of the Muslim community, the state relationship with 
religion facilitates individual interpretations of Islam to speak up and be heard.   
Muslim organizations and activists are left to compete in the public limelight, allowing 
more individual renegades from voicing their transformative frames, even if many still 
turn to affirmative ones. I conclude that Muslim women seem to be less obstructed in 
America from pursuing religious activism and situate them in a historical pattern of 
reform movements that have used the national Constitutional narrative of individual 
rights to fight for social justice. 
 In the remainder of this chapter, I lay out the dissertation’s theoretical 
contributions.  First, I briefly explain my research design and describe the 
methodology I employ to conduct this research.  Next, in section two, I provide an 
overview of the multicultural project in both Britain and the United States and explain 
how a disparate Muslim identity has emerged in each state’s distinct context.  In 
section three, I engage the construction of the Muslim identity in the West in order to 
demonstrate why activists feel they must challenge its androcentric, primocentric 
production.  I also use this section to explain how I position this dissertation’s 
argument at the crossroads of the three literatures mentioned above—social movement 
identity politics, gender politics and immigation politics—and how this alternative 
Muslim identity formulates an important theoretical and empirical contribution to each 
field.  Finally, in section four, I briefly introduce the typology of gender-justice 
claims, classified according to the different targets and frames that activists employ. 
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A. Research Design 
  Examining what is considered to be ‘the Muslim identity’ in these two 
countries poses certain difficulties, considering the different configuration of the 
Muslim population that has emerged in each state’s historical context.  While the 
Muslim population in Britain primarily hails from rural impoverished areas of South 
Asia and continues to rank as its poorest minority community, the American Muslim 
immigrant community is from both Arab and South Asian countries and claims a 
reliable middle class status, generally mirroring the education and employment rates 
of the rest of the country.  Moreover, the fact that British-born Muslims executed the 
2005 London bombings sharpened the British state’s treatment of domestic Muslims, 
treating them as potential security threats. In contrast, the 2001 American attacks were 
carried out by foreign-born Muslims, and the state’s rhetoric towards American-born 
Muslims largely differentiates them from threats posed by Muslims abroad. 
 Given these differences between the two Muslim populations, I employ a 
paired comparison of most-different systems to interrogate why a similar form of 
gender-justice activism emerges among a subset of second generation Muslim women 
in both countries.  Przeworski and Teune (1970) theorize a most-similar and most-
different systems design, where the former explains a dissimilar outcome between two 
similar systems by identifying variation in an independent variable and the latter uses 
a common independent variable between two different systems to explain a similar 
outcome.
4
  While many studies usually use countries as the ‘systems’ in such research 
designs, I argue that sub-communities can also exhibit similar or dissimilar traits that 
affect the behavior of its members; accordingly, I believe the British and American 
                                                
4
 This approach is similar to John Stuart Mill’s (1892) methods of similarity and 
difference, but Pzreworski and Teune’s approach has been argued to be more 
appropriate for political analysis than the experimental method implicit in Mill’s 
approach (Tarrow 2010).   
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Muslim populations should be understood as most-different systems.  This paired 
comparison allows us to identify why we observe surprisingly similar forms of 
gender-justice activism emerging among second generation Muslim women in both 
countries, even though they belong to two most-different ‘systems’ of Muslim 
populations.  
 The benefits of employing a paired comparison design, in regards to the project 
at hand, outweigh its pitfalls. While the paired comparison is often criticized for 
comparing too few cases with too many variables, this method combines descriptive 
depth through close process-tracing with the analytical traction provided by 
identifying an independent variable and examining its effect on outcomes of interest in 
not only one, but two cases. Other criticisms of this research design assume that cases 
are chosen atheoretically, represent extremes, or ignore scope conditions of a prior 
theory (Tarrow 2010).  However, Britain and the US are chosen as specific cases in 
this study because both countries have “gone through similar experience” (terrorist 
attacks perpetrated by Muslim individuals that forced the state to confront a Muslim 
political identity) and are experiencing “similar phases at the same time” 
(incorporating the Muslim minority population into a multicultural political project), 
which make them “obvious subjects for paired comparison” (Tarrow 2010: 247).  
 It is important to note, however, that the limits of any small n study also exist 
in my research design.  I deliberately selected my respondents on the basis of their 
activism, and therefore do not make generalizations across the entire Muslim, or even 
Muslim female, population. As I move forward with my analysis, it will remain 
imperative to remember that my respondents are activists who choose to politicize the 
crossroads of their gender and religious identities; the impact of my respondents’ 
activism and political organization on the broader Muslim community is certainly a 
topic for future research, yet one that unfortunately lies beyond the scope of this 
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dissertation. Admittedly, however, my sample of respondents could be a self-selected 
group of activists willing to speak to an American researcher, or share a similar 
perspective on gender-rights in Islam. For these reasons, I also explore the diversity 
within these activist communities in the second half of this dissertation. 
 While it should also be noted that the terrorist attacks in Britain were 
committed by British- born Muslim men, whereas in the US they were committed by 
foreign-born Muslim men, this disparity does not fundamentally bear on the two 
countries’ shared traditions as Western, liberal democracies that think about Islam in 
relation to their national security.  If anything, this difference should only further 
support my contention that the two Muslim populations should be understood as ‘most 
different-systems,’ making the emergence of gender-justice activism in both 
communities a surprisingly similar outcome of interest.   
 Though paired comparisons are often used to demonstrate structural conditions 
that cause either a similar or dissimilar outcome of interest, I intend to demonstrate 
that gender operates as an individual antecedent condition and generation operates as 
a systemic antecedent condition—and that both of these conditions exist among 
activists in Britain and the US.  I argue that it is these conditions, rather than structural 
or institutional mechanisms, that help formulate the construction of an alternative 
egalitarian Muslim identity.  Even so, I do return to structural and institutional 
conditions in chapter five, when I point to each state’s set of institutional arrangements 
and the role it plays in the frames that Muslim women activists employ.  
 
B. Methodology 
The survey data that exists on the Muslim second generation in either country is 
unfortunately currently limited to descriptive public opinion data.  Surveys primarily 
ask about religious behavior (e.g. how often respondents visit the mosque, whether 
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women wear the hijab, whether men grow beards, etc.), but essentially avoid 
exploring deeper motivations behind such religious behavior.  Additionally, there is no 
known survey data that identifies second generation activists waging gender-justice 
campaigns. Believing that data should drive methods, I found it necessary to primarily 
use qualitative methods to explore the motivations behind my respondents’ activism. I 
conducted in-depth, semi-structured qualitative interviews of 53 female British 
Muslim gender-justice activists and 43 female American Muslim gender-justice 
activists.  Because I am interested in a self-selected population of activists, I found my 
respondents through a combination of snowball sampling (with a quota placed on the 
number of references each activist could provide me) and organizational research.  In 
both the UK and US, the majority of my respondents were in their 20s or 30s, well-
educated, urban, and either in school or employed full time. Recognizing the 
importance of class or ‘cultural’ arguments that could correlate with certain ethnic 
backgrounds, I made great efforts to diversify respondents according to class and 
ethnic origin: roughly 40% of my British respondents were from working-class 
backgrounds (with the rest self-identifying as middle-class), while only 15% of my 
American respondents reported a working-class background; and ethnic origin ranged 
from South Asian, Middle Eastern, North African and Caribbean descent in the UK to 
South Asian, Middle Eastern, North African and African-American descent in the 
US). It is important to note that while different class backgrounds and countries of 
origin add variation to my comparison, I do not observe any substantial variation 
along either lines in interviews with my respondents (this will be addressed in detail in 
subsequent chapters). Interviews lasted, on average, for close to 90 minutes and efforts 
have been made in reporting results to protect the anonymity of the majority of 
respondents—at their request—unless I have special permission from a respondent to 
use her name or describe her work in such a way that she may be easily identified.  
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Chapter two also required media content analysis to: a) investigate the veracity 
of activists’ claims that the media misrepresents the Muslim woman as a submissive, 
oppressed figure to the wider public, and b) demonstrate how activists create 
alternative media outlets to depict the Muslim woman as a normalized citizen, if not 
stronger and more independent than the average woman.  I use the Yoshikoder content 
analysis program to determine the tone of media items (Lowe 2006).  This program 
codes articles as positive or negative, according to a General Inquirer (GI) dictionary 
of positive and negative terms in the English language, which is also supplemented by 
a customized dictionary that I created of positive and negative terms directly 
pertaining to the Muslim identity.  This methodology is explained in detail in the next 
chapter.  
 
II. MULTICULTURALISM  
 The most prominent advocate of multiculturalist theory is William Kymlicka, 
who makes the case that multiculturalism and liberalism are not only compatible, but 
complementary to each other’s successful implementation.  First, some of the 
individual rights that liberalism underlines, such as freedom of speech and association, 
are in fact very important for protecting group difference; these rights allow people to 
form associations and represent their views to broader society (Kymlicka 1996). 
Second, individual behavior that differs from majority norms is best understood 
through differences in group contexts—in other words, individuals’ participation or 
membership in groups that in turn shape ‘societal cultures.’ Kymlicka believes that 
societal cultures form a context of choice that “provides its members with meaningful 
ways of life across the full range of human activities, including social, educational, 
religious, recreational, and economic life, encompassing both public and private 
spheres” (Kymlicka 1996: 76). Seen as a heuristic mechanism for immigrant behavior, 
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culture becomes instrumental in the state’s power relations with immigrants: legal 
mechanisms employ cultural identities as a defense in civil and criminal conflicts, 
certain public policy initiatives aim to cater to group-based needs, etc.  
 Kymlicka distinguishes between national minorities (e.g. Puerto Ricans or 
Native Americans in the US) that preceded immigration and immigrant minorities, 
though it is clear that both types of minorities have non-majority backgrounds or came 
from environments that might explain why their interests differ from those of the 
white, Anglo-majority in Britain or the US. In the case of immigrants, Kymlicka 
focuses almost exclusively on the context constructed for first generation immigrants 
by their sending countries’ customs and traditions. The children of first generation 
immigrants (called second generation immigrants themselves) are almost absent in this 
analysis, which leaves us questioning whether they are expected to draw on the 
context of choice from their parents’ sending countries or from the liberal 
multicultural state in which they are born and raised. Before moving on to the ways in 
which second generation women are speaking up and trying to reinsert themselves into 
the multicultural debate, it is necessary to review how multiculturalism is pursued as a 
political project in both Britain and the US, in order to understand how the Muslim 
political identity developed in each state. 
 Scholars who advocate for multicultural state models generally agree that its 
main virtue lies in preventing the tyranny of majority norms from subjugating 
minority interests (Renteln 2005; Parekh 2002; Glazer 1998; Kymlicka 1996). Though 
these conflicts in interests often come to fruition through ordinary lifestyle decisions 
such as dress codes and dietary restrictions, they actually represent a much more 
symbolic move by the state to observe and honor minority difference in a democratic 
society.  A truly democratic society, scholars of multiculturalism argue, would 
acknowledge the cultural contexts that majority and minority individuals use to inform 
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their own behavior.  
 Scholars who argue against multiculturalism also converge around a common 
concern—namely, that the prioritization of respecting difference might undermine the 
political project of unity on which the survival of any modern nation state ultimately 
relies (Huntington 1998; Fish 1997).  Stanley Fish, in particular, argues that 
multiculturalism’s ‘first principle’ of tolerance is impractical because “sooner or later 
the culture whose core values you are tolerating will reveal itself to be intolerant at 
that same core” (Fish 1997: 3).  According to Fish, tolerance for tolerance’s sake leads 
to what he terms ‘boutique multiculturalism’ and he argues that such multiculturalists 
are only conveniently interested in diversity up until the point at which it conflicts 
with their own convictions.   He argues that a sincere ‘politics of difference’ would not 
only encompass polite interest in minority cultures, but that it would also allow group-
based exemptions to the (majority) legal order.  
 Such legal pluralism often resides at the center of critics’ concerns over the 
ability of multicultural societies to maintain order.  In both Britain and the US, a legal 
mechanism called the cultural defense exists in courts to mitigate the sentencing of 
individuals whose criminal behavior is deemed to conform to their minority culture.  
Advocates for this defense argue that cultural conditioning predisposes people to act in 
certain ways and cultural evidence must be admitted into the courtroom to at least 
explain the defendant’s motivations and cognitive framework (Renteln 2005). Those 
who oppose this legal mechanism largely do so on the basis that it essentializes 
minority cultures, by portraying cultures as stagnant identities that program individual 
behavior.  Domestic violence, for example, is argued in cultural defense cases as 
expected or predictable in ‘Other’ minority cultures, while ignoring the prevalence of 
similar violence in Western states’ majority cultures as well (Song 2005). The 
criticism concerning this legal mechanism echoes a general criticism of 
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multiculturalism: in acknowledging diversity, difference must be reified. These 
detractors do not necessarily oppose the political project of multiculturalism that looks 
to respect diversity, but they disagree with the ways in which it can lead to exclusive 
cultural group classifications. In the following sections, I address the ways in which 
multiculturalism emerged in both Britain and the US against different historical 
backdrops and subsequently gave birth to each state’s distinct Muslim identity. 
 
A. Multiculturalism in Britain 
 Britain experienced a swell in immigration after it granted independence to a 
large number of its colonies after World War II.  Immigrants were mostly South Asian 
and Carribbean men, initially settling as temporary economic migrants to fill labor 
shortages in the former colonial power. It soon became apparent, however, that 
migrants wanted to settle permanently in Britain and sent for wives and families to 
join them under a voucher system that was used for family reunification purposes. In 
response to growing public sentiment against immigration, the Conservative 
government turned towards restrictionism in 1962 and began to strictly regulate 
immigration, effectively stopping Commonwealth immigration by imposing 
requirements on new immigrants that demanded British ancestry and lineage (Hansen 
2000).   
 In the 1970s and 1980s, a political movement emerged among minorities 
organized around anti-racist principles, partly in reaction to anti-immigrant and anti-
racial minority public sentiment, but also largely inspired by similar anti-racist 
ideology in the American Civil Rights movement from the 1960s (Modood 2009).  In 
Britain this movement opened up the question of race by calling all people who were 
considered victims of color racism ‘black’ in a motion towards solidarity, deliberately 
blurring lines between different ethnic and racial groups.   
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 This movement put multicultural demands on the table, pointing out that 
minorities needed policies that addressed racial and ethnic group-specific interests to 
counter the disproportionate deprivation minority communities experienced. The 
movement fought for social welfare policies in housing and employment, such as low-
income accommodations and anti-discrimination legislation. The Race Relations Act 
of 1976 outlawed discrimination on the basis of race, color, nationality, ethnic and 
national origin in education, employment, and social services; the act notably failed to 
include religious identification, which would only be addressed in 2006 by the Racial 
and Religious Hatred Act that outlawed inciting hatred against a person on the basis of 
their religious identity. As will be discussed below, the exclusion of religious 
identification did not go unnoticed by Muslims in the anti-racist movement, who felt 
they received no support from fellow racial minorities when discrimination was based 
on the grounds of their religion.  
 Multicultural policies also allowed anti-racist education at the local level, 
which focused on teaching children to combat racism in the educational system and 
society at large.  These demands emerged formally in response to the perceived racism 
of immigrant education in the 1960s, and criticized British multicultural education 
efforts for focusing on diversity and pluralism at the expense of equality and justice.  
Instead of concentrating on diverse admissions or pluralist subject matter, for example, 
as American multicultural efforts advocated (discussed below), the anti-racist 
movement wanted students to learn about the oppression to which the British majority 
subjected British minorities.  Yet, today multicultural education scholars are 
increasingly arguing that these two educational approaches should be offered hand in 
hand (Gillborn 2005; Figueroa 2004,1999). 
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B. Multiculturalism in the United States 
 The United States does not have any clearly established multicultural policies 
at the federal level, but multiculturalism emerged as a political project in the latter half 
of the twentieth century. Multiculturalism in the US traces back to two key national 
moments in the 1960s: 1) the Civil Rights movement, and 2) the Immigration and 
Nationality Act of 1965 that abolished national origin formulas and resulted in a rise 
of immigration from non-European countries. Kymlicka’s version of multiculturalism 
that addresses incorporating the diversity brought about by two distinct groups—
national minorities and immigrant minorities—effectively describes multiculturalism 
in the US. 
 The Civil Rights Movement, and the racial tension leading up to the movement 
itself, highlighted the fact that national minorities—the African-American population, 
in particular—were excluded from the narrative of US history.  Though religious 
groups such as Jews and Catholics were at the middle of battles over integrated 
schooling (Zeitz 2007) and ethnic groups such as the Japanese were isolated during 
post World War II internment (Hayashi 2004), racial groups have born the brunt of 
discrimination in the US.  The experiences of racial minorities were kept separate 
from the mainstream American narrative and African-American history was either 
overlooked or taught in parallel to the rest of US history.   
 While racial tension was at its peak, the Immigration and Nationality Act of 
1965 passed, resulting in an influx of immigrants from (mostly Asian) non-European 
countries and substantially changing the ethnic make-up of the US.  While the rest of 
the country was contemplating the concept of diversity, a completely new group of 
immigrant minorities flooded the country.  It soon became clear that the old ‘melting 
pot’ image that the Anglo conformity model of immigration had encouraged could not 
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be sustained with more and more demands being made to respect group difference and 
diversity.  
 The creation of Ethnic Studies departments in universities and colleges was an 
important result of the CRM and the change in the country’s ethnic make-up due to 
immigration.  Though the US does not technically have any federal multicultural 
policy, the multicultural political project is most evident in the education system.  
While the country’s federalist system delegates ultimate discretion over curriculum to 
the state-level, which should caution any theorist against making generalizing claims 
about ‘US education’ (with recent 2010 controversies over textbooks in Texas and 
Ethnic Studies in Arizona only underling this warning
5
), the late 1960s and early 
1970s saw a spike in Ethnic Studies departments across the country (Hu-DeHart 
1993).  These departments not only advocated the importance of teaching about 
diverse group’s contributions to US and world history, but also contributed towards 
recruitment and admissions efforts for minority students.  
 Despite the recent controversies across much of the country over immigration 
policy and the continuation of Ethnic Studies, by 1997 the widespread acceptance of 
multiculturalism’s educational effect led a scholar of multiculturalism, Nathan Glazer, 
to proclaim, “we are all multiculturalists now.” There were still state, county and 
individual school battles over curriculum requirements and teaching policy, but Glazer 
argued that, for the most part, “The American public school, originally established to 
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 See media coverage of the Texas textbook controversy: McKinley, James. March 12, 
2010. “Texas Conservatives Win Curriculum Change” The New York Times: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/13/education/13texas.html; Brick, Michael. May 20, 
2010. “Texas School Board Set to Vote Textbook Revisions” The New York Times: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/21/education/21textbooks.html; See media coverage 
of Arizona Ethnic Studies Program controversy: Santa Cruz, Nicole. May 12, 2010. 
“Arizona Bill targeting ethnic studies signed into law” The LA Times: 
http://articles.latimes.com/2010/may/12/nation/la-na-ethnic-studies-20100512.  
  21 
mold Americans of all backgrounds into a common culture… has undergone a 
remarkable change in the last twenty years” (Glazer 1997: 7).  The central demand at 
the heart of multiculturalism for the respect of diversity manifested outside of 
education as well—such as the interpretation of freedom of religion, freedom of 
speech, and exemptions from legal restrictions—but education has remained the 
primary focus of the American multicultural project because of the epistemic value of 
teaching diversity in classrooms.  My research investigates the role that the Muslim 
community plays in both countries’ multicultural political projects and how this might 
impact women members of each community. 
III. CONTRIBUTION TO THE LITERATURE(S) 
 This dissertation places itself at the crossroads of three different literatures: 
social movement politics, gender politics and immigration politics.  My research 
contributes to the literature on identity politics (social movements politics) by 
discussing the construction of the Muslim identity in the multicultural political project. 
I also engage with Muslim and non-Muslim feminist critiques of multiculturalism 
(gender politics) to highlight the androcentrism of the identity construction that uses 
the Muslim male as the point of reference. Lastly, I illustrate that the second 
generation identity is undertheorized in the immigration literature (immigration 
politics), which applies a primocentric perspective and uses the first generation 
immigrant as a point of reference.  The second generation is rarely given agency, as 
theories predict they will either retain the primocentric version of their cultural 
identity, passed down by their parents, or assimilate into the mainstream society by 
abandoning the cultural identity. Instead, I argue that activists among second 
generation Muslim women in both countries formulate distinct Muslim identities from 
their first generation parents. 
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A. Political Identity Construction 
 In order for the multicultural project in either country to manage the needs of 
its Muslim population, it is critical to establish what comprises this particular political 
identity.  As Satya Mohanty (2003) explains, identity is at the heart of multicultural 
politics: “If multiculturalism is to be the goal of educational and political institutions, 
we need a workable notion of how a social group is unified by a common culture, as 
well as the ability to identify genuine cultural differences (and similarities) across 
groups” (Mohanty 2003: 392).  Moreover, if discrimination occurs on the basis of 
social groups, such as racial, ethnic or religious affiliations, then we must understand 
how to define such groups in order to either stop this discrimination or actively 
advance them past the obstacles that historical discrimination has put in their path.  
 As social movement scholars will argue, a primary stage to mobilization 
involves the construction of political identities behind which people organize.  Charles 
Tilly explained that “identities are social arrangements…in which people construct 
shared stories about who they are, how they are connected, and what has happened to 
them… Identities become political identities when governments become parties to 
them” (Tilly 2003: 608-09).  In this sense, the Muslim political identity that the 
government considers in its creation of multicultural policies is indeed a political 
identity that explains the collective Muslim experience; clarifying this identity serves 
the purpose of establishing individuals’ positions in society and their status in relation 
to members claiming non-Muslim identities.  
 The main debate in the identity politics literature emerges between the 
essentialism of scholars who argue that identities are strong predictors of behavior and 
the skepticism of postmodern scholars who argue that identities are all unstable 
constructions that reflect more about their context than any inherent characteristics. 
The latter group of scholars assumes that systemic, social forces such as capitalism or 
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patriarchy powerfully trump the primordial inclinations that the former group of 
scholars assumes. Instead, postmodernists argue that the construction of an identity 
should reflect the complexity of context and just how differently individuals interact 
with their environment.  Mohanty explains: “Our identities are ways of making sense 
of our experiences. Identities are theoretical constructions that enable us to read the 
world in specific ways.  It is in this sense that they are valuable, and their epistemic 
status should be taken very seriously.  In them, and through them, we learn to define 
and reshape our values and our commitments, we give texture and form to our 
collective futures” (Mohanty 2003: 398). Identities are manifestations of how 
individuals perceive not only their surroundings, but also their relative position in a 
social hierarchy that organizes identities in relation to one another.   
 This suggests that any examination of the Muslim identity in both Britain and 
the US should likewise consider each country’s historical context and how it has 
influenced this identity’s construction. In both Britain and the US, the Muslim 
population is comprised of various ethnic groups.  As mentioned briefly above, the 
majority of Britain’s Muslims come from South Asia (43% Pakistan; 17% 
Bangladesh), though there are also Muslims from the Afro-Caribbean, Africa, the 
Middle East, and converts from the British population.  America’s Muslims are more 
evenly derived from three major groups: South Asians, Arabs and African-Americans.  
American estimates are controversial, with one breakdown estimating ‘Americans’ at 
30%, South Asians 29% and Arabs at 33% (Leonard 2005).
6
 While the convert and 
African-American populations have mobilized behind a Muslim identity in significant 
ways, particularly through the Nation of Islam and its associated historical context, 
this dissertation focuses on immigrant Muslim populations because this allows a 
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comparison between the British and American contexts. Though the ‘minority’ label 
has played a large part in constructing the non-immigrant, black Muslim population in 
the US, I use ‘minority Muslim identity’ in this dissertation to describe the first and 
second generation immigrant Muslim populations in both countries.  I use this 
particular term in order to express their demographic minority status, in addition to 
addressing the racialization of the Muslim identity.  
 This minority Muslim identity emerged in both Britain and the US in the late 
1980s as a group to be incorporated into each country’s multicultural political project.  
As the next two sections will demonstrate, each country’s distinct historical context 
gave rise to quite different Muslim identities—in Britain, Muslims comprise a 
disproportionately disadvantaged socio-economic group, while immigrant Muslims in 
America largely mirror the mainstream population in rates of education and 
employment.  In addition to different historical contexts, and perhaps as a result of 
them, each state has also forged a distinct relationship with its Muslim population in 
the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in 2001 in America and 2005 in Britain.  
 Yet, as subsequent sections will explain, despite these differences between 
overall Muslim populations, a subset of second generation Muslim women in both 
countries are engaged in a project to construct a new Muslim identity that considers 
the intersection of their religious identity with their gender and generational identities.  
Intersectionality theory advocates just such a cross-sectional analysis of multiple 
identities and their associated oppressions, but whereas intersectional scholarship has 
focused on how the gender identity intersects with race, class and more recently 
ethnicity, nationality and sexual orientation, it still has yet to seriously consider 
religious or generational identities (Stabile 2008; Pintchman 2000).  
 Nonetheless, the logic applied by intersectionality theory directly relates to 
Muslim women in the West.  Kimberle Crenshaw, the preeminent scholar of 
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intersectionality, argues that reducing women’s experience to a single axis of 
oppression loses sight of the multidimensional nature of women’s identities: 
“Consider an analogy to traffic in an intersection, coming and going in all four 
directions.  Discrimination, like traffic though an intersection, may flow in one 
direction, and it may flow in another.  If an accident happens, in an intersection, it can 
be caused by cars traveling from any number of directions and, sometimes, from all of 
them.  Similarly, if a Black woman is harmed because she is in the intersection, her 
injury could result from sex discrimination or race discrimination” (Crenshaw 1989: 
139). By replacing the hypothetical woman’s racial identity with a religious or 
generational identity, it is clear that Crenshaw’s analysis would apply to second 
generation Muslim women as well.  Before moving on to a discussion of how activists 
promote a new Muslim identity to counter the current understanding of the Muslim 
identity in the West, the following sections explain just how this androcentric, 
primocentric identity was constructed in each country, due to different historical 
contexts of immigration and race relations.   
  
1) Muslims in Britain  
 In the late 1980s, the public outcry in the Muslim world over the publication of 
Salman Rushdie’s Satanic Verses introduced the religious Muslim identity into 
Britain’s identity politics, which had until then had focused on racial and ethnic 
identities.  Rushdie’s book was considered blasphemous because it described fictional 
religious phrases that were in direct contradiction to Qur’anic principles.  The book 
was also controversial because it was deemed by some to have defamed the Prophet 
Muhammad by giving prostitutes the names of the Prophet’s wives.  While many 
British Muslims did not agree with the fatwa issued by Iranian clerical leader 
Ayatollah Khomeini on Rushdie and did not take part in protests calling for the book 
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to be burned or banned, some did indeed mobilize in defense of their religious 
community and take to the streets in riotous demonstrations against the novel.   
 British Muslim leaders pointed out that the British state upheld a law against 
blasphemy that covered blaspheme against the Church of England and argued that 
allowing blaspheme against Islam revealed the state’s anti-Islam bias.  Muslim leaders 
even petitioned the state to extend the laws of blasphemy to other religions, but the 
judgement of the court in R. v. Chief Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte 
Choudhury (1990) ruled that such an extension “would be virtually impossible by 
judicial decision to set sufficiently clear limits to the offence… would pose 
insuperable problems and would be likely to do more harm than good.”
7
  The law 
remained limited to protect religious offense against the Church of England and any 
challenge to its discriminatory nature towards other religions was met with arguments 
of impracticality and claims that extending such a law to other religions would 
encourage an atmosphere of censorship and intolerance instead of one that protected 
the freedom of expression.  Chapter five will discuss the British state’s evolving 
position towards the law against blasphemy and its eventual abolishment in 2008 in 
more detail, but it is important to note at this point in my analysis that Muslims felt 
alienated by the state’s continuous refusal to protect the Muslim community against 




                                                
7
 See “Extending law on blasphemy would likely do more harm than good.” The 
Times. April 10, 1990.  
8
 The blasphemy law was actually limited to the followers of the Church of England 
only, which also meant that it technically discriminated against other denominations in 
Christianity as well (e.g. Catholics, Methodists, etc.).  The House of Lords produced a 
report on religious offences in England Wales in 2003 after being asked to reassess the 
state’s blasphemy law and whether it could be expanded to other religions.  It argued, 
similarly to the court in R. v. Chief Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte 
Choudhury (1990), that to extend the law would be impossibly difficult, put undue 
strain on the freedom of expression, and should remain limited to offenses against the 
  27 
 Muslim activists also felt abandoned by a similar double standard in the anti-
racist movement that fought against discrimination on racial or ethnic grounds, but 
refrained from extending the same logic to religious offence.  Tariq Modood (2006) 
argues that the movement’s lack of support for Muslims during the Rusdhie affair 
formed a definitive moment in British race relations.  This episode marked the first 
time that some Muslim activists felt clearly abandoned by all other non-white 
minorities, though the entire purpose behind the political blackness movement was to 
define the civility and respect that is appropriate in a multicultural society, or to the 
“political constitution of difference in Britain” (Modood 2006: 42). From this point 
onwards, Muslims who had been active in the anti-racist movement began drawing 
attention to Muslim group needs that differed from ‘Asian’ or ‘black’ needs.  For 
instance, they highlighted housing provisions provided state-subsidized 
accommodations for Asians, yet did not allow Muslim Asians in interethnic marriages 
with non-Asian Muslims to move there with their own partners.
9
  Muslims who had 
not been active before and had even considered themselves ‘lapsed Muslims’ found a 
new sense of community solidarity and joined veteran Muslim activists behind the 
British Muslim identity (Modood 2006).    
 The main differences between the British and American Muslim populations 
stem from dissimilar colonial legacies and settlement histories.  The vast majority of 
British Muslims come from Pakistan and Bangladesh.  Most Pakistani migrants were 
poor economic migrants in the early 1960s and hailed from Northern Punjab and the 
rural Mirpur district of Azad Jammu and Kashmir, after the town was destroyed by the 
                                                                                                                                       
Church of England. See: House of Lords, “Religious Offences in England and 
Wales—First Report” Session 2002-2003, 10 April 2003. http://www.parliament.the-
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Mangla Dam’s waters. 
10
 Some Bangladeshi migrants also came as economic migrants 
because of economic hardships in East Pakistan in the 1950s and 1960s, but a large 




 These settlement histories have led to poor reception in the new host society, 
and British Muslims’ socio-economic status remains low with high rates of 
unemployment and low rates of educational attainment. Pakistanis and Bangladeshis 
comprise the poorest two groups in the country, with their male unemployment rates 
hovering at above 10 percentage points above the average population. Despite 
controlling for education and residential area, Muslim men are still much more likely 
to be unemployed than white men, and even Indian Muslim men fare worse than 
Indian Hindus. In education, Muslim children are also falling behind in performance 
rates, experiencing a decline in achievement while Afro-Carribean and Indian pupils 
have fared better than Muslims over the past few years.
12
 
 I argue that the British state has tackled this recently constructed Muslim 
political identity with a system of religious corporatism, an approach theorized by 
Jonathan Laurence (2009) regarding countries on the European continent. 
Corporatism, based on the Latin word corpus meaning body, is broadly understood as 
a system that treats community as a body—certain groups and individuals have 
distinct roles, but belong to the same federation.  This idea developed as a government 
strategy in the 1880s and 1890s to mitigate the rise of potentially violent 
underrepresented groups who threatened the peace and stability of democratic 
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consolidation.  In order to mitigate this threat, the government pursues broad 
institutional engagement with ‘moderates’ from minority groups to help diffuse 
conflict. Religious corporatism, then, is the same strategy employed in religiously 
plural countries where domestic religious extremism is the considered threat.  
 Laurence examines contemporary State-Islam relations across Europe and 
argues that a system of religious corporatism creates Islamic Councils to advise 
Western governments on “pragmatic applications of Islam,” (e.g. appointing chaplains 
in prison, halal certifications, religious education in schools, etc.).  While Laurence 
initial argument proposes that seven European countries, excluding England, have 
formed official Councils, I argue that the same form of religious corporatism has 
existed in Britain since a coherent Muslim identity emerged after the Rushdie affair in 
the 1980s.
13
  Not only are local religious leaders consulted on mandatory Religious 
Education (RE) requirements, but mainstream Muslim organizations such as the 
Muslim Council of Britain also serve as the ‘moderates’ that attempt to represent the 
British Muslim community.  The formation of unofficial Islamic advisory groups may 
emerge as a direct response to the contemporary threat posed by a rising Muslim 
identity, but the corporatist approach is historically grounded in Britain’s approach to 
religion.  The historical role of religion in Britain and how it gave rise to this system 
of religious corporatism will be addressed in detail in chapter five. 
 At the turn of this decade, the British state shifted towards what it called 
‘community cohesion’ efforts.  In 2004, in the wake of the March bombings in Madrid 
and the discovery of an arsenal of explosives in London, the government launched an 
ambitious project that aimed at winning “the hearts and minds” of Muslim youth. 
Confidential documents leaked to The Sunday Times described the government’s 
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concern regarding ‘homegrown terrorism,’ particularly from disaffected, well-
educated Muslim male youth. In the leaked documents, government officials argued: 
“We need to find ways of strengthening the hand of moderate Muslim leaders, 
including the young Muslims with future leadership potential, through the status 
which contact with the government can confer, and through practical capacity building 
measures.”
14
  This relationship between the state and moderate Muslim leaders is 
precisely one that a religious corporatist system would endorse. 
 The documents went on to identify specific (male) leaders it had in mind--one 
of these being Amr Khaled, an Egyptian accountant-turned-lay-preacher who came to 
prominence in Egypt in the late 1990s and now lives in Britain. Khaled has a large 
following, especially among youth, for applying a modern face to Islam; he uses 
television and modern media to preach his messages, appears clean-shaven, dresses in 
modern attire, and speaks in accessible language. However, Lindsay Wise’s (2006) 
examination of Khaled’s influence on youth reveals that he is not trained in Islamic 
scholarship and preaches messages that are deemed moderate to those preoccupied by 
Muslim stereotypes, but are really conservative on women’s rights.  For example, he 
moralizes that women should wear hijab.
15
  Yet, when the topic of religious dress was 
broached in my interviews (see chapter two), the vast majority of my respondents 
believed that dressing modestly was the only Islamic requirement and that the hijab 
was one option, a personal choice that each woman must make for herself.  By 
endorsing the position of quasi-clerics such as Khaled, who publicly take conservative 
positions on women’s rights, the British government effectively sides with male 
leadership against the dissenting views of my gender-justice activist respondents. 







  31 
 In 2005, the government approach intensified in response to the July 7 London 
bombings, which, as they had feared, were carried out by British Muslim youth.  
Initially, the government set up The Preventing Extremism Together taskforce, which 
brought together a rather wide cross-section of Muslim community representatives to 
make recommendations for government policy.  The taskforce produced a report in 
November 2005 that argued the key solution to tackling extremism was to first address 
a series of issues that disproportionately affected the Muslim community in Britain, 
such as inequality, discrimination, and deprivation (Kundnani 2009).  
 But in April 2007, the government launched its official Prevent program, with 
the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG), which effectively 
ignored the recommendations made by the taskforce to address systemic problems 
plaguing the Muslim community.  Instead the taskforce opted for a four-pronged 
agenda: 1) to pursue terrorists, 2) to protect infrastructure, 3) to prepare emergency 
response services, and 4) to prevent people from becoming terrorists. The community 
cohesion efforts were part of the fourth portion of the agenda; in order to prevent 
extremism, the government reasoned that “communities stop terrorism.”  The 
responsibility for solving problems in the Muslim community was shifted to Muslims 
themselves and the government increased the call for Muslims to integrate into 
broader British society. The Preventing Violent Extremism Pathfinder Fund was set up 
so that the DCLG could delegate funds to local Muslim organizations who pledged to 
work towards these goals.
16
  I argue in chapter five that this state policy might have 
                                                
16
 See “Preventing Violent Extremism Pathfinder Fund: Guidance Note for 
Government Office and Local Authorities in England,” Department for Communities 





  32 
had state security in mind, but caused unintended consequences in the Muslim 
immigrant community. I examine how the state brokered relationships with male first 
generation Muslim leaders, inadvertently strengthening the leaders’ authoritative 
powers in the community and marginalizing dissenting voices that did not agree with 
their androcentric, primocentric definition of how the Muslim identity should be 
understood in the West.  
2) Muslims in the United States 
 As a minority religious group in America that is also predominantly non-white, 
Muslims find themselves in a strange position between their marginalized racial 
position and their venerated religious position. The latter position comes from the 
popular image of the American republic as the defender of religious freedom.  Muslim 
studies scholars point out, however, that just as ‘universal rights’ in the America’s 
foundational texts were selectively applied to whites, rights to religious freedom have 
also not been uniformly applied (Haddad and Ricks 2009).  Despite the broad wording 
of the ‘free exercise’ and ‘establishment’ clauses of the US Constitution that pledged 
that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof” (U.S. CONST, amend. 1), the same scholars argue 
that the country’s foundation was a “de facto ‘establishment’ of Protestantism” 
(Haddad and Ricks 2009: 16). The almost schizophrenic image of America as a 
secular, yet religious, country was based on a white and Protestant impression of what 
it meant to ‘be American,’ similar to the Anglo conformity model that was applied to 
immigration prior to the 1960s.  
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 Nonetheless, it could be argued that the elevated role of religion in American 
society paved the way for Muslim immigrants to establish themselves in mainstream 
organizations and institutions. They appreciated the voluntary, yet pervasive function 
religion played in the US and built mosques that modeled after churches, not only 
operating as places of worship, but also as community centers for new immigrants’ 
families.  American Muslim immigrants were also primarily well-off, with more 
education and resources than the vast majority of their British counterparts. The 
community’s ability to relate to America’s religious fervor and their relatively 
comfortable economic standing, combined with the increasing popularity of Islam 
among African-American converts, helps construct the Muslim identity as just another 
example of diversity in America’s multicultural project. 
 In contrast to Britain’s Muslim population, Muslim Americans have fared well 
socio-economically. Recent polling by the Pew Research Center reports that American 
Muslims are doing reasonably well financially, with immigrant Muslims reporting 
more financial satisfaction than native born Muslims (i.e. black converts). Education 
levels are also said to mirror percentages in the general public, with 24% of Muslims 
reporting a college degree and 22%  enrolled in college classes.
17
  
 This success has largely to do with the different settlement histories of 
American Muslims.  As opposed to their British counterparts’ immigration patterns 
from rural, impoverished regions in South Asia, immigrant American Muslims are 
divided between Arab (24%) and South Asian (18%) countries with a significant 
percentage (20%) of African-American native born Muslims as well.
18
  The reasons 
for migration are also just as varied, with respondents reporting educational 
opportunities (26%), economic opportunities (24%), family reasons (24%), and 
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conflict or persecution in the sending country (20%).  The different settlement 
histories and lack of post-colonial migration in the US has created an arguably strong 
‘middle class, mainstream’ American Muslim community (Pew Research). 
 As in Britain, it was not until the Rushdie affair that the Muslim minority 
identity came into focus in the US. Haddad and Ricks (2009) argue that American 
Muslims reacted to the episode with discomfort, because they felt for the first time that 
they did not enjoy the same protection from religious offense or defamation as their 
fellow racial, ethnic and religious minorities, particularly blacks and Jews.  However, 
unlike the British Muslim experience, no American Muslims protested, burned the 
novel publicly, or rioted violently in the streets.  This serves as an important indication 
of the different relationship that British and American Muslims have with their 
respective states.  On one hand, British Muslims felt frustrated by the state’s failure to 
administer welfare benefits to their disproportionately needy community and saw the 
Rushdie affair as adding insult to injury. American Muslims, on the other hand, had 
little socio-economic frustration to tap into to mobilize in response to the literary 
episode.  
 A host of subsequent political developments that rapidly followed, however, 
only increased the alienation that American Muslims felt at the hands of the US 
government. For instance, the first Gulf War and attacks committed by Muslims on the 
World Trade Center and US interests abroad in the 1990s further underscored the 
‘Islamic’ threat to US security. These episodes prompted Muslims to question whether 
they were considered part of the American polity, or an external threat to its well-
being.  Finally, the attacks of September 11, 2001, perpetrated by foreign-born 
Muslim men, served as a tipping point for the state’s security concerns with Muslims 
at large.   While ensuing domestic legislation such as the USA PATRIOT Act clamped 
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down on Muslims’ civil liberties, media coverage of these attacks effectively 
encouraged the normalization of Islamophobia in the public sentiment as well.  
Though there were notable gestures of kindness from non-Muslims around the country 
who felt that the American Muslim community was being scapegoated, and a more 
widespread sense of curiosity emerged about Islam after the attacks, American 
Muslims felt as though the Muslim identity faced different challenges than their fellow 
race, ethnicity, and even religious groups had thus far confronted within the country’s 
multicultural project (Muedini 2009; Maira 2008). A majority (53%) of American 
Muslims reported believing it was more difficult to be Muslim in the US after 
September 11, 2001, with 19% reporting discrimination, 15% reporting being viewed 




 As opposed to the system of religious corporatism that Britain implements to 
engage Muslim identity, the US mainly avoids brokering such power relationships 
with specific domestic Muslim leaders. In part, this may be due to the different 
constructions of threat that were generated by each country’s attack—the conflict in 
Britain was dubbed ‘homegrown terrorism,’ while the threat to the US was largely 
framed as a foreign threat perpetrated by non-American Muslims. Though there have 
been recent isolated cases of American Muslims attempting acts of violence, the 
concern still seems to largely focus on threats coming from abroad.  The few incidents 
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that have been perpetrated by American-born or naturalized Muslims have all been 
framed by the government and media as “lone-wolf” occurrences;
20
  the attacks are 
effectively conflated with other acts of terror that have been executed by non-Muslim 
fanatics, instead of representing organized American Muslim efforts against the state. 
However, in chapter five, I interrogate the relationship between the state and religion 
and conclude that this set of institutional arrangements can be traced back to religion’s 
historical role in each country.  
B. Gendered Identity Politics 
 The most vocal censure of multiculturalism is generated by its feminist critics, 
who argue that the project androcentrically uses minority males as a point of 
reference.  Susan Moller Okin is most famous amongst them, writing a well-known 
essay entitled “Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?” that questions whether allowing 
cultural groups to hold onto traditions from their homelands perpetuates patriarchal 
practices, effectively holding minority women’s rights to a lower standard than their 
majority counterparts. Okin argues that multiculturalist theories do not include enough 
safeguards for women’s rights within minority groups, and specifically targets Islam 
by citing cases of polygamy and female genital mutilation as illustrations of culturally 
endorsed practices that oppress minority women. 
 Okin acknowledges that most multiculturalism theorists argue that minority 
groups must govern themselves according to liberal principles, meaning they ought 
not discriminate among members based on sex, race or sexual preference.  Yet, when 
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addressing Kymlicka’s confidence in multiculturalism she argues that such 
expectations are unreasonable in practice:  “Far fewer minority cultures than Kymlicka 
seems to think will be able to claim group rights under his liberal justification” (Okin 
1999: 21).   
 All the same, Okin’s feminist censure of multiculturalism has drawn a 
considerable amount of its own disapproval from minority women themselves, who 
argue that that she suffers from an androcentric perspective herself.  By equating the 
‘Muslim identity’ with poor behavior by Muslim men, Okin is criticized by some 
Muslim, as well as non-Muslim, scholars and activists as marginalizing Muslim 
women‘s experience in articulating their own Muslim identity (al-Hibri 1999; 
Nussbaum 1999; Sassen 1999). Azizah al-Hibri, an academic expert on Islamic 
jurisprudence and founder of KARAMAH: Muslim Women Lawyers for Human 
Rights in the US, responds to Okin’s essay in a piece  entitled “Is Western Patriarchal 
Feminism Good for Third World/Minority Women?” She criticizes Okin’s 
ethnocentrism, arguing that Okin ignores those women who feel a strong attachment to 
their faith, not because they are oppressed, misled or unenlightened, but because they 
choose to be religious.  Okin is thus seen as perpetuating stereotypical views of 
Islam’s position on women’s rights, effectively further harming the women she claims 
to protect by dissolving multicultural practices.  Al-Hibri argues that the real damage 
done to women by multiculturalism is felt by minority women who feel that their 
culture has been hijacked and misrepresented, in deciding what rights and privileges 
its members deserve as minority members of society (al-Hibri 2000).  
 Al-Hibri also argues that the implementation of multicultural policies 
discriminate against women from minority cultures as well.  She examines the Islamic 
marriage contract in American courts and argues that judges have ruled against 
women’s rights in Islamic marriages by accepting the testimony of male, first 
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generation leaders who offer cultural interpretations of what the marriage contract 
actually dictates (al-Hibri 2000). In one particular example, al-Hibri explains that a 
male imam translated the term mahr as ‘bride price,’ effectively prejudicing the 
Western judge who refused to enforce the contract’s terms upon the couple in 
question’s divorce.  This imam’s translation, however, contradicts Qur’anic text that 
portrays the mahr as a gift from the bridegroom to the bride.  Al-Hibri argues that 
women’s religious rights are denied because “many Muslim men, whether imams of 
mosques or professors of religion, are not sufficiently familiar with Islamic law.  
Often, they confuse their cultural beliefs and practices with Islam itself” (Al-Hibri 
2000). The multicultural provision that considers alternative marriage contracts under 
third party arbitration laws is seen in this instance as a positive policy that would 
protect Muslim women’s assets in the case of divorce; it is the way the policies’ 
implementation relies upon male immigrants’ interpretations of Islam that is deemed 
unacceptable.  
 The argument against essentializing the Muslim identity in particular is also 
employed by Muslim women who are worried that stereotypically associating gender 
violence with the Islamic faith is not only a misreading of their religion, but also a 
perspective that obscures the prevalence of gender violence in wider society.  For 
instance, when a Muslim man named Muzzammil Hassan, murdered his wife by 
decapitation in 2009 in Buffalo, New York, it was immediately dubbed the ‘Buffalo 
Beheading’ and an ‘honor killing’ by the news media.  Interestingly, a similar case 
from just a week prior to the Hassan case, that involved a male Chinese graduate 
student decapitating a female Chinese graduate student who did not return his 
affection, barely received any media coverage; the little coverage that the violent 
incident did receive did not once inquire whether the violence was related to the 
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perpetrator’s culture or religion.
21
 The Muslim American community immediately 
condemned the Hassan murder and numerous civic organizations issued press releases 
disavowing the notion that honor killings have anything at all to do with Islam.  
Instead, they argued that such violence stemmed from the domestic violence that is in 
fact an ongoing problem in the Muslim American community, as it is in the wider 
American community as well.   
 Nonetheless, news coverage continued to imply that the violent tragedy was 
inextricably linked with the defendant’s Islamic faith.  Even feminist leaders such as 
Marcia Pappas, the State President of the National Organization of Women’s New 
York chapter, called the incident “[an] ‘honor killing,’ a murder rooted in cultural 
notions about women's subordination to men.” She goes on to ask, “are we now so 
respectful of the Muslim's religion that we soft-peddle atrocities committed in its 
name?”
22
 Pappas’ reference to ‘overly’ respectful behavior is a clear allusion to 
multiculturalism’s commitment to respecting minority cultural norms.  A considerable 
list of Muslim and non-Muslim women’s rights leaders were distressed by Pappas’ 
erroneous claim that domestic violence is sanctioned by Islam and wrote an open letter 
responding to her statement.
23
  
 It should be noted that this case indeed fit all of the criteria that a cultural 
defense case would require just a decade ago: the defendant was from a minority 
community, the minority community was stereotypically assumed to use gender 
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violence to retain family honor, and the victim had allegedly enraged the defendant by 
filing for divorce.  In similar cases, defendants had received mitigated sentences for 
killing their wives out of an ‘induced rage.’ In one of the most-cited cultural defense 
cases in the United States, Dong-lu Chen, a Chinese immigrant in New York, killed 
his wife with a claw hammer in 1989 after discovering that she had been having an 
affair.  Based on dubious testimony from a white male anthropologist, the Brooklyn 
Supreme Court Justice ruled that Chen “was driven to violence by traditional Chinese 
values about adultery and loss of manhood” and that “Chen was the product of his 
culture. . . . The culture was never an excuse, but it is something that made him crack 
more easily.”
24
 Chen was ultimately found guilty, but of second-degree manslaughter, 
and only sentenced to five years probation.   
 Yet, in Hassan’s case, his culture seems to almost operate as a cultural offense, 
where his Muslim identity is used to indict him in a court of public opinion that 
automatically associates Islam with gender violence, rather than protect him through a 
defense. Anne Phillips (2007) argues that cases involving Muslims in both the US and 
Britain in their post 9/11 and 7/7 societies may be the product of such reverse cultural 
stereotyping.  Whereas just a decade ago, Hassan might have used the cultural defense 
to justify his homicidal blind rage, today’s political climate is quick to demonize the 
Islamic faith in the name of protecting the same minority women it would have 
severely neglected before the terrorist attacks.  
 The fact remains, however, that Muslim women are excluded from deciding 
how the Muslim identity will be defined, represented and, ultimately, treated in such 
multicultural systems.  They do not reject the multicultural political project itself—in 
fact, they appreciate multicultural provisions that allow them to retain religious 
                                                
24
 See Coleman (2001).  
  41 
practices that deviate from majority norms, but they resent what they see as a profound 
analytical lapse that occludes gender within the institutionalization of American 
multicultural policies.  Neither country’s Muslim women want the British or American 
state to endorse a Muslim identity that exclusively represents Muslim men’s interests.  
Accordingly, Muslim women attempt to reclaim their religion by wrestling the reigns 
of representation and interpretation away from male leaders in their communities. 
 
C. Generational Identity Politics 
 While multiculturalism arguably uses the minority male as a point of reference 
in its androcentric acknowledgment of cultural identities, it is also important to note 
that its primocentricism leads it to use the first generation male experience in 
particular.  As a result, the second generation children of Muslim immigrants in both 
countries feel marginalized by state politics that claim to respect diversity, yet only 
seem to recognize diversity comprised of first generation migrants to the host culture.  
The second generation is at an impossible crossroads in multicultural politics.  These 
individuals racially and ethnically resemble their parents’ diversity, yet they are born 
and raised in the host culture, which tempers conflicting socialization that their parents 
might have experienced abroad.  Moreover, they find that their parents’ Muslim 
identity is often conflated with their national-origin ethnicity under Western 
multicultural politics, whereas the second generation is engaged in a project to re-
imagine a new Muslim identity that is divorced from these ethnic adaptations—the 
British Muslim identity and the American Muslim identity, instead of the British 
Pakistani Muslim identity or the American Jordanian Muslim identity.  
 Until recently the political behavior of the children of immigrants has been 
undertheorized.  If immigration scholarship does address this generation, it is usually 
embedded in a discussion of assimilation. Classic assimilation theorists assume that 
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each subsequent generation moves further away from the ethnic enclave and moves a 
step closer to more complete assimilation (Warner and Srole 1945; Gans 1973; 
Sandberg 1973). The ‘straight-line assimilation model’ argued that ethnic groups were 
temporary classifications and would eventually dissolve over time as subsequent 
generations learned that upward social mobility relied upon assimilation to the 
mainstream society. 
 Gans himself rethought the classic straight-line model in the 1990s and 
suggested the new post WWII second generation might actually be in danger of faring 
worse than their immigrant parents. He suggested that assimilation associated with 
upward mobility might have only been realistically possible for white ethnics and the 
new immigrants’ children faced racism and discrimination.  Moreover, he argued that 
second generation children were not likely to accept work for immigrant wages and 
would be caught in “second generation decline.”  
 Around the same time, Alejandro Portes and Min Zhou (1992; 1993) 
introduced their “segmented assimilation” theory, arguing that second generation 
individuals could follow one of three paths: 1) consonant acculturation, 2) dissonant 
acculturation, and 3) selective acculturation. Consonant acculturation is a process of 
upward assimilation, where second generation immigrants acculturate into the 
dominant, mainstream path and succeed. Dissonant acculturation, in contrast, occurs 
when the second generation acculturates into the social and economic underclass and 
becomes trapped in its poverty. Finally, selective acculturation leads to economic 
upward mobility, and occurs when children partially assimilate into the mainstream 
(e.g. enough to do well in school), yet retrain certain aspects of their culture of origin. 
Segmented assimilation theory, in essence, compromised between the classic straight-
line model of assimilation and Gans’ remodeled version by arguing that the second 
generation individual’s journey down one of these three paths was influenced by a 
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combination of parental human capital, modes of incorporation, and family 
structure—neither second generation success nor decline were categorically inevitable.  
Downward assimilation, the model’s greatest worry, occurred when children 
assimilated too quickly into disadvantaged segments of American society, not when 
they failed to ‘assimilate enough’ as both prior models maintained.  
 Richard Alba and Victor Nee (2003) excavate assimilation’s roots from the 
Chicago School sociologists of the early twentieth century (Park and Burgess 1921) to 
(re)argue that assimilation does not necessarily mean Americanization or Anglo 
conformity; instead, while immigrants change their language and culture the more 
they come into contact with the mainstream society, they also contribute new cultural 
or religious elements to the mainstream culture, effectively re-shaping the ‘majority’ 
society’s constitution.   Anticipating critics who might argue that new (post 1965) 
immigrants are different from earlier immigrants who were considered white ethnics 
and more easily assimilated into the mainstream, Alba and Nee effectively 
demonstrate that new immigrant groups will likely assimilate because a) institutional 
changes in the post-Civil Rights era made it possible for new immigrants to be 
incorporated into society, and b) new immigrants will strategically assimilate into the 
mainstream if it is evident that it holds more economic opportunities than their ethnic 
enclaves, which it largely does for second generation individuals.  Alba and Nee 
optimistically conclude that the new immigrant second generation helps shape the 
American mainstream, just as the early European ethnic groups contributed to what we 
now consider American mainstream society. 
 A decade-long study of second generation immigrants in New York City builds 
upon this more optimistic analysis by concluding that there is little evidence of second 
generation decline.  This group of scholars compared new immigrant groups to native 
born youth comparison groups to argue that second generation decline was often 
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entangled with broader urban youth culture.  On the contrary, their research 
demonstrates that there might be a distinct ‘second generation advantage’: “its location 
between two different social systems allows for creative and selective combinations of 
the two that can be highly conducive to success” (Kasinitz, Mollenkopf, Waters and 
Holdaway 2009: 354).  They build upon Alba and Nee’s argument that the racial and 
ethnic makeup of American mainstream society has shifted in the last few decades, 
with more permeable boundaries between groups.  Second generation individuals are 
often also able to appeal to advancement programs, such as affirmative action, that are 
designed to help native born racial minorities.  
 My research expands upon the last three models’ suggestions that the second 
generation might in fact creatively combine elements of the mainstream culture with 
aspects of their parental ethnic heritage.  All three models, however, treat ethnic 
heritage as a static identity that the second generation simply derives from parental 
authority; yet, the rise is religiosity that I detect among my respondents is distinct from 
these models because the second generation in both countries often sees itself as 
distinct from the first generation—particularly in their different understandings of 
Islam.  In fact, often first generation parents plead with their children to assimilate into 
mainstream Britain and America to avoid the ongoing harassment that Muslims suffer 
in both countries after the 2001 and 2005 terrorist attacks (Haddad 2007).
25
 In other 
cases, mothers who immigrated to the West so they could be free from such rules 
imposed on women are often confused by their daughters choice to wear the hijab in 
the West.
26
  Second generation Muslims seem to distance themselves from their 
                                                
25
 For media coverage see: Harris, Sarah. May 29, 2010. “Young. British. Female. 
Muslim.” The Sunday Times. 
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/faith/article7135026.ece;   
26
 See Blake, John. August 12, 2009. “Muslim Women Uncover Myths About the 
Hijab” http://www.cnn.com/2009/US/08/12/generation.islam.hijab/index.html 
  45 
parents’ cultural expectations, distinguishing between their parents’ ‘cultural Islam,’ 
which they believe is tainted by the customs and traditions of their sending countries, 
and their own ‘purist Islam’ in the West.   
 The attachment that my respondents demonstrate to their religious identity 
resembles theories of third-generation resurgence. Marcus Lee Hansen first offered 
Hansen’s Law in 1938: “What the son wishes to forget, the grandson wishes to 
remember,” as a theory to explain why the third generation might be more willing than 
the second generation to take pride in its ethnic past.  Second generation individuals, 
he theorized, would be weighed down by insecurities of their foreign parentage and 
constantly wish to prove their Americanness; third generation individuals, however, 
would be secure in their Americanness and feel free to explore and record their 
heritage through the formation of associations (Hansen 1938).   Will Herberg 
popularized this theory in his work on religion in America, and argued that Hansen’s 
Law explained why there was a religious resurgence among third generation 
immigrants (Herberg 1954).  
 Herberg uses Hansen’s Law of third generation resurgence to explain why we 
observe a religious revival in the middle of the twentieth century in America. He 
argues that individuals who have lost their sense of location turn to their grandparents’ 
generation and selectively retrieve elements of their world—most notably religion—
because their parents’ adaptations do not appeal to them.  While Herberg refers to the 
three predominant religions in America at the time—Protestants, Catholics and Jews—
his theory informs my research on a new emerging religion on the American 
landscape—Islam.  Yet, while we have close to no research on a Muslim third 
generation in America and scarcely any research on the third generation in Britain, my 
research suggests that the second generation in both countries has hastened to forge 
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connections to its religious heritage that Hansen and Herberg assumed would not 
occur until the third generation.   
 This group of second generation immigrants engages in a re-imagined version 
of the Muslim faith in the West that innovatively combines elements of American and 
British mainstream culture with fresh interpretations of religious scriptures. As Alba 
and Nee (2003) would argue, they comprise a minority identity group that contributes 
new religious elements to the make-up of British or American society—distinct from 
the first generation’s contributions. Instead of turning to their parents’ interpretation of 
their ethnic heritage, second generation individuals forge a new Muslim identity 
themselves. For the purposes of the dissertation in particular, I focus on the subset of 
second generation Muslim women who re-imagine a specifically egalitarian version of 
Islam that is distinct from the first generation’s version of the faith.   
 
IV. SECOND GENERATION MUSLIM WOMEN RECLAIM ISLAM IN THE WEST 
  The examination of second generation Muslim women’s political behavior in 
both countries reveals striking similarities in the emergence of gender-justice activism.  
Specifically, activists run similar campaigns to fight the association between Islam and 
misogyny and do so in similar arenas of discourse. They find this false association in 
the public sphere, due to the media’s continuous misrepresentation of Muslim women 
as submissive and abused.  They also find a misogynist interpretation of Islam within 
the private sphere of their own Muslim communities, which they blame on the first 
generation’s conflation of Islam with the customs and traditions from its countries of 
origin. The campaigns share a common fundamental goal: to reimagine each country’s 
standing Muslim identity into an egalitarian British/American Muslim identity. 
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 While the gender-justice campaigns that respond to the false portrayal of Islam 
as a misogynist religion are not transnational in nature, I argue that British Muslim and 
American Muslim claims can be categorized along side one another in a typological 
theory according to: 1) the targets of their claims, and 2) the frames with which the 
claims are made. The first dimension describes the arenas of discourse in which 
Muslim women scholars and activists counter false impressions that link Islam with 
misogynist behavior.  While targets of claims are traditionally understood to be actors 
(such as the state or corporate interests) I argue that the different forms of rebuttal 
should be understood according to their target audience or arena of discourse—the 
public or private sphere.  As a result, I categorize rebuttals as public claims if they 
counter misrepresentation of Islam’s position on gender equality or private claims if 
they counter the misinterpretation of Islam’s position on gender equality that Muslims 
circulate within their own communities.   
 This typological theory illustrates that, on one hand, gender-justice activism in 
both countries makes claims on similar targets.  The frames with which these claims 
are made, on the other hand, vary between affirmative and transformative frames. This 
second dimension attempts to answer how activists have used these different frames to 
articulate their similar rebuttals in different ways. This dimension focuses on the way 
that gender-justice claims are framed and expands upon how framing has been treated 
thus far in the relevant literature (Benford and Snow 2000).  Instead of simply 
discriminating between the core framing tasks of diagnostic framing (identifying the 
problem) and prognostic framing (identifying a solution to the problem), I argue that 
such solutions should be further divided into the discursive process of making 
affirmative claims and transformative claims.  Affirmative claims attempt to remedy 
inequitable outcomes without changing the underlying structure, while transformative 
claims attempt to remedy inequitable outcomes precisely by changing the underlying 
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structure.  This distinction illustrates that framing claims should be understood as a 
constitutive process in proposing solutions to gender-justice problems. This within-
campaign frame variation will be discussed in detail in chapter four, but it should be 
noted that the typology illustrates the interesting observation that transformative 
frames seem to emerge exclusively in the US.  Chapter five will theorize why this 
variation occurs between the two countries and points to intervening structural 
conditions in the British state’s use of religious corporatism.  
 
A. Making Claims 
 According to scholars of contentious politics, claims (broadly speaking) can be 
broken down into three types: 1) identity claims, 2) standing claims and 3) program 
claims (Tilly and Tarrow 2007).
27
  However, instead of dividing claims according to 
their purpose, I suggest that the following two dimensions—targets and frames—offer 
more analytical traction, particularly in regards to how claims adapt to different arenas 
of discourse and how their frames might be constitutive of the kind of justice they 
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 Identity claims declare that an actor exists, or might even be constituted during a 
contentious episode.  These types of claims often set boundaries between one kind of 
identity and another, and also determine the relations inside and across these 
boundaries. Standing claims identify the rights to which the actor is entitled, based 
upon established group membership. And, finally, program claims lay out demands for 
the objects of claims to modify their behavior and act a certain way (Tilly and Tarrow 
2007).  












Figure 1.1: A Typology of Gender-justice Claims 
 
1) Dimension One: Targeting Claims 
 Despite their different purposes, all claims involve “at least one subject 
reaching visibly towards at least one object” (Tilly and Tarrow 2007: 5).  We know 
that the subjects of this study are gender-justice activists in both Britain and the US, 
but the different audiences they target determine the first variable with which to 
categorize their claims. I argue that claims-making analysis should consider targets 
outside of the ‘actor’ purview and might benefit from categorizing them into public vs. 
private spheres.  
 By dividing targets into these two categories, we learn more about the nature 
of the claims.  The claims made on a public audience, for example, communicate a 
certain Muslim identity to the media, broader society, and state all at once.  This 
observation indicates that the claims revolve around how Muslims are represented in 
the public sphere. Examples of misrepresentation include the media’s construction of 
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the British Muslim woman or American Muslim woman as a weak, submissive 
individual.   
 In contrast, claims made on private audiences are made within the Muslim 
community itself and usually focus on family law matters, such as domestic violence, 
marriage, divorce, custody, etc.  As opposed to public claims of representation to non-
Muslim audiences, private claims engage with rights of religious interpretation in the 
private sphere.  These claims challenge prevailing norms of Islamic interpretation and 
involve interpretive strategies such as hermeneutics to dispute textual references for 
misogynistic practices.   
 
2) Dimension Two: Framing Claims 
  Activists’ claims also vary in the extent to which they are framed within 
existing Islamic norms, or whether they attempt to question the established norms 
themselves. Benford and Snow (2000) explain that framing theory relates to social 
movements because activists  “negotiate a shared understanding of some problematic 
condition or situation they define as in need of change, make attributions regarding 
who or what is to blame, articulate an alternative set of arrangements, and urge others 
to act in concert to affect change” (Benford and Snow 2000: 615) They argue that 
collective action frames have two characteristic features—core framing tasks and 
interactive, discursive processes that generate these frames. Core framing tasks 
include diagnostic framing, which identifies the problem and assigns blame or 
responsibility, and prognostic framing, which articulates the solution to the problem.   
 The dimension that distinguishes between affirmative and transformative 
claims builds upon the interactive, discursive processes that Benford and Snow argue 
generate frames. To be precise, some activist claims are affirmative, in that they aim to 
“correct inequitable outcomes of social arrangements without disturbing the 
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underlying framework that generates them,” and other claims are transformative, in 
that they aim to “[correct] inequitable outcomes precisely by restructuring the 
underlying generative framework” (Fraser 1997: 11).  This dimension takes its cue 
from Nancy Fraser’s (1997) typology of justice struggles that differentiates between 
justice struggles that seek superficial fixes to inequitable outcomes and those that fight 
structural causes of inequality.  For instance, an affirmative claim would seek to give 
women equal access to mosques, while a transformative claim would seek for women 
to be imams, questioning the conventional system that bestows this authority 
exclusively on men.  This dimension exposes the possibility that frames can be 
constitutive of the actual solution posed to an example of gender-justice.  In other 
words, does the frame seek superficial remedy in equal outcomes between genders or 
the long-term restructuring of gender relations themselves?  
 
B. The Typology of Claims 
 These two dimensions generate a deductive typological theory of claims that 
organizes second generation gender-justice activism in both countries into four distinct 
categories. Typological theory specifies generalized pathways, characterized by the 
variables that constitute each dimension in the typology (George and Bennett 2005).  
The conjunctions of these variables are called ‘types’ and distinct types fill each 
quadrant. As George and Bennett argue, the purpose of the typology is to identify 
these generalized pathways, “whether the path has occurred only once, a thousand 
times, or is merely hypothesized as a potential path that has not yet occurred” (George 
and Bennett 2005: 236). The typology should thus be understood less as a descriptive 
organizational diagram and more as an analytical schema proposing what sort of 
activism might emerge given certain targets and framing of claims [See Figure 1].  
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 In the first quadrant, type 1 claims are called representative affirmations, 
meaning that these claims will be made on public targets such as the media and 
broader society.  The injustices that generate campaigns of this sort usually have to do 
with public prejudice, in the form of dress code discrimination against women wearing 
hijab, or misrepresentation by the media that portrays Muslim women as submissive, 
veiled individuals who are fundamentally oppressed by Islam.  The affirmations 
denote claims that try to remedy inequitable representation of Islam’s gender positions 
by simply offering alternative representation of Muslim women who do not conform 
to that stereotype. Type 1 claims are usually alternative media campaigns that try to 
‘normalize’ the construction of the Muslim woman in the West. These campaigns 
often use mainstream media as a point of reference, without challenging its underlying 
assumptions, and fight for media standing to add a ‘Muslim woman’s voice’ to 
existing debates.  Chapter 2 will describe representative affirmations in detail.  
 Type 2 claims, in the second quadrant, are called reinterpretive affirmations.  
These claims are made within the Muslim community itself in both countries. Instead 
of public issues of recognition and representation, these claims counter conventional 
interpretations of Islam that associate the religion with misogynistic practices.  The 
activists turn to hermeneutic scholarship that advocates alternative translations of the 
Qur’an, Sunnah and hadith to argue that Islam sought to liberate women from pre-
Islamic misogynistic practices from the time of its founding in the seventh century.  
The reinterpretation of Islam counters that, somewhere along the way, cultural 
practices became conflated with Islamic practices and only a purist interpretation of 
the faith will once again recognize the religion’s egalitarian agenda.  Reinterpretive 
affirmations translate certain vocabulary or examine thematic passages in the Qur’an 
in an egalitarian manner, particularly the holy book’s emphasis on respectful 
interactions between genders, without questioning the underlying framework of how 
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gender relations are constructed.  Chapter 3 will discuss reinterpretive affirmations in 
detail.  
 Type 3 and type 4 claims are both framed transformatively, meaning that they 
both challenge an existing power structure while trying to remedy gender inequalities.  
Representative transformations, for instance, includes claims for female leadership in 
organizations, such as Muslim student organizations or adult civic organizations. 
Whereas existing norms in most Muslim communities in the West would argue that 
Islam only allows men to be leaders, activists making representative transformations 
argue that Muslim women should lead as well. Reinterpretive transformations also 
challenge prevailing interpretations of leadership in mosques and interpret the texts in 
such a way to support the idea that the Prophet himself encouraged women to be 
spiritual leaders.  
 Interestingly, while representative and reinterpretive affirmations emerge in 
both Britain and the US, representative and reinterpretive transformations only seem 
to emerge in the US. But why would activists who display so many similarities 
diverge when it comes to framing their claims? Framing claims is commonly 
understood as a strategic component of any campaign for two primary reasons: 1) to 
garner mass support and 2) to target certain objects.  First, it is possible that 
transformative framing alienates individuals from supporting a particular gender-
justice struggle, while affirmative framing makes the campaign seem less threatening 
and more appealing to a wide variety of people.  Second, it is also possible that both 
public and private objects of claims might construct obstacles to transformative 
framing, by entrenching conservative interpretations of Islam; in response campaigns 
must first try affirmative framing to expand the dissenting community.  Chapter four 
discusses why transformative framing seems to only emerge in the US, and points to 
the intervening variable of each state’s relationship with religion as an explanation.  
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Specifically, the chapter interrogates the British system of religious corporatism to see 
if these brokered power relationships between the state and first generation Muslim 
male leaders inhibit the development of representative and reinterpretive 
transformations among British Muslim gender-justice activists.  
 
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 W.E.B. Du Bois was correct to say that the problem of the twentieth century 
would be the color line.  By the time of his death, however, the racial make up of 
Western societies was already changing quickly with increasing immigration.  Had he 
lived longer, he might have added to his voluminous writings on race an even more 
extensive analysis of the intersectionality of nationality, citizenship and race.   
 The Muslim identity is at the center of multicultural debates in the West about 
reconciling diverse populations and group interests with a commitment to liberal rights 
and individualism.  Unfortunately, all too often the standing Muslim identity used in 
the multicultural project conflates misogynistic behavior with central religious 
teachings and the faith is portrayed as one that is fundamentally injurious to women.  
While Western mainstream feminists’ intentions may be in the right place (to protect 
interests of women they fear might not be able to speak up against oppression in their 
own communities), a new generation of Muslim women is voicing dissent in both 
Britain and the US.  Muslim women activists do not, as mainstream feminists insist, 
wish to exit their communities for their own safety— rather they strive to reclaim their 
faith from misrepresentation and misinterpretation, and engage in a project to 
reimagine its egalitarian roots.  They fight for the agency to construct their own 
Muslim political identity. 
 These young women argue that the state’s commitment to multiculturalism 
will counterproductively harm minority women if it continues to employ androcentric, 
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primocentric versions of the Muslim identity.  Accordingly, activists make claims in 
the public and private spheres that wrestle Islam away from these biases.  They refute 
the idea that multiculturalism must incorporate what they consider to be a fraudulent 
Muslim political identity and run similar campaigns in both countries making these 
claims.  This surprisingly similar political behavior is the focus of this dissertation and 
these campaigns will be described in detail in the following two chapters.  It is 
important to note, however, that these claims are often framed in different ways.  This 
should highlight the diversity that exists within women’s movements and activism and 
lead us to question why certain frames and tactics may be more practical for some and 
not others.  The last two chapters take on this challenge and try to determine what 
gives rise to such diversity in activism.  Regardless of the targets or frames that 
activists use to make their gender-justice claims, however, it is the main argument of 
this dissertation that second generation Muslim women are rising up in both Britain 
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CHAPTER 2 
REPRESENTATIVE ACTIVISM: HOW WOMEN COUNTER THE MEDIA’S 
MISREPRESENTATION OF THE MUSLIM WOMAN 
 
 If, as William Gamson argues, the purpose of the media in a democracy is to 
“provide readers with information about social forces that affect their lives” in order to 
cultivate a sense of active citizenship and political participation in society members 
(Gamson 1992: 373), then the public representation of minority groups is not only 
important for how majorities see minorities, but it also affects the political behavior of 
minority members themselves. Theorists of ‘media standing’ would even argue that it 
affects how much power Muslims exert in society.  The Muslim minority group has 
become the central focus of debates over media representation in the West—from 
headscarf bans to editorial cartoons, media standing reflects whether they are seen as 
objects or subjects in their own representation.  Media standing is a term borrowed 
from legal discourse, meant to designate the media as “contested terrain” (Ferree, 
Gamson, Gerhards, and Rucht 2002). This chapter demonstrates that, in both Britain 
and the US, a group of activists has emerged among second generation Muslim 
women who disagree with the mainstream media’s objectification of Muslim women; 
despite the differences between each country’s Muslim population, particularly in 
terms of socio-economic stratification and ethnic make up, each country’s mainstream 
media constructs an image of the Muslim woman that is submissive and oppressed. I 
argue that these activists battle for media standing through the creation of alternative 
media outlets that depict Muslim women as subjects in order to reclaim how Islam is 
portrayed the Western media.  
 This chapter explores the activism of second generation Muslim women that 
counters what they believe to be a negative representation of the ‘Muslim woman’ in 
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the mainstream media.  This activism creates alternative media outlets that construct a 
more positive image of the Muslim woman as one who is strong, independent and, 
voluntarily identifies with her faith.  Just as Ferree et al. (2002) operationalized media 
standing as the simple ‘appearance’ of a speaker in the media, I conceptualize the 
standing in question as any mention of Muslim women in the mainstream media; 
given that Ferree et al. consider ‘no comment’ to represent the opportunity to make a 
substantive comment, I look at any media that merely involves Muslim women in the 
same logic.  My respondents argue that the ‘Muslim woman’ is most often reduced to 
a simple, veiled, oppressed individual—noting that veiling in particular is important 
because it is the easiest visual marker used to identify Muslims in the West.  Veiling 
has always been a flashpoint in Western debates. Indeed, from colonial to 
contemporary debates, critics of veiling question whether Western values can allow a 
practice that allegedly forces women to cover themselves in public.  The debate over 
veiling is not new to my respondents, but it does exhaust them. They say whenever 
veiling is the center of a debate, Muslim women will more likely than not be portrayed 
as weak and oppressed.  In response, they must battle for media standing and create 
alternative representations of veiled women that show they constitute a diverse group. 
 In section one, I offer a brief overview of how the veil has historically become 
a point of conflict in relationships between colonizers and their colonized subjects.  I 
argue that these debates persisted after colonial relationships ended and have now 
been reincarnated as debates in Western multicultural liberal democracies that are, at 
present, trying to negotiate whether immigrant Muslim minority women ought to be 
able to wear the veil.  These ongoing debates about civil liberties denote the 
importance of how veiled women are represented in the media—veiling’s critics rely 
on its (negative) association with oppression or terrorism to argue that the practice 
challenges Western notions of egalitariansim, while its proponents rely upon its 
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(positive) association with religious commitment and diverse women to argue that the 
practice symbolizes voluntary modesty.  In section two, I investigate with the 
contemporary representation of the veiled Muslim woman in the media against the 
backdrop of Islamophobia in the West and use a combination of media framing theory 
and original content analysis to demonstrate that it is a predominantly negative 
representation. Next, in section three, I examine how this negative representation has 
given rise to a wave of reactive Muslim women’s media activism that battles for 
media standing by creating alternative media outlets that allow them to  transform 
these frames into a more positive image of the Muslim woman. Lastly, I end this 
chapter with a discussion of other media outlets that are emerging in the form of 
literary and artistic activism in both countries.    
 
I. VEILING THE MUSLIM WOMAN 
 Though there are many variations of Muslim women’s modest dress that 
covers their hair and/or bodies, including the hijab, headscarf, niqab, burqa, and veil, I 
refer to all forms as veiling in this chapter for the sake of simplicity. The mandate for 
veiling in the Qur’an is most commonly traced to the following passage discussing 
modesty:  
And say to the believing women that they should lower 
their gaze and guard their modesty; that they should not 
display their zeenah (charms, or beauty and ornaments) 
except what (must ordinarily) appear thereof; that they 
should draw their khimar (veils) over their bosoms and 
not display their zeenah except to their husbands, their 
fathers .... and that they should not strike their feet so as 
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Another verse telling the wives and daughters of the Prophet to cover in public to 
distinguish themselves from others is also cited,
29
 but the verse above is believed to 
address women in general.  Activists explain that the variation of veiling they choose, 
or their choice not to veil at all, relies upon their interpretation of ‘modesty’ at the 
beginning of the verse.  
   Activists in both countries express the frustration they feel at the “Western 
obsession” with veiling and say they are exhausted by researchers’ attempts to 
decipher why Muslim women choose to veil.  While many researchers continue to ask 
such questions, perhaps assuming that individual-level decisions are indicative of a 
larger political statement, my research is more interested in the signaling capacity of 
veiling—that is, how does such a visible marker of the Muslim faith affect the 
construction of the Muslim identity in the West? How do historical and contemporary 
debates about gender and Islam—that often draw on the veil as a core example—shape 
how the ‘Muslim woman’ is represented in the media? And how do activists 




                                                
28
 Verse 24:31-32, as translated by Yusuf Ali or Muhammad Asad and cited by The 
Muslim Women’s League, December 1997: 
http://www.mwlusa.org/topics/dress/hijab.html.  
29
 In particular, verse 33:58: “Those who harass believing men and believing women 
undeservedly, bear (on themselves) a calumny and a grievous sin. O Prophet! Enjoin 
your wives, your daughters, and the wives of true believers that they should cast their 
outer garments over their persons (when abroad) That is most convenient, that they 
may be distinguished and not be harassed.”  
  60 
A. Historical Debates  
 Veiling is one of many historical examples that students of colonialism 
encounter when they study the justification offered for imperial behavior.  Just as 
British colonizers claimed to save South Asian women from sati and child marriage, 
history is full of cases from Egypt to Algeria, where not only colonizers argued that 
they were liberating women from backwards practices, but they were also joined by 
‘colonial feminists’ arguing the same (Lazreg 1994; Ahmed 1992; Spivak 1988).  
Veiling, in particular, was argued by colonials to be an oppressive practice in Muslim 
societies that violated women’s rights and represented Islam’s fundamentally 
regressive position on gender equality (Ahmed 1992; Abu-Lughod 2002).   
 In reality however, veiling was a pre-Islamic practice adopted in non-Arab 
Middle Eastern and Mediterranean societies and originally marked the seclusion of 
elite women (MacDonald 2006; Ahmed 1992; Hoodfar 1993).  Scholars argue that 
Muslims only began justifying the practice of veiling in the name of Islam in the 
nineteenth century, after colonials promoted the veil as a symbol of primitive behavior 
in Muslim societies (Hoodfar 1992; Esposito 1988).  In addition to colonizers who 
wanted to degrade colonial subjects by claiming that their traditions demeaned 
women, colonial feminists engaged in a project to ‘save Muslim women’ that scholars 
argue hypocritically ignored the problems that colonial feminists faced themselves.  In 
spite of the restrictive education, employment and even dresscodes (e.g. corsets) that 
plagued Western women at home, they pursued a double standard of liberating 
Muslim women from Muslim men (Hoodfar 1992; Mabro 1991).  
 In collusion with colonizers, upper-class subjects often advocated de-veiling as 
a step towards modernization (Haddad 2007). Nationalists responded by taking up 
veiling as their cause, arguing that it was part of the Islamic tradition and their fellow 
countrymen/women needed to resist colonial and elite efforts to stop the practice.  
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Veiled women effectively became the symbol for colonial resistance and symbolically 
represented cultural preservation. The voices of Muslim women themselves were lost 
in this battle between colonizers and nationalists, in a way that forecast their 
contemporary marginalized position between multiculturalism and its feminist critics 
in the West.  
 Traces of these colonial relationships continue to appear in more contemporary 
interactions between Western and Eastern women’s rights activists.  Homa Hoodfar 
(1992) describes Western feminist, Kate Millet, and her trip to Iran after its 
announcement in the 1980s that veiling would be made compulsory.  She compares 
Millet’s trip to the colonial relationship between Western colonizers and feminists 
who arrived in colonies and lectured on women’s rights; colonizers did so to convince 
the colonies that they were ‘backwards’ and needed to adapt to modernity, and 
feminists lectured “as though [their] political ideas, life expectations and experiences 
were universally applicable” (Hoodfar 1992: 2). Likewise, she says Millet’s disinterest 
in acknowledging Iranian women’s rights movements resembles the indifference of 
colonial feminists to women’s rights struggles that already existed among colonized 
subjects.  
 Other contemporary Western feminists have also been criticized for allegedly 
replicating this antagonistic relationship by traveling outside of the West and trying to 
impose their ideas of gender equality without concern for local culture.
30
  However, 
now the relationship between Westerners who see the veil as an instrument used to 
oppress, and those who defend the practice has shifted to West itself.  With increased 
migration from Muslim majority countries to Western countries in Europe and North 
America, now Western critics of the veil have the unique opportunity to make their 
                                                
30
 For instance, see Eve Ensler’s monologue about the burqa in Afghanistan, entitled 
“Under the Burqa” in The Vagina Monologues. 
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arguments on their own soil. In some countries, such as France and Germany, Western 
feminists are more outspoken and openly advocate for legislation prohibiting the veil 
in public places.  In other countries, such as Britain and the US, the media plays more 
of a primary role in constructing how the public understands the veil.   
 
B. Contemporary Debates 
 Contemporary debates in Western countries revolve around the question of 
whether the immigrant Muslim minority should be allowed to retain veiling practices 
that they, presumably, would have practiced in their sending countries.  This debate 
centers around migration and the idea that once an adult is socialized for the large part 
of his or her life in one culture, it would be unnecessarily cruel or unfairly demanding 
to ask him or her to abandon familiar practices in order to settle in what is meant to be 
a new, multicultural, tolerant Western country.  Veiling’s opponents argue that the 
practice serves as a visible marker of difference and the immigrant’s unwillingness to 
assimilate to the host culture; a feminist subgroup of this camp argues that the practice 
oppresses women and prevents them from fully participating in society.
31
  
 Veiling’s advocates are usually considered to be vocal spokesmen from the 
minority Muslim community, often arguing a civil rights angle that says the Muslim 
minority should not be discriminated against for their religious practice—particularly 
in the West, with its historical narratives of both religious persecution and tolerance.
32
  
                                                
31
 See media coverage of a debate between second-wave feminist Phyllis Chesler (in 
opposition to the veil) and third-wave feminist Naomi Wolf (in defense of the veil): 
http://www.salon.com/life/broadsheet/feature/2009/09/05/veil_debate.  
32
 See a report by the Fawcett Society: “The veil, feminism and Muslim women: a 
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However, a new group has emerged in Western countries that negotiates whether to 
allow immigrants to retain these traditions that seemingly conflict with mainstream 
norms: daughters of Muslim immigrants, who are increasingly donning the veil for a 
variety of reasons (Haddad 2007).  Putting their reasons aside for a moment, the fact 
remains that this generation of women challenges the contemporary debates over 
veiling in the West.  While the debate assumes that the conflict resides in first 
generation immigrants being torn between the traditions they purportedly left in their 
sending countries and new Western norms, second generation women are Western.  
They were born and raised in the West, have Western citizenship, and feel more at 
home in their Western countries than the sending countries from which their parents 
migrated.  Often their mothers choose to take off the veil after leaving countries where 
they did not have the option, yet the daughters, under no similar pressure, choose to 
put on the veil.
33
 How do contemporary discussions about veiling in the West take the 
second generation’s needs into consideration?  
 In the sections below, I first engage with the contemporary debate over veiling 
in France, to demonstrate an instance where Western feminists advocate legislation 
that would prohibit veiling in public.  Then I move on to explain how the debate 
operates in countries that have made no national move to ban veiling, such as Britain 
and the US.  In these two countries, the debate questions where and when the practice 
of veiling is appropriate, usually through localizing decisions and leaving the matter to 
local jurisdiction.  This public discourse is shaped by the media’s representation of 
Muslim women, which will be discussed in detail in the second section. 




 See the media coverage of a diverse group of Muslim women who explain their 
different reasons for choosing to wear the veil: 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/this-britain/the-many-faces-behind-the-veil-
1865772.html.  
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1) France 
 In 2004, France passed legislation that prohibited the wearing or display of 
overtly religious symbols in public schools.
34
 While the restrictions technically 
included large Christian crosses and Jewish yarmulkes, critics argued that the ban’s 
true intentions were to single out Muslim women for the use of headscarves, dubbing 
it the ‘headscarf ban.’
35
 In spite of second generation Muslim women’s complaints 
that they were being forced to take off their veils, rather than being forced to wear 
them by relatives, French feminists supported the ban.  Elisabeth Badinter, for 
example, argued “Soon feminists in the rest of Europe will realize the headscarf is a 
terrible symbol of submission. You cannot denounce what has been going on in 
Afghanistan while tolerating the veil in Europe - even if women claim they are 
wearing it voluntarily.”
36
 Badinter and other feminists argued that the French system 
of secularism, called laïcité, was born out of a battle against religious imperialism, 
indicating that it was important to separate the laws of man from the laws of God. 
Second generation women who argue that such neutrality is meant for teachers to 
exhibit in a position of authority in school, and not for their students among one 
another, are met with arguments about the oppressive message of the headscarf and 
disbelief that anyone would choose to wear it voluntarily.
37
 
 In 2010, the lower house of the French parliament decided to expand the ban 
on religious symbols in public schools to the broader public sphere. In July, an 
overwhelming 336 members voted in favor of a ban on the burqa (face veil) while 
only one member opposed on grounds that the ban represented nothing more than the 
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 See http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/europe/07/13/france.burqa.ban/index.html 
35
 see http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3478895.stm 
36
 See http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/feb/01/france.schoolsworldwide 
37
 Ibid. 
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fear of the Other that would eventually lead to totalitarianism.  A number of the 
remaining 557 members were Socialist Party members who wanted the ban limited to 
public buildings only; instead of restricting the bill, however, these members abstained 
from voting after coming under pressure from French feminists.
38
  Once again, 
feminists made arguments about the oppressive nature of the burqa and cited public 
opinion that stated nearly 80% of the French public was in favor of such a ban.
39
   
 This time around Muslim critics who opposed the ban were joined by some 
Western American feminists who argued that such restrictions were unconscionable in 
democracies allegedly committed to equal liberty.  Martha Nussbaum, for example, 
writes that all five major reasons given in support of the ban (1-security, 2-
communication, 3-sexual objectification, 4-coercion, 5-comfort and hygiene) apply 
their logic inconsistently to non-Muslim behavior, effectively discriminating against 
Muslim women.  For instance, she argues: “Many beloved and trusted professionals 
cover their faces all year round: surgeons, dentists, (American) football players, skiers 
and skaters. What inspires fear and mistrust in Europe, clearly, is not covering per se, 
but Muslim covering.”
40
 Still, the head of the French women’s rights group, Ni Putes 
Ni Soumises, Sihem Habchi, argued in favor of the bill because the full veil is the 
“banner of sectarian ideology” and threatens “human dignity.”
41
   
 
 




 See Pew Research Center Report, “Widespread Support For Banning Full Islamic 
Veil in Western Europe” July 8, 2010. http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1658/widespread-
support-for-banning-full-islamic-veil-western-europe-not-in-america 
40
 See Nussbaum’s editorial in The New York Times in opposition to France’s ban on 
the burqa, July 11, 2010: http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/07/11/veiled-
threats/.  
41
 Habchi’s remarks in an essay in Liberation, as cited in 
http://www.csmonitor.com/From-the-news-wires/2010/0713/Burqa-ban-approved-by-
French-lower-house-of-parliament.  
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2) Britain and the US 
 In contrast to the high-profile opposition to veiling demonstrated by French 
feminists, feminists in both Britain and the US have either refrained from comment or 
argued that a ban would violate the rights of Muslim women who choose to veil.  In 
both countries’ cases, it is likely that the combination of stronger anti-racist narratives 
than those that exist in France, and the development of third-wave feminism 
highlighting minority women’s concerns, leads to greater consideration for Muslim 
women’s interests.  When the veil is questioned in either country, it is usually over 
isolated incidents such as young girls wearing the veil while playing soccer or a veiled 
woman being asked to uncover herself before entering a bank.
42
  Neither country has 
made a national move to ban the veil, and even those politicians who have spoken out 
against it have done so without party or government backing.  
 Britain’s debate peaked around one such controversy started by Member of 
Parliament (MP) Jack Straw in 2006, when he asked his Muslim women constituents 
to remove their full-face veil before visiting him in his constituent surgery.
43
  Straw’s 
comments caused an uproar among both liberal multiculturalists and British Muslims, 
who argued that his comments were racist and went against the multicultural ethos.
44
 
As recently as July 2010, another MP, Phillips Hollobone, declared that he refuses to 
hold meetings with Muslim women wearing full Islamic dress, unless they lift their 
                                                
42
 See media coverage of these isolated incidents: 
http://www.reuters.com/article/pressRelease/idUS201321+02-Feb-
2009+PRN20090202; http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3585377.stm.  
43
 For Jack Straw’s comments that sparked the debate, see: 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2006/oct/06/politics.uk. For coverage of the 
row that followed, see: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_politics/5410472.stm. 
44
 See media coverage blaming an increase of racist attacks against Muslims on 
Straw’s comments: 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2006/oct/06/jackstrawmissesthepoint.  
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face veil.
45
 Hollobone argues that the majority of human communication is done 
through the sight of one another’s faces and believes that representatives and 
constituents should be able to trust one another enough to show their faces.  In both 
Straw and Hollobone’s cases, however, the MPs lacked government backing for a 
policy that would require women to lift their veils, leaving the matter to one of local 
constituency preferences.  Activists among the Muslim population, however, took 
Straw’s statements as evidence that they need to defend their right to wear the veil 
because it might be under threat. 
 Rajnaara Akhtar, for example, started a British organization called The 
Assembly for the Protection of Hijab in 2003, while France was still discussing the 
ban that would eventually pass in 2004.  While Akhtar does not believe that a ban 
would ever succeed in Britain, she believes it was important to demonstrate to 
governments around the world that there were Muslim women in the West who 
considered it an important civil liberty to be able to express their faith through 
covering themselves.  She argues:  
But the reason we were concerned was first because 
France was moving towards effectively banning the 
hijab in educational institutions. There were other 
European countries that had already covertly taken such 
steps as well and we just thought that for us as Muslim 
women who freely wear the hijab and really believe that 
it’s our human right in terms of religious freedom to do 
it, we really did feel that we had to start speaking out 
against it. There were lots of stereotypes where the hijab 
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is concerned, where Muslim women are concerned 
really, but especially with the hijab. For me personally I 
got involved because part of the problem was that we as 
muslim women weren’t willing to speak out about it, we 
weren’t willing to go out there and say, hey this is my 
decision, I want to do it. Instead, the stereotypes of 
muslim women as being oppressed were being 
perpetuated because muslim men were actually speaking 
out about it, on our behalf. Because that actually almost 
confirms the stereotype that it’s the men who are making 
you do this.   
Akhtar does not sense the same danger to British Muslim women’s civil liberties that 
she senses happened in France, but she believes it is important to preemptively 
organize for women’s rights in case such restrictions are ever proposed in Britain as 
well.  
 The British debate over the veil has otherwise been restricted to individual 
cases where women are told to remove their veil for professional reasons.  One case 
that gained national attention in 2006 involved a teacher in northern England who 
refused to take off her face veil when teaching her eleven year-old pupils.
46
 The school 
chose to suspend her after the British High Court upheld the position that teachers and 
pupils need to be able to see each other’s faces to communicate properly, allowing 
schools to ban face veils in their uniform codes.
47
  While most activists I interviewed 
argued that the French ban on wearing the veil in public egregiously violated Muslim 
                                                
46
 See http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6068408.stm. 
47
 See http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/education/6466221.stm. 
  69 
women’s civil liberties, they appeared to believe that professional considerations were 
important in deciding where it is appropriate to wear the veil.   
 For example, one British Muslim activist, age 24, who works as teacher herself 
at an Islamic school, argues that the teacher in question should not have been wearing 
a full face-veil in front of such young children:  
Firstly, I think she was quite stupid because she was told 
not to take it off in front of other peers… interaction is a 
MUST in a primary school, if you’re in a female only 
environment, which you are in a primary school most of 
the time, you take it off-you don’t have to wear it. 
Secondly, when there’s that high level of interaction 
needed, you can’t wear a veil. If I saw someone, 
personally, in a school wearing a veil, I’d go mad and 
tell her to take it off. If my child was in that school, and 
her teacher was wearing the veil, I would pull her out 
because it would be unacceptable to me. The whole 
purpose of wearing the veil is modesty, and in a teaching 
environment, you don’t need to sit there and look at 
someone like that…. as far as I was concerned, it was a 
publicity stunt. 
She suggests that the case was more about publicity, either on the side of male Muslim 
leaders who wanted to ‘win symbolic victories’ for the community, or on the side of 
the state, who wanted to keep minorities in line. When asked to elaborate, she demurs, 
which seems to insinuate that she is less certain of evidence but confidently cynical of 
the case’s merit.  Yet though she does not believe the teacher in question was correct 
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in veiling in school, she does believe the practice of veiling needs to be protected in 
general:  
I was wearing the veil at that time…I did go on national 
television, I did promote it, saying that there was 
nothing wrong with it—I got in a brow, in fact, on 
morning television once where a woman was telling me 
‘look, you don’t have to wear this’ and I said ‘but it’s 
my choice! You don’t have the right to tell me you 
can’t’… [though] there are certain circumstances where 
I don’t think you should wear it, like around children. 
The activist could be correct in suggesting that the northern England case was not 
supported by the broad Muslim women’s community.  After the court ruled in 2007 
that it was up to the school’s discretion to dictate dress code, within reasonable 
standards—effectively striking down the minority multicultural claim that Muslim 
male leaders were hoping to win—there was little reaction among Muslim women 
activists.  
 The debate over veiling in the US also manifests itself in legal battles that 
challenge a Muslim woman’s right to cover her face: a hijabi woman in southern 
California was told for security reasons that she could not enter her federal credit 
union while wearing her headscarf;
48
 in Oklahoma, a young hijabi girl was suspended 
from her public school because she refused to remove her headscarf;
49
 and in 
Philadelphia, a hijabi police officer was told she must remove her headscarf while on 
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duty.
50
  In the case of the federal credit union, civil rights groups demanded that the 
Department of Justice conduct an investigation of religious discrimination and the 
credit union apologized to the woman, claiming that they were trying to work through 
a new policy prohibiting headgear and would allow headscarves in the future.  The US 
Justice Department actually filed a complaint on behalf of the young girl in Oklahoma, 
citing the equal protection clause of the US Constitution and claiming that the young 
girl had been a victim of religious discrimination; the school eventually allowed her 
back in school, wearing her headscarf.  
 In the case of the Philadelphia police officer, however, a federal appeals court 
upheld the Philadelphia Police Department’s policy that prohibited Muslims from 
wearing headscarves on the job and ruled that accommodating the officer would 
severely damage the department’s appearance of religious neutrality.  Oddly, though it 
was ultimately reviewed by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, the case received little 
to no media coverage and was most frequently discussed on law blogs online.
51
  In 
spite of this development, when asked about the right to wear hijab in the US, my 
respondents largely believe that this right is secure in the US.   
 And besides these isolated incidents, veiling rights for Muslim women in both 
Britain and the US do seem secure at the moment, with activists like Akhtar emerging 
to pre-empt restrictive legislation rather than react to it.  However, while respondents 
did not express concern that either state would restrict their rights to wear the veil, 
many women mentioned the role the media plays in exacerbating misrepresentations 
of veiled women.  I argue that we should understand second generation Muslim 






 See blog coverage on the law-related blog Findlaw: 
http://blogs.findlaw.com/law_and_life/2009/04/muslim-police-officer-kimberlie-
webb-loses-discrimination-claims-based-on-headscarf-ban-workplace-dr.html.  
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women’s media involvement as another form of activism to reform not only how 
veiling is understood in the West, but also how gender in Islam is broadly framed.  As 
will be explained below, activists generate their own representations of veiling in the 
media because they see the media as a crucial social institution that helps construct the 
second generation Muslim identity in the West. 
 For the most part, contemporary debates address second generation women as 
victims of male and even female relatives who force them to veil against their wishes.  
Instead, activists argue, many second generation women voluntarily cover themselves 
for a variety of reasons. Williams and Vashi (2007) argue that some women use the 
veil to buy themselves more mobility outside of the home, if their parents are worried 
that they might otherwise fall prey to Western corruptive values; others use it to 
distance themselves from their Westernized, assimilative parents who failed to pass on 
an ‘authentic Muslim identity’ (282-284).  They argue that feminist anti-veil criticism 
does not take the second generation’s strategy of negotiating freedom from parental 
authority into serious enough consideration. To the second generation, the veil is more 
than a marker of cultural preservation or an instrument of oppression—in contrast, it 
can take on the symbolic value of liberation.  Activists believe that media 
representations that exclusively portray the veil in this oppressive light must be 
modified to include accounts of the liberating perspective as well. 
 
II. MEDIA REPRESENTATION AND ISLAMOPHOBIA 
 Scholars who study media representation argue that the media can construct 
images through the use of framing, but the process of making social meaning depends 
on how readers determine the meaning of the images (Gamson, Croteau, Hoynes and 
Sasson 1992).  While general framing theory involves activists “negotiat[ing] a shared 
understanding of some problematic condition or situation they define as in need of 
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change, mak[ing] attributions regarding who or what is to blame, articulat[ing] an 
alternative set of arrangements, and urg[ing] others to act in concert to affect change” 
(Benford and Snow 2000: 615), media framing refers to the media’s production of 
images that can help construct social realities (Gamson et al 1992, Gamson & 
Wolsfeld 1993, Ryan 1991, Scheufele 1999).  Media frames are crucial to the activism 
emerging among second generation women because they try to correct negative 
frames advanced by the mainstream media that depict Muslim women as weak or 
dangerous, but perpetually veiled, characters.  In correcting these negative frames, 
they turn to counterframing the Muslim woman in their own alternative media outlets. 
 Counterframing, also theorized by Benford and Snow, is the refutation of an 
opponent’s logic or, in the case of the media, the refutation of the media’s version of 
reality (Benford and Snow 2000).  They explain, “The important point is that opposing 
framing activity can affect a movement's framings, on the one hand, by putting 
movement activists on the defensive, at least temporarily, and, on the other hand, by 
frequently forcing it to develop and elaborate prognoses more clearly than otherwise 
might have been the case” (2000: 617).  Accordingly, the activists I interviewed 
articulated the first level of reacting to the misrepresentation, and then the second level 
of using that misrepresentation as motivation to develop their ideas further.  In the 
next section, I examine two transnational news websites, Muslimah Media Watch and 
Altmuslimah, that have emerged among young women in the Muslim diaspora. These 
sites serve as portals of this activism where women publish critical essays about 
misrepresentation in the media, and publicize their own alternative frames of the 
Muslim woman through literary and artistic activism.  
 Activists in both countries argue that the mainstream media employs the veil to 
construct an image of the Muslim woman that is perpetually weak, submissive and 
oppressed.  Scholars argue that media framing has a symbiotic relationship with 
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political context, and, in this case, such framing occurs within a context of 
Islamophobia in the West.  Gottschalk and Greenberg (2008) define Islamophobia as a 
largely unexamined, yet deeply ingrained “anxiety towards Islam and Muslim 
cultures…[that] relies on a sense of otherness” (5).  While they concentrate on 
Islamophobia in the United States’ media, particularly in political cartoons, Jonathan 
Birt (2009) explains that Islamophobia has played a large role in constructing the 
Muslim identity in Britain as well. He argues that Islamophobia conflates ethnically 
disparate communities as ‘all Muslim’ and this urges reactive identity construction on 
the part of Muslims to take control over how their identity is defined.   
 This anxiety towards Islam has appeared historically through public 
representations of Muslim women.  Up until roughly the twentieth century, literature 
and colonial travel writing painted Muslim women as the “personification of desire” 
and harems were used to make the association between unveiling and sexual fantasies 
(Haddad 2007; Macdonald 2006).  As the harem’s salience faded, contemporary 
representations of Muslim women continued to portray them as the submissive, 
secluded women the harem had housed through media constructions of the veil.   
 Scholars argue that Islamophobia has surged in the post 9/11 climate, as have 
negative representations of Muslim women and the practice of veiling (Greenberg and 
Gottschalk 2008; Cooke 2007; Haddad 2007; Macdonal 2006; Nayak 2006).  Miriam 
Cooke argues that Muslim women, in the aftermath of 9/11, have become the evident 
representatives of the Muslim Other because of the visibility of their veils.  She coins 
the term ‘Muslimwoman’ to draw attention to the “newly entwined religious and 
gendered identification that overlays national, ethnic, cultural, historical and even 
philosophical diversity” (Cooke 2007: 140) and contends that this label reduces all 
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diversity to a single image.
52
  Moreover, the Muslimwoman, she argues, is caught 
between Western and Muslim audiences who each want to infuse the veil with their 
own meaning: “Under Western eyes, an essential (usually negative) Islam is encoded 
by the oppressed Muslimwoman; in Muslim societies under threat from non-Muslims 
the Muslimwoman represents an equally essential (but this time positive) Islam” 
(Cooke 2007: 142).  She concludes that young Muslim women in the West are 
paradoxically attempting to deploy the Muslimwoman identification in order to 
change it. I refer to this strategy in detail in the next section, when I discuss how the 
activists I interviewed generate their own alternative public representations of the 
Muslim woman.  
 The intensification in Islamophobia after the 9/11 attacks in the US was also 
felt in Britain, as “the host society and the media were ascribing identities to 
[Muslims] that distances them from the host and connected them to a constructed 
notion of their faith group” (Afshar, Aitken and Franks 2005: 276-77).  The European 
Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia published a 2002 report on the 
prevalence of Islamophobia across the European Union in the aftermath of 9/11, 
recounting that the British media included “very basic Islamic stereotypes” and 
devoted an inordinate amount of coverage to “extremist Muslim groups” while “less 
sensationalist Muslim voices were mainly overlooked” (Allen and Nielsen 2002: 29).   
 Numerous British activists referred to a sense of Islamophobia that took hold 
of the British public after 9/11, and argued that it only intensified after the London 
bombings on July 7, 2005.  One student activist from London explained the 
harassment that spiked after the 2005 attacks: “Pretty much everyone I know had 
‘terrorist’ yelled at them at some point. Especially the girls though, because we’re 
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 Cooke (2007) follows both Sherman Jackson’s (2005) use of the term 
‘blackamerican’ that connects the concepts of race and citizenship, and Joan Martin’s 
(2000) use of ‘blackwoman’ that connects race and gender.  
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obviously walking targets a lot of the time. One of my friends wasn’t physically 
attacked, but verbally attacked by a man who was yelling at her ‘you should go back 
to your own country!’” A community organizer from Birmingham similarly explained 
the shift she felt in public hostility after the attacks: “When I first put the veil on, there 
wasn’t this so-called Islamophobic atmosphere. Before 9/11 and 7/7 and all that kind 
of thing, it was a different atmosphere to put the veil on. Whereas now, I feel if I 
walked in to do a presentation on forced-marriages, I [would have to] explain myself 
and say I don’t represent extremism.” For both of these activists, the veil operates as a 
visible marker that makes them vulnerable in an Islamophobic environment. 
 The post 9/11, post 7/7 hostility towards the veil reveals an important 
transition in how both British and American societies have constructed the image of 
the Muslim woman.  Whereas certain representations still concentrate on the 
oppression that the veil allegedly represents, there has been an increase in accounts 
that suggest veiled women may be security concerns.   Michelle Byng (2010) conducts 
critical discourse analysis of seventy-two stories from The New York Times and 
Washington Post that discuss veiling in the context of politics in Britain, the US and 
France.  She concludes that the newspaper stories suggest that all three nations share 
an ideological perspective that would limit veiling in public, because it is seen as the 
failure of Muslim minorities to integrate successfully into Western countries (Byng 
2010: 112).  
 Byng is particularly interested in the media’s role in shaping the public’s new 
understanding of veiling that revolves around security concerns (123).  Her analysis 
suggests that the media portrays American assimilation in a more voluntary way than 
the legislative methods of Britain and France, yet she argues that the desired end result 
is the same—that Muslim women should not veil because “the July 2005 bombings, in 
combination with [the] 11 September [bombings] … made the tethering of Muslim 
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identity to fear and threat easy” (120).  Her analysis corresponds to recent 2010 
polling data that reports a majority of the British (62%) and French (82%) public in 
favor of a ban on the burqa, while a majority of US (65%) disapproves of such a 
legislative public ban.
53
   
 More extensive polling data reveals, however, that the American reluctance to 
legislate veiling prohibition does not translate into widespread acceptance of veiling or 
the Muslim identity.  In 2006, the Pew Global Attitudes survey reported that 69% of 
non-Muslim Americans felt that Muslims were ‘not respectful of women.’ (Pew GAP 
2006: 31).  While another Pew Research Center report on Islamic Extremism and 
public opinion informs us that a majority of the US (57%) public has a favorable 
opinion of Islam, it also reports that 22% of Americans view Islam in an unfavorable 
manner, versus only 7% viewing Judaism unfavorably and 6% viewing Christianity 
unfavorably.  The same poll reports that, of those respondents who believe some 
religions are more prone to violence, an overwhelming majority (67%) believe Islam 
is more violent than Christianity (9%) or Judaism (4%).
54
 
 Scholars who study media and public opinion seem to agree that media frames 
can have a substantial effect on the audience’s public opinion and policy preferences, 
whether the media source is in print or on television (Ansolabehere, Behr, and Iyengar 
1993; Page, Shapiro and Dempsey 1987).   Moreover, public opinion is not typically 
based on direct and certain knowledge, but on a world that the media helps the reader 
imagine (Lippmann 1922: 10).  Activists in both Britain and the US lamented the 
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 See Pew Global Attitudes Project Spring 2010 Report: “Obama More Popular 




 See Pew Global Attitudes Project, 2005 Report: “Islamic Extremism: Common 
Concern for Muslim and Western Publics.” http://pewglobal.org/2005/07/14/islamic-
extremism-common-concern-for-muslim-and-western-publics/.  
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obstacles that the mainstream media places in their way by misrepresenting Muslim 
women:  
Every single time the media talks about muslim women, 
like, once in the metro, there was this picture of a 
muslim veiled woman, the media is obsessed with the 
veil—I always see images of women like this and it was 
just to show that elections in India were taking place, 
like women in India had just cast a vote and they have to 
show the veil? Why are they so obsessed with the veil?  
--Student activist, London, 21 
 
When they want to talk about a Muslim woman, what 
does it look like? Instead of using a picture of an 
uncovered woman, they’ll pick one with a hijab, even 
though Muslim women range. When the media 
interviewed me once, they put a picture of me and then 
put a picture of a woman with a headscarf right next to 
me. Why? the interview’s about me, right? --Leader, 
British Muslim women’s organization, Birmingham, 40 
 
I went to college shortly after 9/11 and it was the first 
time anyone was telling me that I’m not American… 
just in terms of the media and on the news, if you see 
these images and the way that people talk about 
Muslims.  --Student organizer, Northern Virginia, 25 
 
  79 
It is this public imagination that second generation Muslim women want to alter 
through media activism.  Whether the media represents the Muslim woman as a 
helpless or hazardous character, the activists I interviewed believed that both 
approaches infringe upon their ability to represent themselves.  They counter the 
media’s deployment of the veil as negative symbol by battling for standing and 
specifically portraying the veil in an alternative, positive light.  
 
A. The Construction of the ‘Muslim Woman’ in the Mainstream Media 
 In order to examine the counterframing exchange in this section, I use content 
analysis of mainstream media outlets to examine whether activists’ perceptions of the 
mainstream media’s negative tone towards veiling and Muslim women are indeed 
accurate.  Given that my respondents claim that the mainstream media constructs a 
negative image of the Muslim woman, particularly by depicting veiled woman as 
either oppressed or dangerous, I am interested in determining whether this negative 
bias may be objectively gauged or whether it might be activists’ perceived bias.   
1) Methodology 
 In order to investigate the positive or negative tone of mainstream media 
coverage of veiling, I use Yoshikoder software, a multi-lingual content analysis 
program that was developed as part of the Identity Project at Harvard University’s 
Weatherhead Center for International Affairs.
55
  This program analyzes the tone of 
textual data, by comparing given documents against a General Inquirer (GI) dictionary 
of the words coded as either ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ in the English language.  The 
program also allows the user to custom-code certain words that are particular to her 
research questions. 
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 This open-sourced software and description are available at: 
http://www.yoshikoder.org/.  
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 I created two original datasets, each of which is comprised of a randomly 
selected sample of 200 news stories from each country’s ‘newspaper of record,’ The 
Times (London) in Britain and The New York Times in the US, during a fifteen-year 
period between January 1, 1995 and July 22, 2010.
56
  The first data set is composed of 
articles that mentioned both ‘Islam’ and any form of Muslim women’s covering: hijab, 
headscarf, burqa, niqab, and veiling;
57
 for the purposes of simplicity, I continue to 
refer to all varieties of covering as ‘veiling.’ In order to make sure that the mention of 
veiling was not spurious with my dependent variable of negative tone, I also created a 
second data set made of articles that mentioned ‘Muslim woman’ or ‘Muslim 
women.’
58
  This dataset examines activists’ claims that the mainstream media 
constructs the image of the ‘Muslim woman’ in a negative manner.  I also customized 
the GI dictionary with a supplemental list of negative terms that materialized in 
interviews when activists described what they believed to constitute ‘negative words’ 
describing veiled Muslim women.  
2) Results 
 When I ran a dictionary report against my sample, the results demonstrate that 
there is a clear inclination towards using a negative tone to describe the practice of 
veiling.  See Figure 2.1. 
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 I chose these papers because they are considered the ‘papers of record’ in both 
countries. I also used a random number generator to select my samples.  
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 This conjunctive search was necessary to rule out thousands of bridal articles that 
mentioned the tradition of Muslim and non-Muslim veiling at weddings. The universe 
of cases for this fifteen-year period in The New York Times was 1083 articles, while 
The Times published 753. Though ‘Muslim’ might be an alternative term used to 
associate veiling with Muslim women in particular, I cross-checked this conjunctive 
search and found comparable results: 1224 articles in the US; 984 articles in Britain.  
58
 There was a total of 663 articles that mentioned the conjunctive phrases ‘Muslim 
woman’ or ‘Muslim women’ in The Times (London) and 746 in The New York Times. 







   
 Figure 2.1: Veiling (US) 
 
Because I am interested in the perception of tone taken as a whole over the past fifteen 
years, rather than particular fluctuations in intensity, the above figure should be 
interpreted as net negative tonal results. It quickly becomes evident that the media 
coverage of veiling in the New York Times can be objectively gauged as using 
negative tone to describe the practice.  
 The results for media coverage in Britain are remarkably similar. In a 
comparable analysis of media coverage of veiling in The Times (London) during the 









   Figure 2.2: Veiling (UK) 
 
 
  82 
Again, just as I mentioned that I am interested in the predominant tone of media 
coverage of veiling over the last fifteen years versus the fluctuation in tone, changes in 
frequency of coverage are also not central to my analysis.  It is interesting to note that 
in the sample of British cases, even cross-checked against two addition random 
samples, the frequency of coverage picks up remarkably after 2004.  The increased 
frequency is likely owed to a host of events in rapid succession that involved Muslims 
in Europe (i.e. the 2004 French hijab ban, the 2005 London attacks, the 2006 Jack 
Straw controversy, etc.).  Yet, the fact that coverage does not increase dramatically 
after 2001 is slightly puzzling, given that Britain’s concern over the US terror attacks 
was formative in the former’s national security and foreign policy decisions.
59
 
Answering this puzzle is beyond the scope of this chapter, but it warrants further 
research.  For our purposes, it is enough to notice the starkly negative net results. 
  I also ran samples of articles that had mentioned “Muslim woman” or 
“Muslim women” to speak to my respondents particular concerns about how the 
‘Muslim woman’ is constructed by the mainstream media’s negative tone. Regardless 
of the mention of veiling, when Muslim women are portrayed by the media, they are 
portrayed using predominantly negative language in both countries’ papers of record. 
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 See coverage of former Prime Minister Tony Blair testifying that the September 11, 
2001 attacks intensified the threat posed by Saddam Hussein, justifying Britain’s 
involvement in supporting the US in the Iraq War: “Burns, John F. “Citing 9/11, Blair 
Defends Legacy at Iraq Inquiry” January 29, 2010. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/30/world/europe/30britain.html.  








       
 
  Figure 2.3: The Muslim Woman (US) 
 







  Figure 2.4: The Muslim Woman (UK) 
 
 
In both of these diagrams, it is clear that the negative tone overwhelms the positive 
tone when media coverage discusses the Muslim woman. Again, in the British case, 
the frequency of coverage increases at a comparable time to the increased coverage of 
veiling in the mainstream media.  But what is more interesting, for the purposes of this 
chapter, is that it shares the same net negative results as the American case.  
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III. ACTIVISTS AND ALTERNATIVE MEDIA FRAMES 
 Scholars of media framing argue that actors can battle for what is called ‘media 
standing’ if they want to challenge how the media frames certain individuals, groups 
or even ideas (Ferree et al 2002).  Specifically, the terminology of ‘standing’ is 
borrowed from legal discourse to denote contested terrain, and scholars argue that 
media standing represents the opportunity for an actor to make a substantive comment 
and affect how the public imagines the topic in question. They argue: “standing both 
reflects and enhances acceptance as a player in a given policy issue and thus is a 
measure of achieved cultural power” (Ferree et al 2002: 87). Given that the previous 
section demonstrated that the mainstream media frames the Muslim woman and the 
practice of veiling using predominantly negatively toned language, this section 
demonstrates how activists react to what they term misrepresentation and battle for 
media standing to represent what they believe to be a more accurate representation of 
the Muslim woman.   
 Activists have emerged among second generation women in the Muslim 
communities of both countries who battle for standing by creating alternative media 
outlets, where they can portray the Muslim woman as a subject in her own 
representation.  There are magazines, blogs, books, art exhibitions, radio interviews, 
and news websites that help construct this alternative image, yet it is the last of these 
outlets that I focus on the remainder of this section, because it is this outlet in 
particular that lends itself to a transnational activist community.  While there is 
otherwise little collaboration between Muslim activists in Britain and the US, mostly 
due to self-perceived exceptionalism on both sides, the internet news sources bring 
women together from not only these two populations, but from countries all over the 
world as well.   I look at the Muslim Media Watch and Altmuslimah websites to 
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demonstrate that Muslim women activists in both Britain and the US counterframe 
how the Muslim woman is represented in the media. Because of the unique nature of 
the online news outlets, these sources are able to use visual counterframes through 
photographs and images to an extent that print newspapers are unable to match. In this 
way, the news websites become a portal into other forms of activisms as well, by 
publicizing and reviewing literary or artistic ventures.  
 
1) Muslimah Media Watch 
 An American Muslim woman named Fatemeh Fakhraie founded Muslimah 
Media Watch (MMW) in 2007, a website dedicated to “critically analyzing images of 
Muslim women in global media and pop culture.”
60
   Originally a one-woman 
operation, MMW was recently launched with a 21-person contributing team, made up 
of women from London to Los Angeles, as well as women from Cairo, Paris, 
Johannesburg and Toronto.
61
  The issues that are covered on the website range from 
political to social topics, but all contributors share the mission of the news outlet, 
which is stated on its website:  
Muslimah Media Watch is a forum where we, as 
Muslim women, can critique how our images appear in 
the media and popular culture. Although we are of 
different nationalities, sects, races, etc., we have 
something important in common: we’re tired of seeing 
ourselves portrayed by the media in ways that are one-
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 See Fakhraie’s personal website: http://fatemehfakhraie.com/about/.  
61
See Uddin, Asma. “Muslimahs in the Media Do It Themselves” 
http://www.altmuslimah.com/a/b/a/muslimahs_in_the_media_do_it_themselves/. June 
29, 2010. For a list of contributors, see: http://muslimahmediawatch.org/about-
2/mmw-contributors/  
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dimensional and misleading. This is a space where, from 
a Muslim feminist perspective, we can speak up for 
ourselves.  As Muslim feminists we aim to locate and 
critique misogyny, sexism, patriarchy, Islamophobia, 
racism, and xenophobia as they affect Muslim women.
62
 
The articles published on MMW adhere to this agenda to be critically analytical of 
how the Muslim woman appears in the mainstream media.  There is a range of 
material, from essays on the misrepresentation of Muslim women to reviews 
publicizing work by Muslim women themselves trying to counter these negative 
representations with more positive portrayals.   
 Essays that critically analyze misrepresentation in the mainstream media are 
the most common pieces, such as a piece by American Muslim Noorain Khan, 
originally published at Jezebel, “Your Complete Guide to Bad Burqa Puns.”
63
 Khan 
takes a tongue-in-cheek approach to deconstructing what she argues is the indolent 
overuse of the ‘veil pun,’ in media outlets around the world, ranging from “Behind the 
Veil (The New York Times)” to “The Many Faces Behind the Veil” to “Unveiling the 
Truth Behind Shariah (Toronto Sun).” She argues:  
These veil puns pointedly remind us of the public's 
obsession, discomfort, and fascination with Muslim 
women and their sexuality. Even when headlining an 
article about a Muslim-majority country or about Islam 
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 See “About Us”: http://muslimahmediawatch.org/about-2/.  
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 Jezebel.com is an online magazine that prides itself on providing alternative and 
cutting-edge news about women in the media. The website presumably plays on the 
reference of Jezebel to the Phoenician princess in Hebrew theology who was 
considered to be an evil woman in power.  The name Jezebel is now often conflated 
with an evil woman, which is likely to be the misogynistic framing that a news outlet 
like Jezebel.com attempts to counter. 
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more generally, and not about Muslim women, the veil 
puns draw us back to what we should be thinking about-
women who seem to exist in a sexual realm outside of 
the existing norms of Western society.
64
 
It could also be noted that all of the objects unveiled in these puns, when they are not 
explicitly referring to Muslim women, are good objects that should come out into the 
open—they ought to be unveiled (i.e. truth, policies, anxieties).  These headlines 
potentially perpetuate the idea that only good can come from removing the restrictive 
veil.  
 The website also takes advantage of the ability to post many more visual 
images on the internet, opposed to the print media, and engages with the visual 
representation of the Muslim woman. While there are plenty of pieces analyzing 
misrepresentation in the mainstream media itself, MMW also engages with 
misrepresentation in other alternative outlets as well.  One piece, by an American 
Muslim name publishing under the moniker ‘Diane,’ discusses the artwork of Shepard 
Fairey.  Fairey is most commonly known for the iconic contemporary art image he 
created for President Barack Obama’s 2008 Presiential Campaign, the stylized stencil 
“Hope” portrait.
65
  Fairey explains in his 1990 manifesto that his sticker campaign is 
an “experiment in phenomology” which he cites Heidegger to describe as “the process 
of letting things manifest themselves.”
66
 It is a guerilla campaign, meant to forcibly 
confront people to think about objects that they take for granted by putting such 
images on stickers, posters, and clothing without any written explanation.   
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 Diane analyzes images that Fairy recently began creating of Muslim women on 
his websites. See Figures 2.5, 2.6 and 2.7.  In all of these figures, Diane admits that 
Fairey’s purpose might have been to challenge perceptions and motivate discourse, 
presumably by depicting veil-wearing women in images that are different from the 
mainstream’s oppressive or dangerous images.  He may do this by creating the image 
of a woman looking seductive and allowing her hair to show from under the headscarf 
as in Figure 5, or perhaps by showing women looking determinedly into the audience 









 Figure 2.5: Fairey #1         Figure 2.6: Fairey #2          Figure 2.7: Fairey #3 
 Source: Shepard Fairey, original artist. Online gallery:   
http://obeygiant.com/industries.  
 
 Still, Diane observes that when Fairey portrays other struggles, such as the 
Zapatista National Liberation Army, men and women are shown side by side as foot 
soldiers. In contrast, she argues, when Fairey depicts conflicts involving Muslims, 
only women are used and in ways in which they appear to be observers, rather than 
participants.  Diane also notes that the niqabi woman with a flower in the end of her 
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rifle in Figure 7 concerns her because of its use of a weapon.
67
 Though she admits the 
picture is more commanding that those where woman are passive observers, she 
argues that associating the niqab with a garment under which weapons could be 
concealed plays into public stereotypes of Muslim women being concealed extremists.  
 MMW also publishes reviews and commentaries covering projects created by 
Muslim women themselves that also strive to counter media misrepresentations of the 
veil.  Shelina Zahra Janmohamed’s book Love in a Headscarf is just such an example.  
The young London-based writer published her first novel in 2009, which catalogues a 
young British Muslim woman’s search for her ultimate companion.  A reviewer at 
MMW writes of the book, “This is ‘our’ story—the story of every Muslim woman 
trying to negotiate between her faith and her culture, her upbringing and the world she 
lives in.  It’s like Shelina has scanned our minds and shone a light into the dark 
corners of our hearts, finding our deepest hopes and fears and praying for the same 
things.”
68
  The reviewer expresses her frustration at the lack of stories “about normal 
Muslims and way we live our lives” and explains that Janmohamed’s choice to depict 
a Muslim woman’s quest for love effectively normalizes the Muslim woman in the 
reader’s mind.  
Janmohamed herself explained in our interview her motivation for writing her novel:  
There weren’t then and there aren’t now stories of 
Muslim women told by themselves in the media. 
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Something that really irritated me was that all the stories 
I saw in bookshops and online were misery memoirs—
women with black veils over their faces who were 
kidnapped or sold into slavery or faced FGM and this 
kind of thing. And these things happen, but I faced those 
constantly. And I got quite upset that there weren’t other 
stories about Muslim women and I just felt that if we 
wanted to change that, I would have to do that myself. 
Janmohamed explains that the September 2001 attacks in the US changed her life as a 
Muslim woman because suddenly everyone believed they could talk about her because 
of her faith.  She began writing a column in a local community paper, which 
eventually led to her own blog, called Spirit 21.  In 2009, her blog was awarded the 
honors of Best Blog and Best Female Blog by the Annual Brass Crescent Awards;
69
 
her popularity among her readership led her to write an autobiographical account of a 
young Muslim woman’s search for a mate. She admits her mission is quite simple in 
reality: “I thought that Muslim women themselves only ever get to be talked about by 
talking about oppression or rights… [but] actually [we could] just change our narrative 
by talking about something that’s just very funny, personable and about day to day 
life.”  In  contrast to the negative tone of media representations, however, these 
otherwise ordinary depictions appear to be rebellious counterframes.  
 In her book, Janmohamed discusses the construction of the British Muslim 
identity and how second generation women play a particular role in this process:  
 
Muslim women were pushing forward the debate about 
our community’s understanding of Islam.  We were 
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questioning ‘how things were’ in the way that our faith 
was practiced.  Our spirituality and faith were important 
to us, and we wanted to have our voiced heard and our 
questions explored.  We were confident that we would 
be the ones who could create real and positive change in 
the Muslim community and in extricating the faith of 
Islam from the cultures that had taken root in its 
practice. (Janmohamed 2009: 122) 
She also turns to discussing the hijab itself, a topic that her chosen title forces her to 
address. She suggests that the symbolism of her hijab should not be lost on her 
companion:  
The more I had to fight the preconceptions of what a 
Muslim woman who wore hijab should be like, the more 
I wanted a man who understood why I wore it and 
supported me… I wanted him to have a vision of a better 
future for our society, and to understand that the reason 
that I had chosen to wear hijab was a small contribution 
to that future. (Janmohamed 2009: 168) 
In this way, Janmohamed explains her most personal dilemmas and shares with 
readers how she reasons her role as a Muslim woman in her community. In contrast to 
the images of weak and oppressed women in the mainstream media, often denoted by 
the same practice of wearing a headscarf that she embraces, she frames hijabi Muslim 
women as ordinary individuals who share the same anxieties about love and happiness 
as their non-Muslim peers.  
 The substance of the various pieces MMW publishes stays consistent: the 
mainstream media’s unsophisticated portrayal of the Muslim woman as perpetually 
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veiled and thus submissive or dangerous fails to adequately communicate the diversity 
within Muslim women’s experiences.  The news website has gathered an international 
contributing staff, that has in turn drawn an international audience of Muslim women 
who agree with this message.  
2) Altmuslimah 
 Altmuslimah also gathers this international community, evidenced by its 
contributors and readership. In her introductory letter published on the website at its 
inaugeration in 2009, the founder, Asma Uddin, explains that she believes the media 
has the power to shape public opinion: “With the media constantly spewing out 
images of oppressed Muslim women and angry Muslim men, the world looks on with 
both fascination and disgust. The Muslim gender dynamic – supposedly a singular, 
unchanging construct – has become a spectacle for everyone to gawk at, comment on, 
and ultimately use to ridicule the larger Muslim community.”
70
  In order to shape 
public opinion in the favor of Muslim women, Altmuslimah publishes pieces similar 
to MMW—critical essays and public reviews and commentaries that counterframe the 
mainstream media’s negative portrayal of the Muslim woman with alternative positive 
frames. Though the website does draw international audiences, Uddin admits in an 
interview that it is primarily targeting the American Muslim audience.  She says that 
the “vast majority of contributors are second generation” who are interested in sharing 
their experiences with other individuals who are reconciling their religious and 
American identities.  
 Altmuslimah is also aware of the visual advantage it can enjoy over many print 
mainstream outlets.  One of its campaigns is called the Photographic Campaign and 
solicits photographs from its audience “aimed at providing an alternative to the 
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dominant media image of oppressed Muslim women and angry Muslim men.”
71
  The 
campaign has received endorsements from notable academics who study Muslim 
politics, including Louise Cainkar and Mona Eltahawy. On one hand, Cainkar 
connects the idea of stereotyping Muslim women to a larger global culture of distrust: 
“As long as it remains socially acceptable to portray Muslims in these negative and 
deceptive ways, our societies will be unable to move forward: to step up and out of the 
politics of hatred.”
72
  On the other hand, Eltahawy explains how stereotypes 
effectively silent women: “Angry Bearded Muslim Man is the favorite…His female 
counterpart is Covered in Black Muslim Woman. She’s seen, never heard. Visible 
only in her invisibility under that black chador, burqa, face veil, etc.
73
”  Both scholars 
give their approval for a media project that tries to counterframe stereotypes with 
positive images of women. 
 One of the photographers associated with the Photographic Campaign is Sadaf 
Syed.  Syed is an American Muslim woman who published a book of photo-essays 
called iCover: a day in the life of an American Muslim COVERed girl. She traveled 
around the country taking photographs of American Muslim women living their lives, 
illustrating veiled women in scenes that are meant to defy public expectations of 
veiled women as oppressed, submissive and hidden from the public spotlight.  A 
sample of the photos below depicts a woman boxer, surfer, high school Homecoming 
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 Source—Photographs taken from: Sadaf Syed. 2010. iCover: a Day in the Life of a 
Muslim-American COVERed Girl. .USA: iCreate Publishing. 








          Figure 2.8: Boxer        Figure 2.9: Surfer   Figure 2.10: Queen 








 Figure 2.11: Truck Driver 
 
 Another American Muslim campaign profiled on Altmuslimah is the 
production called The Hijabi Monologues (THM). In 2009, Sahar Ishtiaque Ullah, 
Zeenat Rahman, and Daniel Morrison published a set of stories narrated by American 
Muslim women meant to be performed on stage by women wearing the hijab; they 
decided to make the title of the production a play on Eve Ensler’s The Vagina 
Monologues.  One of the 12 women performers writes an essay about the play, posted 
on Altmuslimah (in addition to other media outlets), that notes the inverse relationship 
between the two productions: “Unlike The Vagina Monologues, which brought private 
              
 
  95 
subject matter into public discourse, Hijabi Monologues is actually taking the hijab 
from the public news and media discourse back into women’s personal lives.”
75
  The 
performer says “Hijabi Monologues was born of a joint desire to take the Muslim 
woman out of the public and make her private, and to decentralize the hijab as the 
focus of Western popular discourse about Muslim women.”
76
   
 The play consists of 12 narratives, each performed by a young woman wearing 
hijab.   While the performers wear the headscarf, none of the stories actually discuss 
the topic and instead focus on the diversity of stories that women who happen to wear 
hijab can encounter.  In Ullah’s own words, she believes that “stories have the 
potential to create a better understanding of our lives, generating empathy and a sense 
of shared humanity, while as the same time describing a unique experience.”
77
  She 
uses the hijab as a physical marker of difference, only to make clear that the characters 
are each Muslim.  Stories address a range of topics, from teenage pregnancy to a 
daughter watching her father arrested on charges of national security to a mother 
dealing with the accidental death of her son.  Like Love in a Headscarf, these stories 
are meant to normalize the image of the Muslim woman as just another type of woman 
who experiences heartbreak and joy similar to her non-Muslim peers.  
 Before a performance in Washington, D.C., Ullah shared a few words with the 
audience where she explained that the idea for the play was born from multiple 
conversations she used to have with her white, male classmate, Morrison, when they 
were both masters students in the Middle Eastern Studies department at the University 
of Chicago. She recounts that Morrison was so impressed by the seeming indefinite 
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amount of stories she shared about being an American Muslim women who wears the 
headscarf, that he suggested she write a collection of stories representing such diverse 
perspectives. Morrison stayed committed to the idea and pushed her to move forward, 
she remembers in front of the audience.  
 Asma Uddin would agree with the play’s objective to represent diversity.  In a 
piece on media and Islam published on Altmuslimah, she argues: “a media alternative 
is needed – one that explores gender in Islam in all of its nuance and complexity rather 
than demonizing or simplifying it. Because media distortion happens both through 
biased reporting and exaggerated, selective images, the counter-response must be 
similarly multifaceted.”
78
  Though Altmuslimah’s entire staff is made of American 
Muslims, and Uddin admits that her motivation for founding the news website was to 
provide a unique space for second generation American Muslims to discuss issues 
concerning both gender and Islam, the coverage and range of topics are extensively 
international.
79
 While MMW’s has assembled a more international staff, the news that 
both sites publish is consistently transnational in substance. 
 While both MMW and Altmuslimah are aware that their audiences are not as 
broad as the mainstream media’s audience, they reason that they may draw individuals 
who are curious about Islam and attempting to research more information about 
Muslim women.  More importantly, however, activists believe that frames that depict 
Muslim women as weak or extreme individuals need to be counterframed to help 
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Muslims as well. Uddin argues that the communal element to this form of activism has 
its own intrinsic worth:  
Looking inward is about reflecting on our individual 
spiritual cores – the place where we, in our quiet 
moments, wonder about our identity vis-à-vis the world, 
the part of us that cowers under the spotlight. While 
putting on a façade of defiance, our spirituality is often 
in a state of flux…Recognizing that our spiritual growth 
is often a lonely, confusing process, it is one of 
Altmuslimah’s goals to provide a space where the 
process can be shared with others.
80
 
Though the public misrepresentation of the Muslim woman frustrates activists who 
believe that such images shape public opinion against Muslim women, these 
alternative news sources infiltrate the cluster of sources that portray Muslim women in 
public. Such activists for media standing define their own success—by simply 
existing, these sources prove the diversity of Muslim women’s voices.  
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 Though the Muslim populations of Britain and the US stand in stark contrast to 
one another on levels of education, employment and other socio-economic indicators, 
these differences do not seem to affect the mainstream media’s representation of the 
Muslim woman as either oppressed or dangerous.  In order to distinguish the Muslim 
woman, the media does not refer to class or ethnic origin markers (except, perhaps, for 
the racialization that depicts Muslims as ‘brown’ individuals from the Middle East or 
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South Asia).  Instead, it relies on the visual marker of the veil, in any of its derivations.  
Both countries’ mainstream media reduce the Muslim woman to this single image, 
effectively erasing the diversity that exists among Muslim women in reality. Activists 
believe this objectification denies them voice in their own representation, or media 
standing, and misrepresents the Muslim woman as indeed oppressed or dangerous.  In 
response, activists battle to obtain better standing and counterframe how the public 
thinks of the Muslim woman by creating alternative news outlets.  They take 
advantage of new technology, predominantly the internet, to create a transnational 
community of activists who all have the same goal: to reclaim Islam by diversifyng 
the representation of the Muslim woman in the media and prove that the Muslim 
woman can be a strong voice in constructing the her own identity in the West.  
 In addition to the media’s representation of the Muslim woman that portrays 
her as inevitably weak and oppressed, Muslim women also battle against 
intracommunal misogynistic interpretations of the Muslim woman’s role in relation to 
Muslim men. Though this behavior is often justified with religious doctrine on gender 
relations, Muslim women activists take their battle for standing into the private sphere 
and argue that sexist behavior, in fact, violates Islamic teachings. In the next chapter, I 
describe how Muslim women activists in both countries also fight to reclaim Islam in 
the private sphere of their own faith communities. 
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CHAPTER 3 
REINTERPRETIVE ACTIVISM: HOW WOMEN REFRAME ISLAM’S POSITION 
ON GENDER VIOLENCE 
 
 The gender-justice activism that emerges among second generation Muslim 
women in Britain and the United States not only challenges misogynistic 
representations of the Muslim woman in the public sphere, but it also confronts 
misogynistic behavior within the private sphere of their own Muslim communities.  
While activists address a variety of intracommunal issues, such as inheritance rights 
and custody conflicts, the most urgent struggle emerges against the prominance of 
domestic violence in both countries’ communities. An American study estimates 
physical violence in 10% of American Muslim homes, with rates of verbal and 
emotional abuse reaching as high as 50%.
81
  British research on the British Muslim 
community reports that ‘honor killings,’ murders committed in the name of family 
honor when a female allegedly practices immoral behavior, occur most visibly in 
Islamic Asian or Middle Eastern immigrant communities.
82
  While domestic violence 
is still a prevalent concern in mainstream British and American society, the urgency of 
violence in their Muslim communities is  compounded by two factors: first, female 
victims are reluctant to ‘air the community’s dirty laundry’ because fellow community 
members argue that such negative publicity only promotes the hostility that Muslims 
face in both Britain and the United States;
83
 second, community members use Islamic 
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interpretations of religious scriptures to justify the violence against women. 
 In response to these challenges and the prevalence of violence in the British and 
American Muslim communties, gender-justice activists engage in what I call ‘re-
interpretive activism,’ a project that articulates an alternative interpretation of Islam 
that specifically prohibits domestic violence in the Muslim home.  At the heart of this 
re-interpretation is the Islamic principle of ijtihad, a hermeneutic strategy that obliges 
critical thinking and individual reasoning of Islamic texts. Both scholars and second 
generation activists articulate a version of Islam that counters the androcentric, 
primocentric account that prevails among first generation immigrant Muslims and is 
often employed to excuse incidents of violence. While activists argue that their 
alternative version primarily stresses a distinction between concepts of ‘culture’ and 
‘religion,’ I will interrogate their use of ‘culture’ and demonstrate that activists would 
gain more analytical traction from differentiating between ‘tradition’ and religion 
instead.   
 Through a combination of original interview data and secondary source analysis, 
I demonstrate that activists move their efforts to construct a new egalitarian Muslim 
identity into the private sphere of both countries.  In section one, I contend that they 
employ framing theory in their reinterpretation of Islamic teachings to rearticulate 
Islam’s position on gender violence to fellow Muslims.  In section two, I explain how 
they engage in diagnostic framing to identify the problem at the root of the pervasive 
violence: the androcentric, primocentric account of Islam that prevails in the 
community. Next, in section three, I detail how they engage in prognostic framing to 
find a solution to domestic violence.   I argue that they use a hermeneutic strategy to 
argue that women’s rights ought to be protected within an Islamic framework, as an 
alternative to deriving their rights from Western secular state-based models that 
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protect women from domestic violence.  I conclude in section four by demonstrating 
how activists are beginning to apply the principle of ijtihad (critical reasoning)—and 
their resulting distinction between ‘culture’ and religion—to additional intracommunal 
issues, such as marriage norms in the diaspora.  
 
I. FRAMING THEORY 
 This reinterpretive strategy that aims to alter people’s associations between 
Islam and gender violence relies on a process called framing, where activists engage in 
the production of meaning and construct so-called ‘frames’ which serve as schemata 
of interpretation for their gender-justice struggles. As is discussed in the previous two 
chapters, Benford and Snow (2000) explain that these frames are created when 
activists “negotiate a shared understanding of some problematic condition or situation 
they define as in need of change, make attributions regarding who or what is to blame, 
articulate an alternative set of arrangements, and urge others to act in concert to affect 
change” (615). My findings show that gender-justice activists in both countries 
generate a common central frame to facilitate their reinterpretive activism at the local 
community level: Islam prohibits domestic violence.  
 While the previous chapter connected Benford and Snow’s theory of framing 
with Ferree et al.’s theory of media standing to demonstrate that the media can create 
social meaning through what is specifically called media framing, this chapter focuses 
on more general framing theory that argues activists can also generate social meaning 
simply through the ways they identify and propose solutions to social problems. There 
are two core framing tasks, in particularly, that apply to my respondents’ frames in 
their reinterpretive activism: diagnostic framing, which identifies the problem and 
assigns blame or responsibility, and prognostic framing, which articulates the solution 
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to the problem.
84
  The diagnostic frame identifies the problem as the androcentric, 
primocentric account of Islam that condones domestic violence.  Activists believe that 
the first generation is generally unable to differentiate between customary practices 
from their sending countries and true religious doctrine; the second generation argues 
that this effectively leads to a version of Islam that uses the perspective of the male 
first generation Muslim as a point of reference in deciding proper Islamic teachings.  
 The prognostic frame articulates a solution to the problem that involves 
reinterpreting Islam according to the original texts.  This hermeneutic strategy requires 
critical thinking to reveal that androcentric, primocentric interpretations of Islam 
contradict the religion’s teachings on women’s rights. Activists argue that the solution 
to domestic violence in the Muslim community resides within a ‘purist’ Islamic 
framework, because they believe that Islam grants women the rights to a peaceful 
family existence. This approach neutralizes the need to rely on the secular state-based 
rights’ framework that outlaws domestic violence in both Britain and the US.  
 There are three interactive and discursive processes that help generate the central 
frame that says Islam does not allow domestic violence.  The first two, frame 
articulation and counterframing, also appear in representative activist efforts discussed 
in chapter two.  Likewise, in the case of reinterpretive activism, the discursive process 
of frame articulation offers a novel combination of ideas “spliced together and 
articulated, such that a new angle of vision, vantage point, and/or interpretation is 
provided” (623).  My respondents articulate that such a frame necessitates drawing a 
distinction between the concepts of culture and religion, a distinction which will be 
further interrogated below. Instead of taking traditional practices for granted and 
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conflating them with religious practices, activists look to Islamic texts and the 
Prophetic tradition to clarify Islam’s stance against domestic violence.  Consequently, 
the patriarchal practices that condone such violence and migrate with the immigrant 
Muslim community are framed as anti-Muslim.  
 Second, constructing counterframes also play an important role in reinterpretive 
activism, particularly in understanding how vigorously frames are contested by fellow 
community members.  This opposition, in turn, further influences gender-justice 
activists’ frames. Scholars and activists argue that males often counterframe domestic 
violence in Islam by exploiting religious interpretations that superficially appear to 
justify domestic violence.  This exploitative interpretation employs verses out of 
context that allegedly grant men authority over women and creates a counterframe 
with which gender-justice activists must engage.   Some victims of domestic violence, 
in accepting such inaccurate religious interpretations, believe that speaking out against 
such violence will go against their faith. Activists call this type of manipulation 
‘spiritual abuse’ (implicitly comparing it to physical and emotional abuse) and contest 
the frame that Islam allows domestic violence.  
 While activism in the public and private spheres employs processes of both 
frame articulation and counterframing, I argue that reinterpretive activism employs an 
additional and distinct framing process called frame transformation.  This process is 
used to “[change] old understandings and meanings and/or [generate] new ones” 
(Benford and Snow 2000: 625), enabling activists to transform the frame that Islam 
prohibits domestic violence for use in other gender disputes in the communities.  My 
findings demonstrate that they employ the same critical thinking mechanism called 
ijtihad to apply the same reinterpretive strategy that differentiates between cultural and 
religious practices.  I conclude by presenting preliminary evidence that activists are 
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disproportionately more likely that the average citizen in either country to pursue 
intermarriage across ethnic and racial groups.  I suggest this behavior demonstrates 
that the second generation, in both countries, follows a similar reinterpretive strategy 
that frames first generation elders’ tendency towards endogamous marriage as simply 
an attempt at cultural preservation, rather than a practice endorsed by an Islamic 
understanding of marriage. In the sections that follow, I will demonstrate how second 
generation gender-justice activists in both countries employ a discursive practice to 
facilitate their reinterpretive activism at the local community level that framing theory 
helps us understand. 
 
II. DIAGNOSTIC FRAMING 
 Activists argue that violence committed against women violates Qur’anic 
principles of gender-justice and peaceful family relations, yet such violence still 
pervades both British and American Muslim communities, as described above.  
Second generation activists recurrently blame this persistent violence on the first 
generation immigrant Muslim community’s inability to distinguish between the 
concepts of culture and religion.  They find their parents and other community elders 
incapable of separating their understanding of Islamic teachings from the cultural lens 
through which they learned their religion in their country of origin.  The problem with 
conflating these ideas, activists argue, is the fact that cultural interpretations often 
stray far from authentic Islamic tenets. As chapter one explains, this project to reclaim 
Islam in the West exists against the larger backdrop of a multiculturalist political 
project in both countries--that is, both Britain and the United States are trying to 
manage the increasing diversity of what they call cultural communities.  My 
respondents, however, argue that defining the Muslim culture according to the 
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androcentric, primocentric account offered by first generation male immigrants 
excludes their experience as second generation British and American Muslim women.  
In this sense, they articulate culture as a relative frame that decides beliefs according 
to the country in which individuals were born and socialized, whereas religion is a 
universal frame that derives its beliefs from common scripture. 
A. Frame Articulation: Culture vs. Religion 
 My findings show that respondents who claim that culture is at fault for 
misogynistic interpretations of Islam in fact trace their heritage back to a wide span of 
countries, ranging from Somalia to Lebanon to Bangladesh. Since we know that these 
countries surely do not share one singular culture, the concept of culture as it is 
popularly conceived deserves some interrogation.  The conceptualization of culture 
has challenged a number of disciplines, but political science in particular struggles 
with the idea of culture as a heuristic mechanism for social practices and political 
preferences (Kymlicka 2000, 1996, 1995; Laitin and Wildavsky 1988).   
 As discussed in the introduction, William Kymlicka, the most prominent 
multicultural theorist, thinks of culture as a “context of choice” that “provides its 
members with meaningful ways of life across the full range of human activities, 
including social, educational, religious, recreational, and economic life, encompassing 
both public and private spheres” (Kymlicka 1995: 76).  According to this definition, 
cultural group membership can signal how members see the world and, consequently, 
how they not only determine their interests, but also translate these interests into 
behavior.  
 Aaron Wildavksy (1987) would likely agree with Kymlicka, as he defines 
culture as “shared values legitimizing social practices” (Wildavsky 1987: 6).  His 
version of cultural theory also argues that culture serves the role of ‘context,’ in 
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helping individuals determine what they favor, as well as what they stand against.  
David Laitin (1988) challenges Wildavsky for failing to see the difference between 
culture and political preferences. He argues that people can stand for or against very 
different political ideas within the same culture, just as people from different cultures 
may align similarly.  Instead, he sees culture not as values upheld, but agrees with 
Thomas Metzger (1977) who sees culture as “points of concern that are debated” 
(Laitin 1987: 589).  Culture, in Laitin’s estimation, will not tell you what to believe, 
but it will decide what issues are worth discussion.  
 Yet Laitin goes on to argue that “to share a culture is to share a language or 
religion or historiography,” all the while admitting that it is rare for these systems to 
coincide perfectly with large societies (Laitin 1987: 591).  A religion such as Islam, 
however, that not only spans numerous countries and regions of the world, but also 
spans multiple generations through migration, might also challenge the cultural 
classification.   In this case of second generation Muslim women, there is clearly 
tension between the cultural identity they associate with their parents and the religious 
identity they construct for themselves in the West—yet both are often casually 
grouped together into the Muslim identity.  
 Activists described a common narrative, in which they felt disillusioned with 
their “parents’ Islam” when they discovered that certain aspects actually contradicted 
Islamic teachings. They discovered this disconnect through reading texts in English 
translation, aided greatly by resources on the internet and Qur’anic study circles or 
community seminars at local mosques.  It usually only took one conflict within the 
home--often over whether the Qur’an prohibited female education or mandated 
wearing the hijab--to propel these activists down a path of inquiry, upon which they 
discovered more interpretations at odds with the Islam they felt their parents endorsed.  
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 It should be noted that activists apply the term ‘culture’ in two different, but not 
wholly unrelated, ways.  In one respect culture is used to label what might otherwise 
be considered ethnic groups, along the lines of Laitin’s definition.  This usage 
predominantly appears when activists are frustrated with the racialization of Islam, 
which conflates ethnic groups from regions with a considerable population of Muslims 
with the religious group itself (e.g. South Asians, Middle Easterners, etc.).  The second 
form of usage seems to identify practices or behavior, along the lines of Wildavsky’s 
definition, that might otherwise be called ‘tradition.’ While this idea is further 
explored below, it is important to note that these attributes usually refer to customs 
with long historical grounding in the same regions that are connected to the 
racialization of Islam in the West. Thus, certain traditions from first generation 
immigrants’ sending countries are often interpreted as Muslim behavior in the West, 
which activists misleadingly ascribe to their parents’ ‘culture.’  
B. Frame Articulation: Domestic Violence is a Problem 
 Activists’ diagnostic framing has identified domestic violence as a serious 
problem that both British Muslim and American Muslim communities must tackle, 
often because women are charged with hiding the community’s negative features from 
the public spotlight. In this section, I examine Muslim domestic violence activism in 
each country to demonstrate that both: a) argue against violence from within an 
Islamic framework, because they see the secular state-based rights framework as 
inadequate, and b) promote the same conceptual distinction between culture and 
religion to explain that Islamic teachings condemn domestic violence.   
 The following sections will demonstrate that both countries’ activists offer an 
alternative to the secular state-based rights framework because of each state’s failure 
to exhibit adequate political will to protect women from violence.  On the one hand, 
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British activists suggest that the British state discriminates against Muslim women’s 
needs in particular, while still supporting Asian women’s rights organizations. On the 
other hand, American activists seem to react to the American state’s indiscriminate 
failure to support (Muslim and non-Muslim) activists fighting violence against 
women.   
1) Domestic Violence in Britain 
 While both countries deal with more conventional examples of domestic 
violence that include battery and abuse in the home, British Muslim activists argue 
that forced marriages should be considered examples of domestic violence as well. 
Forced marriage refers to a marriage that is arranged for either a man or woman 
without his or her consent and against either party’s free will (Phillips and Dustin 
2004).  It has emerged as a social problem that is far more salient in Britain than the 
United States, due to each country’s different experiences with historical immigration 
patterns. The British Muslim population draws heavily from rural communities in 
Pakistan and post-conflict refugee populations from Bangladesh--the two countries of 
origin with the highest involvement in British forced marriages.  Some families from 
these two populations force their daughters to marry males from their country of origin 
to preserve cultural expectations and prevent daughters from submitting to the ‘ways 
of the West.’ These marriages are distinct from family reunification measures, which 
allow migrants to bring spouses into Britain, because the young woman is forced to 
marry against her will or held hostage until she concedes. A large number of cases 
involve consanguineous marriages with cousins from the rural communities and 
villages that first generation immigrants left to migrate to Britain; often relatives in the 
immigrants’ countries of origin expect the migrant to provide for more family 
members’ settlement abroad, which is most easily arranged through marriage with 
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young female relatives. 
 While the majority of forced marriage cases do involve families from South 
Asian communities, primarily Pakistanis and Bangladeshis, activists resent the 
conflation between what they stress is a regional South Asian cultural practice with the 
Muslim tradition. They point out that forced marriage is also a problem in Hindu and 
Sikh families, two other religions that are represented on the subcontinent. Pakistanis 
and Bangladeshis, they argue, make up the vast majority of the British South Asian 
population, which is why they also comprise the majority of forced marriage cases. 
   
 In 2005, Britain created the Forced Marriage Unit, a joint initiative between the 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Home Office to help victims of forced 
marriage find civil remedies to their predicaments. In 2009 the FMU reported that it 
gave advice or support to 1682 cases, 86% of which involved females as the primary 
victim, while 14% involved males.
85
 The Forced Marriage (Civil Protection) Act 2007 
enables family courts to issue forced marriage protection orders to prevent forced 
marriages from occurring, or remove women from marriages into which they have 
already been forced.
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 These orders take proactive measures to prevent victims from 
being taken abroad, such as confiscating passports, as well as reactive measures that 
involve demanding the disclosure of whereabouts once an individual has already been 
taken abroad, and counseling support once victims return to Britain.   In the 
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 Amrit Wilson’s (2007) analysis of forced marriage related legislation in Britain, 
however, suggests that such measures are more representative of the state’s 
marginalization of minority communities than its commitment to prevent violence.  
While the state claims to have minority women’s interests in mind by cracking down 
on coerced marriages to overseas spouses, Wilson argues that it has simultaneously 
reduced funds allocated to minority women’s refuges, which are necessary to provide 
shelter to women who experience violence.  The state has also implemented legislation 
that requires spouses to file an official complaint against their families if they want 
their spouses deported back to their country of origin.  Wilson argues these two 
measures demonstrate the state’s lack of familiarity with the support network that 
Muslim victims of domestic violence need when exiting violent relationships.  
 The British state has tried different legal interventions to enforce immigration 
regulations that would discourage forced marriages. Most prominently, the state has 
increased the age of entry for non-EU spouses, along with an increase in the age 
required to sponsor such spouses.  These state attempts are also criticized for their 
marginalization of minority communities.  Gangoli and Chantler (2009), for example, 
argue that it is problematic for the British state to enforce legislation that relies on 
dubious research connecting increased age, maturity and resistance to forced marriage.  
Phillips and Dustin (2004) also criticize such legislation for effectively promoting an 
immigration regulation regime that equates all overseas marriages with forced 
marriages, discriminating against minority citizens and pronouncing judgments on 
their ability to make sound decisions in marriage.   
 The activists I interviewed shared this criticism of the state’s efforts to prevent 
violence in the Muslim community. The An-nisa Society, one of the most prominent 
Muslim women’s organizations in Britain, was established in London in 1985 by a 
  111 
group of British Muslim second and third-generation women who were tired of being 
marginalized by local authorities. Whereas the anti-racist movement of the 1970s 
resulted in the Race Relations Act of 1976, this legislation prevented discrimination 
primarily on racial and ethnic grounds. Even its successor, the Race Relations Act of 
2000, which requires public institutions to demonstrate that their anti-discriminatory 
measures have been effective, primarily addressed racial and ethnic groups.  Religious 
groups were not recognized in British anti-discrimination legislation until 2003, when 
a European Commission directive outlawed religious discrimination in employment, 
and then later with the Racial and Religious Hatred Act of 2006 (Modood 2006: 42-
44). 
 Before these recent developments, however, Muslim women’s groups felt that 
the state failed to address their needs as religious women, by only addressing racial 
and ethnic group needs.   While neoconservative economic policies and a conservative 
government in the 1980s contributed to the decline of women’s rights organizations 
across all communities (Elman 2003), Muslim women felt especially marginalized 
because even the remaining concern for women’s safety focused on Asian group needs 
only. One of the An-nisa Society’s founders explained how the group formed to 
represent the specific needs of Muslim women in particular:  
When we set up, it was a group of us, 2nd and 3rd 
generation [women] from various different backgrounds 
and we decided that we were British and Muslim…and 
we want to have our needs met as such… First thing we 
wanted to do was set up a nursery because a lot of us 
were mothers…I was working and I wanted my children 
to go somewhere where they could have faith based 
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care. So we applied to the local council and we were 
shocked at how we were treated… They came down on 
us like a ton of bricks, they said if we already have an 
Asian nursery, we can’t have a Muslim nursery. And 
they kept on addressing us as Asian women, and we said 
‘we’re not Asian, we’re Muslim from different 
backgrounds.’ They kept on saying it’s religious, we 
don’t fund religious things…we had to really fight and 
we didn’t get the funding.  
Beyond childcare, this organization began addressing broader social service issues that 
disproportionately affect women and children in the Muslim community--violence, 
housing, the foster care system, etc.  
 The An-nisa Society continues to experience difficulty in receiving funding from 
the state.  Leaders argue that the state’s treatment of religion has evolved from 
inattention to a misguided focus on the Muslim community for security concerns (this 
evolution in the state’s treatment of religion will be discussed in detail in chapter five).  
While they argue that some other religious organizations have begun ostensibly 
agreeing with the government’s counterterrorism strategy to procure funding in a 
political climate that prioritizes security issues, the An-nisa Society has vocalized a 
strong stance against the Preventing Violent Extremism fund (an initiative that will 
also be discussed in detail in chapter five).  The group published a scathing report of 
the PVE’s blatant disregard for the genuine problems that ail Muslim women and 
children in British society (i.e. poverty, violence, and limited educational and 
employment opportunities) and subsequently feels that the state has reacted 
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defensively to the report’s allegations, instead of engaging with its criticisms.
88
   
 This organization appeals to the distinction between culture and religion and 
argues that it is necessary to make any progress in meeting Muslim women’s needs. 
One of the founders described two examples that illustrate how the state’s conflation 
of these two concepts hurts Muslim women in the process:  
It was very crude the way they were delivering the needs 
of these communities. For example, halal food in 
hospitals. We’ve been banging our heads against the 
walls for years saying ‘it is not about curry!’… we 
spoke to so many Muslim patients in hospitals who said 
‘they keep on giving us curry!’… and the point is, even 
if you’re from the subcontinent, you don’t necessarily 
want curry…when you’ve just had a stomach operation, 
that’s not what we’d have at home. On the subcontinent 
when you’ve been ill, you usually get bland foods and 
soups and what have you. It was just fixed in their minds 
that halal is Asian, therefore it’s spicy and curry… then 
you have a Bosnian woman saying she doesn’t eat curry, 
                                                
88
 The author attended a speech given at the London School of Economics and 
Political Science on February 25, 2009 by Hazel Blears, the Secretary of State for 
Communities and Local Government at the time, in which she defended the PVE fund 
against the report’s allegations. See the report, “Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) 
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but when she goes to a hospital and asks for halal, that’s 
what they get. So we had to say, it’s like Kosher. You 
can you have shepherd’s pie that is halal and you can 
have curry that’s not halal. 
You can’t use anti-racist strategies to address 
Islamophobia, you can’t just lump them together…so for 
example, you have an Asian housing association and 
what you’re doing is lumping together Hindus, Muslims 
and Sikhs together… I used to be in a group for housing 
for the Asian elderly…[and] you’ve got these 3 different 
religions of people who come here, primarily, and 
you’re saying that they can live together, very closely in 
a home, sharing a lot of the area, [even though] Muslims 
might object to statues of gods being there, Hindus 
might object to Muslims eating meat, and even some 
Hindus that do eat meat might eat pork, which Muslims 
might object to, all sorts of things like that…. Also, in 
the Muslim community, we have a lot of marriages 
between ethnic groups. Would you allow a partner from 
a different background who might be white (but 
Muslim) in this housing area? No. So there’s all these 
[problems]. 
When this activist voices frustration with the state’s conflation of a religious identity 
with a cultural identity, culture in this case refers to ethnic groups.  The British state 
racializes Islam by equating Muslims with all ‘Asians,’ though the latter group also 
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includes Hindu and Sikh individuals.   
 Culture is also used to label the traditions deemed popular in the regions from 
which these ethnic groups migrate.  A popular seminar that the organization hosts 
called “Family Tyranny” questions the role of the Muslim family and the influence 
that certain cultural norms may play in enabling domestic violence, forced marriages, 
and parental tyranny. The seminar aims to teach participants about the “exploitation of 
religion in the perpetuation of violence in the Muslim family.”  One of the founders of 
this organization explains how important it is to clarify that Islam and cultural norms 
are distinct concepts:  
I think Islam is very misrepresented and I hate it being 
synonymous with being anti-women… I wouldn’t 
follow it if I thought it was anti-women, because I’m 
really pro-women! … I think there’s been a number of 
cultural practices that we’ve taken on in our 
communities which people are practicing all sorts of 
things that they think [are] Islamic, but they’re actually 
not based on Islam at all.  
In its efforts to spell out the distinction, in the hopes of preventing violence in Muslim 
homes, the organization continuously emphasizes the Islamic model of family 
relations that orders partners to think of each other as complementary garments. This 
model also encourages fathers to take an active part in family raising, ideally 
encouraging more holistic households with less traditional gender dynamics, and is an 
example of prognostic framing (which is discussed further in the latter half of this 
chapter). 
 Activists underline this distinction between misogynistic traditional practices 
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and egalitarian religious teachings by engaging in a reinterpretive strategy that derives 
Islam’s position against violence from Islamic texts themselves.  A student activist 
from London elaborated on a hadith that explains forced marriages are un-Islamic:  
Sexual inequality does exist in our community but that's 
because it has to do with cultural Islam… Islam does not 
allow you to do forced marriage. There's this one case 
where a woman came to the Prophet and said she's 
unhappy with the man she was married to and the 
marriage was forced upon her. And the Prophet said 
‘your marriage is null and void because it was forced 
upon you.’  
By referring to hadith that explain Islam’s position against forced marriages, activists 
engage in a reinterpretive project to educate fellow Muslims about gender-justice.  
Activists appeal to the prohibitions against such violence within the Islamic 
framework, instead of appealing to British laws that have emerged against forced 
marriage. 
 Another British Muslim women’s organization also underlines the distinction 
between tradition and religion to emphasize Islam’s prohibitive position on coerced 
marriage. The Doli Project (a reference to the traditional chair used to carry South 
Asian brides into a wedding ceremony) in Birmingham began as an immigrant 
counseling service, but leaders quickly realized that the vast majority of young women 
who came to them seeking advice and support were victims of forced marriage. One 
41 year old social worker who worked with the project explained that their strategy 
was to convince victims that coerced marriage violated Islamic principles, so they 
were not being ‘bad Muslims’ by escaping the marriages their parents had forced on 
  117 
them: 
People will blame religion, but religion actually gives 
you the right to say no… Islam doesn’t allow forced 
marriage.  There are certain communities that are known 
for perpetrating forced marriages and that’s a cultural 
thing, it’s not a religious thing.  It takes place in other 
parts of the world that are [geographically] similar, but 
not all Muslim. 
When activists choose to argue against violence within the Islamic framework, they do 
so because they not only believe that women in the community will trust a sense of 
religious authority over secular state-based authority, but also because perpetrators of 
violence misleadingly use incorrect Islamic interpretations to justify their violence.   
2) Domestic Violence in the United States 
 While there is anecdotal evidence of forced marriage also occurring in the 
American Muslim population, domestic violence organizations do not identify it as a 
pressing issue in the community.  Instead, it appears to be a rather infrequent problem 
that receives little to no official attention, and is mostly treated as an example of 
human trafficking across various immigrant communities. The US State Department 
includes a section in its Foreign Affairs Manual that compares forced marriage to 
arranged marriage, explaining that US law considers the former to be a violation of 
basic human rights while the latter is an acceptable tradition supported by many 
cultures around the world, as long as it does not involve duress on the part of either 
intended spouse (US Dept. of State Foreign Affairs Manual 2007). 
 The broader shelter movement that fights violence against women in the US 
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shares a similar decline with the British refuge movement.  The first women’s shelter 
in the US was a legal-aid collective that started in 1972—the same year that the British 
Chiswick Women’s Aid started.  Soon after, the US also experienced a combination of 
neoconservative economics and a conservative social agenda in the 1980s that forced 
shelters to make considerable organizational changes.  These changes involved a 
transition to more streamline- efficient services that impersonally treated victims as 
though they were the clientele of state social service agencies.  This drew shelters’ 
attention away from serving the diverse needs of the women who sought their help 
(Elman 2003).  
 This signaled the state’s inadequate attempts to prevent violence against women 
across different communities and grassroots women’s activism emerged among 
minority racial and ethnic groups.  These groups formed their own shelters to meet the 
needs of their communities that they felt were being ignored by the state and, 
consequently, the mainstream organizations that the state controlled. However, 
Muslim women in both countries came to believe that even these minority 
organizations failed to meet their community’s faith-based needs (e.g. dietary 
restrictions, prayer space, etc.).   
   The most-established Muslim domestic violence organization in the US that has 
developed to serve these needs is the Peaceful Families Project (PFP) in northern 
Virginia.  PFP focuses on domestic violence in the more conventional sense—battery 
and abuse in the home. This organization was started by a second generation Muslim 
female activist and, after her recent demise, is now directed by her daughter.  PFP 
recently conducted a national level quantitative survey of directors of Muslim 
domestic violence providers around the country that showed 85% of clients are from 
the immigrant Muslim population.  One of the leaders of PFP explained that it is the 
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immigrant population’s cultural interpretation of Islam that enables domestic violence 
to pervade the Muslim community and requires the organization to draw the same 
distinction between culture and religion. She explains: 
When you’re talking about religion to immigrant 
Muslims, there’s this general notion that they must 
know more and that you must know less because you 
were born and raised [in the United States], so when you 
start to have discussions and you can quote a lot more 
scripture, they’re always very surprised… there’s some 
resentment and… an unwillingness to let go of that 
cultural baggage because then people would have to 
admit to themselves that they’re following a cultural 
version of religion, not a more purist form.   
In order to bolster its reinterpretive framework that distinguishes this ‘purist’ form of 
Islam from immigrants’ cultural interpretations, this organization has enlisted the help 
of imams around the country. In response to research based on 22 mosques in New 
York City that found 96% of participants perceived the imam as a counselor and 74% 
had sought counseling from imams for safety issues (Abu-Ras and Gheith 2008), PFP 
decided that anti-domestic violence workshops must target local imams, training them 
on how to handle such situations among their  congregations with publications and 
DVD resources that the organization  produces.   
 One such publication is in the form of an edited volume surveying diverse 
perspectives on domestic violence within the American Muslim community 
(Abugideiri and Alkhateeb 2007). The introduction, written by Maha B. Alkhateeb, 
one of PFP’s directors, explains that the second generation is more likely to see the 
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distinction between culture and religion and might more easily understand Islam’s true 
prohibition against domestic violence. She writes: “More recent generations of 
indigenous and immigrant Muslims have begun to forge an ‘American Islam,’ one that 
is becoming more bereft of cultural norms and traditions that may contradict Islamic 
teachings” (Alkhateeb 2007: 6).  In contrast, she argues that “some cultural practices 
in Muslim societies promote the uninhibited superiority of men, which is often shown 
to be a contributing factor to violence against women.” This cultural imposition of 
patriarchal beliefs in the home, she believes, clearly contradicts Islam’s egalitarian 
position on marriage.  
C. Counterframes: Spiritual Abuse in Britain and the US 
 Activists at PFP argue that another reason they specifically use Islamic teachings 
to prevent domestic violence in the Muslim community is a pragmatic response to a 
phenomenon they call ‘spiritual abuse,’ where the abuser manipulates religious texts 
to benefit his own interpretation of patriarchal power. This misuse of religious texts 
has been documented in Christian and Jewish traditions as well, where the Bible and 
Torah are respectively used by men to support their abuse. In Muslim communities, 
men “quote Qur’anic verses out of context, reference unsubstantiated traditions of 
Prophet Muhammad, and sometimes even confuse cultural practices with Islam, since, 
in some families…the boundaries between culture and religion have been blurred” 
(Alkhateeb 2007: 21).  Community members, such as clergy and mosque council 
members, also practice spiritual abuse in the Muslim community, exploiting the 
authority they enjoy as male leaders of the community. 
 Activists believe that appealing to the Islamic framework to argue against such 
violence is a pragmatic response because the secular alternative is impractical, since 
the state cannot counter with ideas of what proper Muslim behavior might be.  In cases 
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that PFP observes, “Muslim women who internalize spiritual abuse struggle with the 
feeling that they will be wronging God if they challenge the violence, and that they 
will be condemned by their community leaders and the larger community if they leave 
their abusive situation” (Alkhateeb 2007: 22). Moreover, if this practice hasn’t 
convinced the victim to stay silent and she actually seeks help from an organization 
such as PFP, she often meets a lack of consideration by fellow community and even 
family members who have internalized the cultural definition of Islam themselves, 
discouraging her from seeking appropriate intervention.  In order to tackle these 
counter-frames, activists find that it helps to use specific references in Qur’anic texts 
that demonstrate that such violence violates Qur’anic principles, and that seeking help 
only defends the rights Islam granted to women in the first place.  
III. PROGNOSTIC FRAMING 
 Diagnostic framing identifies the problem of domestic violence and attributes 
blame for its prevalence in the Muslim community to the state’s inadequate attempts 
to protect women and the conflation between cultural and religious practices.  
Subsequently, activists engage in prognostic framing to offer solutions to this 
intracommunal problem.  Their approach primarily involves the Islamic principle of 
ijtihad (critical reasoning) which they argue obliges all Muslims to take part in 
independent reasoning.  Activists believe that independent reasoning will lead men 
and women to egalitarian interpretations of Islam.  In the following sections, I first 
interrogate the concept of ‘culture’ further, and determine how exactly it relates to 
ideas of ‘purist’ religion.  I present the historical debate between ijtihad and ijma 
(societal consensus) as a model that strongly forecasts the distinction that activists 
make between culture and religion.  I use this model to demonstrate that activists 
might gain more analytical traction from reclassifying what they call ‘culture’ as 
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‘tradition.’ Next, I demonstrate that activists in both countries invoke ijtihad to justify 
their own reinterpretive strategy for gender-justice struggles. Finally, I describe the 
hermeneutic strategy employed by both scholars and activists that examines Qur’anic 
texts. This reinterpretive strategy demonstrates that traditional exegeses conducted by 
males have incorrectly passed on a patriarchal perspective that contradicts Qur’anic 
principles.   
A. Frame Articulation: Ijtihad vs. Ijma 
 Though the distinction between culture and religion is an important one to make 
for gender-justice activists who are worried that inaccurate interpretations of Islam are 
responsible for misogynistic practices, it is necessary to briefly problematize the way 
in which ‘culture’ is used as a catch-all term to refer to different interpretations that 
the first and second generations might hold due to different experiences of generation, 
migration, and tradition. As discussed above, many disciplines have addressed the 
challenge of identifying what, precisely, ‘culture’ identifies and it continues to be a 
much-contested topic.  For the purposes of this chapter, however, it should be 
understood that “characterizing a culture is itself a political act, and the notion of 
cultures as preexisting things, waiting to be explained, has become increasingly 
implausible” and the cultural explanation has the “tendency to call on culture when 
faced with anything we cannot otherwise understand” (Phillips 2007: 45). The 
tendency of respondents to find some sort of cultural imperative in common between 
first generation immigrants from Somalia and Bangladesh highlights an almost 
hypocritical resistance to drawing an important distinction between different cultures, 
while a similar distinction between culture and religion is considered crucial to their 
activism. 
 So what do respondents actually mean when they repeatedly refer to culture and 
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blame the first generation’s misogynistic interpretations of Islam on cultural practices? 
I suggest that this distinction between culture and tradition actually harks back to a 
central ideological debate in Islam during the construction of the Sunnah
89
 after the 
Prophet’s death.  This debate argues the importance that Muslims attach to ijtihad 
(critical reasoning) versus ijma (societal consensus) in the creation of religious 
knowledge after the Prophet’s lifetime.  Ijtihad enables one to interpolate meaning by 
examining the revealed text in its own historical context, while ijma usually refers to 
the unanimous consent of jurists or the consensus of the entire community.  Rahman 
(1965) tells us that these two modes of knowledge operated in symbiosis in the early 
years, and were meant to provide a democratic balance between using individual 
reasoning and communal consensus to determine proper Islamic practices in the 
Sunnah, since the Qur’an did not actually advise Muslims how to practice the faith 
(e.g. prayer guidelines, dietary restrictions, etc.). Theoretically, individual reasoning 
was meant to be checked by ijma, with the latter’s emphasis on consensus 
incorporating interpretive differences.  In reality, however, one of the founders of the 
four legal schools of Sunni Islam and an influential Arab jurist named Abu 'Abdallah 
Muhammad al-Shafi, made the tactical mistake of elevating the importance of ijma 
over ijtihad because he believed that communal consensus represented God’s will. 
Scholars have commented that, as the outcome of ijtihad, ijma could be progressive, 
but the inverted relationship could lead to unfortunate conditions of theological 
conservatism (Moazzam 1992).  
 It is this historical relationship between two systems of knowledge that forecasts 
the current interpretive conflict between second generation gender-justice activists in 
Britain and the US and their first generation elders. Islamic scholars argue that ijma 
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 A term that refers to the sayings of the Prophet Muhammad. 
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was actually used to promote taqlid (tradition), and certain social norms became 
conflated with religious principles (Rahman 1965; Barlas 2002). Barlas further argues 
that this construction of the Sunnah that prioritized communal consensus and tradition 
over individual reasoning performed a political project by allowing the state to 
maintain stability through endorsing certain elite scholars’ approved interpretations 
and discouraging further (potentially disruptive and challenging) interpretations from 
being put forward. Scholars began ruling in favor of the hadith when conflicts arose 
between their authority and the Qur’an, but instead of proposing a monolithic 
interpretation of Islam, they appeased society by incorporating pre-existing social 
norms into Islamic practice that were in fact contradictory to the Qur’an’s teachings.  
Interestingly, this interpretation granted elevated religious status to pre-Islamic, 
misogynistic Arab practices such as female circumcision and being stoned to death for 
adultery (Barlas 2002).  
 This same distinction—between a true Islamic egalitarian position and 
customary practices that violate women’s rights in the (incorrect) name of religion—
exists in the interpretive conflict between my respondents and their first generation 
elders. Given this history, it becomes clear that the true target of reform is not a vague 
sense of ‘culture’ that impedes interpretation--in fact, culture is often used to identify 
constantly evolving, nebulous social norms--but ‘tradition,’ a concept that implies a 
sense of loyalty to the way things have historically been done. In the same way the 
reformers continue to employ ijtihad to rethink ways of the past and reason how new 
circumstances and conditions might affect Islamic knowledge, a number of activists in 
both countries referred to the importance of ijtihad and critical thinking in their 
gender-justice struggles: 
Ijtihad … is the ability to critically evaluate something. 
Or you make it applicable for the situation…There are 
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obviously things that we need critical thinking 
for…because these things were obviously not discussed 
at the time of the Prophet. –Student activist, 23, UK 
 
There’s a verse in the Hadith about hitting a woman and 
if you take that out of context, you won’t understand it. 
If you look at the translation it means you’re not allowed 
to leave a mark on my body, so how was it said, when 
was it said, who was it said to, why was it said, you 
know, what was the condition of those people when it 
was said. Those are the preambles you need to apply 
before you can look at something. If you just read and 
do, that’s not right, because you can’t read between the 
lines. – Mosque youth activist/local government, 28, UK 
 
I think [the second generation] is open to a lot more 
questioning, and that’s on a spectrum. I question 
everything, absolutely everything…I personally see 
Muslim cultures around the world as stuck… and 
they’ve started to make religion stuck, because they 
refuse to reinterpret, they refuse to use critical thinking 
when looking at these issues…we have to reinterpret, 
especially if you come from more conservative 
backgrounds…in order to live in this society—Domestic 
violence activist, 35, US 
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And any student of Islam knows that you have to 
continue to interpret, it goes on and it goes on in the 
context of modernity. Something happened in the 10th 
century when ijtihad just sort of ceased, and we’re 
interpreting everything in that time’s cultural context—
Domestic violence activist/researcher, 33, US 
 
 The concept of ijtihad has actually been the subject of much controversy, 
regarding who is capable of its practice and whether it is still considered a legitimate 
means of interpreting Islamic texts. The practice of ijtihad to reinterpret the Qur’an, 
often on the subject of women’s rights, is opposed by traditional Sunni scholars who 
believe that the ‘gates of ijtihad’ closed somewhere in the 10th century. Accordingly 
Sunni scholars were supposed to stop its practice and their teachings increasingly 
relied upon taqlid (tradition, as discussed above). An Islamic legal scholar known for 
his expertise regarding ijtihad, named Wael B. Hallaq, however, argues that no such 
closure is clear in Islamic history.  Instead, the argument reflects the historical political 
project where mujtahids (scholars who practice ijtihad to reinterpret ‘new’ problems) 
were socially shamed out of existence in order to maintain social stability based on 
ijma. The process involved a gradual increase in qualifications and requirements 
deciding who was capable of legitimate ijtihad, but Hallaq concludes that, in fact, 
minimal legal knowledge required (Hallaq 1984).  
 The next section will demonstrate that, despite this controversy, the practice of 
ijtihad has flourished in Muslim women’s hermeneutic scholarship, and it has also 
been adopted by second generation gender-justice activists to critically challenge 
misogynistic interpretations of Islam.  In keeping with this chapter’s focus on 
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domestic violence, I will narrow my analysis to two predominant female exegetes’ 
(Asma Barlas and Amina Wadud) hermeneutic strategies that attempt to uncover 
Islam’s prohibition on domestic violence.  It should be noted, however, that each of 
these female scholars applies a similar hermeneutic model to a vast range of gender-
justice issues, including topics as diverse as rights to inheritance and bear witness. 
B. Hermeneutic Strategies: Scholar-Activists Reinterpret the Qur’an 
 There now exists a considerable body of scholarship that uses hermeneutic 
strategies to uncover what is believed to be Islam’s true egalitarian spirit, and 
positions itself in opposition to conventional interpretations of Islam that portray it as 
a misogynistic religion (Davary 2009; Barazangi 2004; al-Hibri 2002; Barlas 2002; 
Wadud 1999; Mernissi 1992; Ahmed 1992).  In this section I examine how two female 
scholars—Amina Wadud and Asma Barlas, who are considered to be preeminent 
Qur’anic exegetes on the topic of women’s rights—demonstrate that women can 
derive the rights that protect them from domestic violence within a strictly Islamic 
framework, in contrast to a secular framework that outlines state-based rights.  
 Amina Wadud argues against an “atomistic methodology [that begins] with the 
first verse of the first chapter and [proceeds] to the second verse of the first chapter--
one verse at a time” because this linear methodology fails to recognize larger themes.  
It also makes no methodological attempt at “linking similar Qur’anic ideas, syntactical 
structures, principles, or themes together” (Wadud 1999: 2). In order to offer a more 
comprehensive interpretation of the Qur’an, she argues that the intention behind the 
verse is crucial.  This approach often means that she looks for multiple appearances of 
controversial words to understand how they are contextually applied in different 
passages. She refuses to take words at their surface definition for two main reasons: 
one, because what “concerns [her] most about the ‘traditional’ [interpretations] is that 
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they were exclusively written by males;” two, because the “Qur’an was revealed in 
seventh-century Arabia when the Arabs held certain perceptions and misconceptions 
about women and were involved in certain specific lewd practices against them” 
(Wadud 1999: 6).   She admits that the exegete’s individual bias will always 
contaminate interpretation—such is the central admission of hermeneutics--yet 
believes that a holistic, non-linear interpretation that puts effort into unveiling major 
themes in the Qur’an can mitigate this bias to a reasonable extent.  
 Asma Barlas also advocates a hermeneutic strategy that recognizes the “textual 
and thematic holism of the Qur’an” in order to uncover what she believes is its 
inherently antipatriarchal epistemology. In fact, she believes that ijtihad is the central 
hermeneutic of Islamic reasoning and jurisprudence.  She argues that the state has 
actually played an integral role in suppressing ijtihad--and thus hermeneutic strategies 
that might detect Islam’s true egalitarian spirit--because the state’s “ongoing 
involvement in sustaining the hegemony of conservative interpretive communities and 
of religious meaning has injected coercive power into the very heart of knowledge 
construction in many Muslim societies” (Barlas 2002: 88).  Although the state she 
refers to is the historical development of the state in the Muslim world, and neither 
Britain nor the United States, activists in the West could apply this indictment to first 
generation male leaders as well. In their case, it is these male leaders who effectively 
hegemonize ‘traditional’ androcentric, primocentric interpretations of Islam.  In 
response to these communal interpretations, Wadud, Barlas and second generation 
activists use ijtihad to reclaim Islam’s egalitarian themes.  
 Both Wadud and Barlas make an interesting discursive move in their work that 
prioritizes Islam as a rights-granting framework that effectively supercedes any state’s 
rights-granting ability: each in turn argues that the Qur’anic text, as God’s word, is 
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infallible, which interpreted properly would eliminate the need for other worldly 
authorities to protect women (Wadud 2006, 1999; Barlas 2002).  Barlas describes this 
move as the Divine Ontology, or God’s Self-Disclosure, which is the organizing 
principle of Islam and boils down to the following three assumptions: first, tawhid 
(Divine Unity) is the unicity of Allah; second, Allah would not do zulm (harm) to 
anyone; and third, Allah is incomparable, so cannot be equated with either man or 
woman. Each of these assumptions allows these exegetes to launch a hermeneutic 
strategy from a common ontology that says God sees men and women as equal, God 
would never do either harm, and God cannot be considered equal to either group 
(rejecting a common tactic of equating God and male to assert patriarchal 
interpretations).  
 Their hermeneutic strategies converge on the Qur’anic verse that is thought to 
most directly deal with domestic violence in family relations--verse 4:34: 
Men are [qawwamuna ‘ala] women [on the basis] of 
what Allah has [preferred] (faddala) some of them over 
others, and [on the basis] of what they spend of their 
property (for the support of women). So good women 
are [qanitat], guarding in secret that which Allah has 
guarded. As for those from whom you fear [nushuz], 
admonish them, banish them to beds apart, and scourge 
them. Then, if they obey you, seek not a way against 
them. - Qur’an 4:34 (as cited in Wadud 1999: 70) 
 
Wadud begins with the linguistic approach, focusing on nushuz, and its traditional 
translation when applied to the wife, as ‘disobedience to the husband.’ She looks for 
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the application of the word elsewhere in the Qur’an, however, and finds it in verses 
where it also applies to men. She argues: “since the Qur’an uses nushuz for both the 
male and the female, it cannot mean ‘disobedience to the husband.’” She prefers 
Sayyid Qutb’s definition of the term as a state of disorder between the married couple. 
Wadud argues that this interpretation is more logically consistent with not only the 
different applications of nushuz elsewhere in the Qur’an, but with the Qur’an’s 
thematic focus on family relations that treat spouses as equal partners. 
 She moves on to discuss the solution to this disorder and points out that the 
Qur’an lays out a three-step process. The first resort is a verbal solution, the second is 
separation, and the third is the scourge. It is this third, and final, resort that 
misogynistic interpretations of the verse 4:34 have used to justify male violence, but 
Wadud refers back to the ontological position discussed above and argues that “the 
nature of the ‘scourge’ cannot be such as to create conjugal violence or a struggle 
between the couple because that is ‘un-Islamic’” (Wadud 1999: 75).  What would 
otherwise appear as circular logic actually derives its definition from the ontological 
position that God would not cause harm--for the purposes of thematic consistency, the 
scourge could not be considered violence if the Qur’an’s broader message insists that 
family relations be harmonious. Returning to a linguistic hermeneutic strategy, Wadud 
admits that the use of daraba in the third suggestion is traditionally interpreted, ‘to 
strike,’ but that this word has also been used when “Allah gives or sets an example,” 
or “when someone leaves, or ‘strikes out’ on a journey” (Wadud 1999: 76).  
 Barlas agrees with Wadud there may be alternative definitions of daraba, but 
argues that another example in the Qur’an suggests that even if it is taken to mean ‘to 
strike’ in a physical sense, it is meant as more of a symbolic than punitive gesture. She 
points to the the passage where Job threatens to beat his wife for cursing God and God 
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asks Job to instead take a little grass in his hand and daraba his wife.  Since grass 
cannot possibly cause bodily injury and God intervened to prevent Job from beating 
her more violently, Barlas argues that daraba should be seen as a restrictive, rather 
than prescriptive, treatment of domestic violence. She also supports this interpretation 
by considering historical context at the time of the revelation, when wife beating was 
considered a norm. By making the symbolic admonishment the third, and final, resort, 
Barlas argues that the Qur’an must have meant to restrict such violence.  
 Though activists invoke a broader understanding of ijtihad as general critical 
thinking, cited earlier, some activists also apply hermeneutic exegeses of Islamic texts. 
PFP’s reinterpretive strategy, for instance, uses specific Qur’anic verses to educate 
Muslims about peaceful family relations and tries to counter spiritual abuse by 
stressing that committing violence is, in fact, wronging God.  Again, appealing to 
religiously-derived rights allows activists to appeal to victims’ faith-based priorities, 
as opposed to the secular approach of state-based rights.  The organization uses the 
following verses in their workshops and resources to fight domestic violence: 
And among His signs is this: that He created for you 
mates from among yourselves so that you may dwell in 
tranquility with them. He has put love and mercy 
between your hearts; in that are signs for those who 
reflect. (30:21) 
O you who believe! Stand out firmly for justice as 
witnesses to God, even if it is against yourselves,  or 
your parents, or your relatives; and whether it is against 
someone whos is rich or poor. (4:135) 
And why should you not fight in the cause of God and 
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for those who, being weak, are ill-treated and 
oppressed?  Men, women, and children, whose cry  is, 
‘Our Lord! Rescue us from this place where there are 
oppressors, and raise for us from You one who will 
protect and help! (4:75) 
If two parties among the believers fall into a quarrel, 
make peace between them.  But, if one of them 
transgresses beyond bounds against the other, then all of 
you should fight against the one that transgresses until 
the person complies with  the command of God; but 
if the person complies, then make peace between them 
with justice and be fair, for God loves those who are fair 
and just. (49:9) 
PFP compiles these specific verses to engage in reinterpretive activism that fights 
against domestic violence.  In order to demonstrate that Islam prohibits domestic 
violence, they quote the ultimate religious authority—Islamic scripture.   
C. Counterframes: Deriving Rights from an Islamic Framework 
 In both exegetes’ work, as well as the work of domestic violence organizations, 
the restriction against domestic violence is clear in the Qur’an, but has been 
misinterpreted by traditional interference.  They consequently apply ijtihad to uncover 
the true intention behind certain language and verses’ intentions.  Whereas the rights 
that these scholar-activists derive from Islam are in reality also protected by both the 
British and US states, their deliberate move to argue against violence from within an 
Islamic framework makes strategic sense since believers are more likely to accept the 
authority of religious, rather than secular, language.  This reinterpretive strategy fights 
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against domestic violence by emphasizing Islamic restrictions placed upon men 
harming women, instead of appealing to secular laws that provide protective orders 
and would ideally arrest abusers to stop such violence. By referring to an Islamic 
framework, these scholars aim to not only convince women that God intends them no 
harm and that such violence is un-Islamic, but they accuse abusers of being un-Islamic 
as well.  
 A number of British Muslim activists believe that the Islamic framework grants 
them their rights as women, instead of either a secular state framework or secular 
Western feminist tradition. In many cases, activists expressed that they often equate 
the word feminism with orientalist tendencies that automatically assume Islam 
oppresses women. Instead, some activists suggest that Islam is more interested than 
the Western feminist tradition in the liberation of all women: 
Feminists think that Muslim women are oppressed, 
maybe because I wear a headscarf or I don’t show as 
much skin, but to me that’s not oppression, that’s 
liberation. Because selling your self, what does that 
accomplish? The men enjoy it, you lose your self-
esteem, and it oppresses other women because they feel 
that they have to beautify themselves and go the extra 
mile. It just debases you…I think that feminism was 
established long ago, and we were given our rights by 
the Quran and the Prophet Mohammed, peace be upon 
him, who changed the society for women and gave us 
rights that were unknown to women in the seventh 
century.  
– Student organizer, 28, UK 
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I don't feel that women need to project themselves in 
that fashion, or concentrate on that aspect of things. The 
whole system in Islam gives women their rights and we 
don't need to aspire to another ideology, feminism, to be 
able to gain our rights. Within Islam we have more 
rights than the average lady on the road.  
– Student/Political organizer, 23, UK 
 
When I think of the word feminist, I think of someone 
fighting for women’s rights, but we have those rights 
anyway… and I get these rights from my religion. So 
while some people might be ignorant of those rights, I 
have those rights and I know I’m entitled to those rights. 
For example, like my mum, whatever she says goes--in 
Islam, you’re not allowed to question your mother… 
that’s a right of a mum, and her right is that whatever 
she says (as long as it doesn’t go against the laws of the 
Creator) goes… if you don’t give her that right, you’re 
committing a sin and you’re going against the Creator… 
I feel like I have those rights and I don’t need to fight for 
them; they’ve been given to me by God and no one can 
actually take them away from me because God gave 
them to me. –Islamic school teacher, 24, UK 
Activists suggest that their religion grants them rights as women that supersede either 
what the secular state could offer or the rights for which the secular women’s 
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movement struggles.  Whereas the secular state-based rights framework relies upon 
law enforcement that may be vulnerable to external factors such as limited resources 
and prejudice to prevent violence, the religious framework relies upon the believer’s 
fundamental desire to be a good Muslim.  This alternative Islamic framework, activists 
argue, makes a separate ideological struggle to obtain gender rights outside of religion 
effectively redundant. 
 Similarly, in the US, PFP operates under the assumption that interventions 
against domestic violence in the Muslim community must rely on educating Muslims 
about Islamic teachings that prohibit any sort of violence in the family, rather than 
appealing to secular state-based rights that Muslim women are entitled to in the West. 
For example, the publication talks about the problem of marital rape, arguing:  
Verbal, emotional, physical and spiritual manipulation is 
un-Islamic, and at no time is the use of any type of force 
acceptable by any party. If a spouse insists on practicing 
sexual relations in a way that lies outside the Islamic 
dictates of ‘mercy’ and ‘compassion’ then that person 
has violated divine orders and is subject to punishment 
in a court of law in this life, and is also deemed to be 
held accountable in the hereafter.   
While marital rape was legal in the US until as late as 1976, it is nonetheless 
technically illegal in all 50 states today, meaning that Muslim women can appeal to 
this secular law if they find themselves the victims of such a crime.  Instead, however, 
PFP believes that combating domestic violence is more effective in a faith-based 
community by appealing to the more familiar Islamic framework. One of the leaders 
explains why she uses the religious framework to convince women that they have 
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these religiously derived rights to safety: “You cannot go to a group of people and 
hope to help them in a way that doesn’t relate to their reality--they need a solution that 
they’re going to adopt.” In this case, the reality of immigrant victims of domestic 
violence is that they have been removed from any support networks they might have 
had in their country of origin, they sometimes live with in-laws who are multiple 
abusers, they often have passports and other documents withheld to limit their 
mobility and regularly live in fear and distrust of the authorities.  These vulnerabilities 
compound the difficulty of appealing to secular state-based rights to exit situations of 
domestic violence and the more familiar appeals to religion might give them more 
ammunition in seeking help from family or community leaders. 
 
IV. FRAME TRANSFORMATION 
 Activists also engage in non-violent intracommunal issues by transforming the 
frames they use to fight against domestic violence. Frame transformation is one of 
four frame alignment processes through which movements can take their framing of a 
particular issue and adapt it to broader interests, expanding the scope of the original 
frame (Benford and Snow 2000). While frame bridging, frame amplification and 
frame extension also help to link existing frames to new points of interest, frame 
transformation is seen as the most ambitious alignment process for symbolic 
innovation (Tarrow 1998).   
 In the case of my research, activists use frame transformation to adapt the 
practice of ijtihad to issues beyond the scope of domestic violence that also warrant 
critical reasoning, such as marriage norms in the diaspora. This section will 
demonstrate how activists apply ijtihad to construct feminist tropes in the Prophetic 
tradition, and subsequently use the narrative of one of the most popular heroines 
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(Khadija—the Prophet’s first wife) to endorse their reinterpretation of marriage rules 
in Islam. This strategy not only transforms the practice of ijtihad, but it also 
transforms old understandings of parental involvement in finding partners for children, 
generating a new process of ‘self-initiated’ marriages. This development still seeks 
parental approval, yet operates as a system that prioritizes the second generation’s 
religious identity over the cultural preservation that their parents seek. 
  A. Transforming Ijtihad   
 My findings suggest that gender-justice activists are using ijtihad to articulate a 
‘new Islam’ in both Britain and the US that is distinct from the Islam of their first 
generation elders. While the literal practice of ijtihad involves a hermeneutic strategy 
that closely analyzes texts and looks for logical inconsistencies between definitions 
and their historical context, as well as applications of certain words across various 
verses, its figurative application employs critical thinking to highlight female role 
models and interpret stories in the Qur’an and Prophetic tradition as myths and tropes 
that symbolize positive virtues.  Respondents made recurrent references to women in 
the Prophet’s life: 
Khadija was actually older than the Prophet…a 
businesswoman, she was a leader in her own right in 
many ways. I look at her as a role model and she was 
never dependent on any man. I see myself and my mum 
in the same way—neither of us has ever been dependent 
on a man.—Local Authority Worker, 28, UK 
 
In stories that are told, you can’t relate to the experience 
unless you can somewhat relate to that experience. So I 
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think things are changing as women become more alive 
and have more opportunities, education… they’re 
drawing on their tradition to say, hang on, what are the 
examples? What were women doing at that time? 
Actually there’s all sorts of things … Khadija was a 
businesswoman at a time when it was a patriarchal 
society.—Chair of community non-profit, 38, UK  
 
I think you have to be careful who you read from and 
who you take your sources from. The Quran is clear, 
there’s no room for error or doubt, extreme error or 
doubt. The Prophet’s wives, Aisha and Khadija, were 
great leaders. The first martyr was a woman. So women 
have had a critical impact … they are the ones who 
shaped the future, and they have the biggest 
contribution.—Student Organizer, 28, UK 
 
I always viewed Islam as something that liberated 
women and gave them a lot of rights.  For me, Islam is 
the reason I went to business school, because I grew up 
hearing stories of the Prophet’s wife and how successful 
she was. My mom used to read me stories when I was 
little and she was a fantastic woman--she would have 
been the CEO of Pepsi if she were alive today…so for 
me, Islam has always been very empowering. – National 
Level Student Organizer, 25, US 
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[When I ran a campaign insisting that women should be 
part of our school’s MSA], I would use Khadija 
(PBUH), who was the wife of the Prophet. She was the 
more powerful one in the relationship, she was wealthy, 
she was a businessowner, a merchant. She had an 
established life and career. She was older--all of these 
things… so she was never sectioned off from society. I 
would use the wives of the Prophets as examples--his 
daughters too, Fatima being one of them, as being very 
outspoken, loud… Musaiba, who wasn’t a wife or a 
daughter, but a follower, she actually went to battle and 
jumped in front of him one day when he was being 
attacked. So women were always integrated and the 
Prophet never, ever shut women out from public 
discourse, from education, from anything. – Local 
government advisor, 28, US 
 
These findings suggest that second generation activists are constructing sacred 
feminist tropes out of commonly told stories about women in the Prophetic tradition.  
Gottfried Hagen (2009) argues “the interpretive function of myth” is an 
important tool used to analyze the stories of the Prophet in Islam, even though Islam is 
deeply suspicious of myth, as are other monotheistic religions. Despite this, he 
proposes a ‘functional approach’ which “studies myths as binding memories…[and] 
applied narrations… which respond to certain societal needs and concerns about the 
experience of the world and the human condition” (Hagen 2009: 307). Though Hagen 
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fails to mention any female characters in the Prophet’s life, his functional approach 
resembles how my respondents employ female characters in Islam: they remember 
particular narratives about certain women’s lives that demonstrate that strong, 
independent, women were an integral part of historical Islam and prove that women 
were deeply valued in Islam’s early days.  This strategy was employed by respondents 
across different levels of education and class status, suggesting that the construction of 
sacred feminist tropes could be a more accessible hermeneutic strategy for activists to 
reinterpret women’s role in Islam than scholarly strategies that rely on academic 
exegeses of the Qu’ran.  
 While respondents mentioned Aisha as one of the Prophet’s favorite wives and 
revered her for leading soldiers into the Battle of Basr, or referred to Fatima (the 
Prophet’s daughter) and her struggle to win her Islamically granted inheritance rights 
after her father’s death, the most prominent feminist trope mentioned is Khadija’s role 
in the Prophet’s life. Activists not only venerate her in the quotes above for her 
business prowess and successful career, but they also repeatedly raise the fact that she 
was older to the Prophet and took it upon herself to propose marriage to him:  
But it’s the traditional sense of courting I suppose, you 
just have someone with you, instead of being alone.  The 
interpretation of some people is that because some 
people are so strict, there’s no room to meet anyone. 
Because historically communities used to be smaller, a 
man could see a woman doing shopping, like her, 
inquire, someone would know her, and then they could 
get married. Like Khadija, the Prophet was her 
employee, and she inquired about him and so forth, 
found out about his character, inquired through a third 
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person whether he’d be interested in her, instead of 
approaching him directly. She actually proposed to him. 
We don’t have those limitations. Whereas today, 
everyone says, noooo, the guy has to propose to you, but 
that’s because it’s cultural influence. –Local Authority 
Community Engagement Worker, 28, UK 
 
[Khadijah] was a smart, sophisticated woman who knew 
what she wanted and how to get it.  When I read stories 
about her, I admire not only her dignity and grace, but 
also her determination and self-confidence… the story 
of Khadijah’s proposal and subsequent marriage to 
Muhammad was often recounted as part of the 
discussion that Muslims had about the rights of women 
in Islam.. To understand out heritage and the principles 
which underpinned our story as people of faith, we 
looked back at the individuals like Muhammad and 
Khadijah who had laid the foundations of Islam. –
Author (Love in a Headscarf), 35, UK 
The reinterpretive strategy of using Khadija’s feminist trope about self-initiated 
marriage transforms part of the frame that activists use to counter domestic violence in 
the Muslim community—namely, they draw a similar distinction between tradition 
and religion to clarify that Islam, in fact, requires individual consent in marriages 
(preventing forced marriages, discussed above), and also considers all ethnicities and 
races equally.  This interpretation is offered in direct contrast to the first generation’s 
efforts at cultural preservation. During interviews, activists argued that the first 
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generation strongly prefers intragroup marriages and would like for the second 
generation to marry within endogamous ethnic or racial boundaries. In spite of this, 
activists demonstrate that reinterpreting a more ‘purist’ Islam mandates prioritizing the 
religious identity above all else, which effectively endorses intergroup unions.  
However, transforming the frame involves changing the role that parental approval 
plays in second generation marriages, without rejecting it completely. This 
transformation means that second generation women still abide by Islamic restrictions 
on pre-marital intimacy and wish to obtain parental approval, even if they have found 
their own partners outside of their ethnic or racial group. 
B. Reinterpreting Marriage Norms 
 Advocates for arranged marriages, from numerous faith and immigrant 
communities, argue that the practice of matchmaking through family and friends 
preserves cultural traditions and provides options for individuals who have otherwise 
limited options due to cultural or religious restrictions on dating, which is an otherwise 
popular system of finding partners in the West.  However, the distinction between this 
system and forced marriage is one of great importance to respondents.  In discussing 
parental and community involvement in making matches, respondents made recurrent 
references to Islamic requirements for consent.  In interviews, they cite the same story 
from the Prophetic tradition that the British student activist cited above about the 
woman whose marriage was considered null and void because it was initiated without 
her consent. 
 Whereas anecdotal evidence suggests that arranged marriage may be on the rise 
in the second generation,
90
 activists in both countries emphasize the importance of 
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America” Alternet.org. 
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individual consent in such unions, which suggests that there might be conflicts 
between the first generation’s interests in procuring a match and the interests of their 
second generation children.  Respondents in both countries claim that the incidence of 
interethnic marriages is noticeably higher among second generation Muslims than the 
first generation and argue that it is, once again, cultural conventions of racism that 
prevail among the first generation in trying to prevent their children’s marriages to 
exogamous partners: 
In Pakistan, the culture that my parents come from, it's 
very unusual for a person to marry outside of the 
Pakistani culture. And I'm marrying a Bengali, someone 
who's from Bangladesh and the fact is that I didn't feel 
that his nationality was important to me because he had 
full Islamic principles. So… culture would say why are 
you marrying outside of your culture? Because it's a 
cultural norm to marry within your [community]. Even 
so much that you should marry people within your 
province. My parents obviously broke that because my 
parents are from different parts of Pakistan but I went 
one step further and married a person from a different 
country. But he's not really from a different country 
because were both brought up in Britain…and the 
Muslim identity was important.  –Student organizer, 23, 
UK 
The individuals who are more religious will often 
organize themselves in a way so that their Islamic values 
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are …the criteria. And so anything that fits the criteria 
from either of their ethnic or cultural affiliations is okay 
and whatever doesn’t fit the criteria is amoral… and 
they’ll kind of let it go. I think it’s fascinating because it 
allows for young Muslims who are growing up to marry 
across ethnic lines with much more frequency. So, just 
to give examples of my own age group, there are a lot of 
people who have married the same ethnic background as 
them but there are at least 7 people off the top of my 
head who have married someone from a very distinctly 
different ethnic background and that was primarily 
achieved because they prioritized their religion. –
Mosque Youth Worker, 29, US 
These activists suggest that the religious and Western nationalities that women share 
with their partners supercede the cultural heritage that may differ between their 
parents.   
 Denise al-Johar conducts a (2005) qualitative study of second generation 
American Muslim women’s marriage decisions in Houston’s Sunni immigrant 
community and concludes that marriages arranged strictly through family and friends 
correlates exclusively with unions between people in the same linguistic or ethnic 
group, while what she calls ‘self-initiated’ marriages correlates exclusively with 
unions between people from different linguistic or ethnic groups.  In the latter group, 
nonetheless, all of the young women in the study still admit to following Islamic 
principles of marriage, including abstaining from any premarital intimate relations and 
attempting to gain their parents’ approval.  Al-Johar also detects the distinction 
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between culture and religion that informs her respondents’ marriage behavior: 
“informants following this route to marriage explained that the arranged marriages of 
their homelands are actually more cultural than religious, and in America they took the 
opportunity to follow Islamic rules of marriage instead” (al-Johar 2005: 568). Her 
findings suggest that “increased religiosity and an emphasis on ethnic equality in the 
Qur’an legitimate[s] young Muslims’ desires to marry beyond their communities” 
(571).   
 While al-Johar’s study is relatively small (n=27) and limited to one, albeit 
densely populated, geographical concentration of Muslims, her research falls in line 
with my own findings regarding second generation perspectives on intermarriage in 
both countries (See Figure 1).  Though it should be noted that my samples are also too 
small to confidently extrapolate generalizations across the Muslim activist population 
in either country, I use my data to illustrate a significant and suggestive difference 
between the marriage behavior of Muslim activist women and the rest of the country.   
 I created a subsample of my respondents who are married and compared the 
prevalence of intermarriage in this group against the rates of comparable unions in 
each country’s entire population.
91
  The figure illustrates that an overwhelming 
number of marriages in both countries’ national populations are endogamous with 
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 I use the term intermarriage to describe unions that cross ‘community’ lines. In the 
US, the term ‘interracial’ gained prevalence due to historical miscegenation laws that 
prohibited unions between a white and a non-white spouse.  The Supreme Court case 
of Loving v. Virginia 388 U.S. 1 (1967) declared such laws were unConstitutional and 
violated both the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. However, after ongoing immigration for the past four decades in the US, 
‘interracial’ does not accurately describe the increase in unions across ethnic groups in 
the US that may not involve a white spouse—such unions are more recently being 
described as ‘interethnic’ (as they are referred to in Britain), but both interracial and 
interethnic are coupled in recent research (see Pew Research Center report cited 
below) in reporting exogamous marriages.  
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only a minority reporting exogamous marriages.
92
  A 2010 Pew Research Center 
report that surveyed American couples in 2008 reports that one in seven new 
marriages is interracial or interethnic in nature.
93
  The only accessible British data 
gathered by the UK national census of 2001 that reports interethnic unions at 2 percent 
is outdated, though there is no reliable reason or recent data to suggest that the 
percentage has increased significantly.  Among the subsample of my respondents, 
however, 69 percent of American Muslim activists and 63 percent of British Muslim 
activists report exogamous marriages, which involve marrying outside either their 
racial or ethnic group.  These rates, illustrated in the graph below, comprise suggestive 
evidence that activists are disproportionately involved in exogamous marriages, far 
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 Endogamous marriage refers to marrying within a specific group, while exogamous 
marriage refers to marrying outside of a specific group to which an individual belongs.  
The ambiguity of the ‘group’ is precisely why I use this term to describe intermarriage 
unions—in some cases they may be unions across racial lines, in others they may cross 
ethnic lines. In either scenario, there is a distinct group boundary that is noticeably 
preserved or challenged by endogamous and exogamous unions. 
93
 See Pew Research Center Report: Passel, Jeffrey S., Wendy Wang and Paul Taylor. 
2010. Marrying Out. Pew Research Center, Washington, D.C. 
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           Figure 3.1: Marriage Rates 
Sources: US: Pew Research Center; Britain—Office for National Statistics; Muslim 
sub-group: author’s interview data. 
 
 Respondents in both countries argued that the first generation’s tendency 
towards cultural preservation, which manifests itself not only in endogamous pairings 
for their children but in culturally-segregated mosques and community centers as well, 
leads to racial exclusiveness in both countries. A 24 year old teacher in an Islamic 
primary school in Britain explains her disdain with the first generation’s racism 
towards people outside of certain cultural groups:  
Pakistanis, culturally, will turn around and look down 
upon a black person, but then I turn around and say to 
them ‘do you know Islam got [to Africa] first before it 
got to you?’ and then they’re shocked. It’s a cultural 
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thing, but if they were 100% practicing, they wouldn’t 
think like that. They would look at them on equal 
footing, because it’s all equal in Islam. If there are 
congregational prayers, a king will pray in the same line 
as a pauper.   
A 28 year old American Muslim activist of Indian origin who works for New York 
City’s local government describes her relationship with a Black convert male:  
Black men are 40% of our prison population, 50% of 
our unemployed, and black women, in the grand scheme 
of racial dating and hierarchy are at the very bottom, so I 
used to think ‘who the hell am I to take one educated 
black man from that pool, when I have a billion South 
Asians to choose from, technically?’ So that was really 
hard for me to get over. It was really [my husband] 
being like, ‘no, no, no, it has nothing to do with my 
color or your color, it has much more to do with the fact 
that we’re both American and we’re both Muslim and 
we need to really unite around that.  
According to this respondent, the religious and national identities that she shares in 
common with her partner supercede their differences in ethnicity or race, echoing the 
British respondent of Pakistani origin quoted above who plans to marry a British 
Muslim male of Bangladeshi origin.  The same American Muslim respondent went on 
to explain that she also reads a revolutionary fervor into the interethnic/interracial 
unions between second generation Muslims:  
Dr. Jackson… talks about this immigrant-indigenous 
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divide and talks about how the third resurrection of 
Islam in America will be when immigrants and 
indigenous [Muslims] figure out how to work together 
and one of the ways that’s going to happen is through 
marriage. So I started to think less about the fact that 
I’m taking a black man from the black community… 
and more about the fact that I’m from a… middle-class 
South Asian household that’s now going to accept a 
working-class Brooklyn black boy--woah, in what world 
is that happening? You know what I mean? So that 
revolutionary mindset kind of propelled me to get my 
parents to start being okay with it.  
Dr. Sherman Jackson, cited by the respondent above, is an Islamic Studies scholar as 
well as the co-founder of the American Learning Institute for Muslims (ALIM), a 
specialized institute that “seeks to produce Islamically literate members of society that 
will have a positive effect on Muslim society as well as the society at large.” 
94
 Four of 
my respondents personally attended ALIM summer programs for students, and 
mentioned that it is one of the central networking events where second generation 
American Muslim activists meet.  
 Jackson’s (2005) work on the ‘third resurrection’ claims that Islam spread 
among Black Americans, prior to the influx of foreign born Muslims in 1965, because 
of the distinctively American phenomenon of ‘Black religion’ that was used to combat 
racism. He argues that Black Americans must fight the claims of “immigrant 
supremacy” that suggest Blacks do not follow an ‘authentic’ form of Islam and that 
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the key to this fight might be to unite with second generation Muslims, who are also 
interested in battling the first generation’s feelings of supremacy that conflate cultural 
beliefs with acceptable Islamic practice.  Along this vein, interethnic/interracial 
marriage helps construct the new Islamic identity of the West and depends on a similar 
reinterpretive strategy that second generation women use to fight domestic violence.   
 While the previous literature on intermarriage in the West has been limited to 
work that assumes intermarriage with a white partner suggests higher rates of 
integration (Alba and Nee 2003; Lee and Bean 2004), more recent analysis has also 
looked at increasing rates of intermarriage between ethnic and racial minorities. Miri 
Song’s (2009) analysis, for example, suggests that our conceptualization of interethnic 
unions should expand to include more complicated interethnic unions, particularly in 
multicultural societies. In discussing ethnicity versus religion, she argues: “in Britain, 
it may be that second generation Indian, Bangladeshi and Pakistani Britons may 
intermarry if their common sense of being second generation Asian overrides their 
different ethnic backgrounds. Of course, intermarriage across religious lines--for 
instances, between Hindus and Muslims--may be an inhibiting factor” (Song 2009: 
344).  Although the idea of an interreligious union might inhibit interethnic unions 
across certain groups, my findings suggest that intrareligious unions might encourage 
interethnic unions across other groups, e.g. Pakistani-Bangladeshi, Asian-Afro-
Carribean, Afro-Carribean-Convert, etc.  While the data are limited on interethnic 
Muslim marriages in both countries, my findings suggest that gender-justice activists 
represent disproportionately high rates of interethnic unions in both countries.  This 
disproportionate inclination to join interethnic or interracial unions reflects a similar 
reinterpretive strategy to reclaim Islam in the West. Activists transform the frame they 
use to fight domestic violence by employing ijtihad to distinguish between 
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misogynistic cultural practices and egalitarian religious principles, in order to pursue 
marriages that prioritize their Muslim identity. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 Just as second generation Muslim women activists in both Britain and the 
United States counter what they believe to be misrepresentation of the Muslim woman 
in mainstream media outlets in the each country’s public sphere, activists also contest 
the construction of the Muslim woman within the private sphere.  This latter form of 
activism takes the form of challenging what activists believe to be misinterpretation of 
Islam’s position on gender-justice.  A group of reinterpretive activists have emerged to 
counter an androcentric, primocentric interpretation of how women should be treated 
in Muslim communities, a version that activists believe exclusively uses the first 
generation Muslim male and his interests to construct gender relations in Islam.  
Rather, they argue, Islam was founded with a fundamentally egalitarian spirit; they 
promote alternative translations and interpretations of the original texts that reveal the 
religion’s positive position on gender-justice.   
 In a sense, this position has ramifications that go beyond the private sphere as 
well. In the public sphere, if we remember back to the previous chapter, some activists 
suggested that some community members might perpetuate conservative stereotypes 
of gender relations in the Muslim community.  This chapter explained that such 
representation of gender relations in the community points back to misinterpretations 
of religious texts.  If activists can change how Muslims themselves believe Islam 
treats women, then more positive representations of gender relations could have a 
ripple effect on public constructions of the Muslim woman as well.   
 In observing how activists go about countering misrepresentation and 
misinterpretation in both public and private spheres, it became evident that activists 
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choose to frame their claims differently—even within campaigns tackling the same 
issue (e.g. women’s rights in mosques).  In the next chapter, I discuss the different 
frames and explore the diversity and disagreement that comprise the community of 
second generation Muslim women activists in both Britain and the United States.  
 The fact that activists make the conscious decision between appealing to the 
diversity within religious interpretations of gender instead of appealing to the diversity 
apparent within ethnic cultures suggests that the religious identity may hold more 
salience in the second generation’s desire to organize its members’ lives for 
themselves.  Anne Swidler, a sociologist who theorizes how culture and religion may 
affect behavior argues that “doctrine and casuistry tell people how to act and provide 
blueprints for community life…ritual acquires such significance in unsettled lives 
because ritual changes reorganize take-for-granted habits and modes of experience” 
(Swidler 1986: 279).  Second generation activists stress the idea that being born and 
raised in the West divorces them from the cultural traditions in which their parents 
were raised, yet the literal and figurative distance created by their parents’ migration 
allows second generation activists to experiment with their religious identity. In 
‘unsettled’ periods of what they believe to be misdirected hostility towards Muslims 
and racial/ethnic profiling, perhaps activists find the ritual guidance of religion to be 
comforting, rather than mere membership in a race/ethnic group. 
 Moreover, because the conservative interpretations of women’s roles are being 
advocated by first generation males in the Muslim community under the guise of 
religious authority, activists deliberately choose to counter such religious justifications 
with religious counter-arguments themselves.  In this sense, activists are persisting in 
the activism of those scholars who defend the principal of individual reasoning 
(ijtihad) over communal reasoning and tradition (ijma).  They revive the argument that 
cultural interpretation of religion may distort religious teachings through communally 
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sanctioned and normalized behavior.  In order to reclaim what they believe to be the 
original egalitarian spirit of Islam, second generation activists pursue reinterpretive 
strategies that appeal to religion, instead of cultural or ethnic identities that they 
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CHAPTER 4 
A TYPOLOGY OF GENDER-JUSTICE CLAIMS 
 
 Although the past two chapters focused on the remarkable similarities between 
the representative and reinterpretive claims that emerge among second generation 
women in the Muslim communities of both Britain and the United States, it is 
important to note that variation still exists within these gender-justice campaigns.  
While campaigns vary from the public to private sphere, there also appear to be 
differences in how activists sometimes use different frames to argue why gender-
justice has been violated and how it should be remedied. For instance, some activists 
argue that gender-justice in the home requires men to follow their Islamic duty to 
provide for all of the women in his household, while others would argue that gender-
justice in the home requires a dismantling of the gender relations that place 
breadwinning responsibilities on the man’s shoulders and child-rearing responsibilities 
on the woman’s shoulders.  In both cases, women activists are concerned about 
women’s interests in the home, but the ways in which they believe a violation of 
justice has occurred and how they propose correcting the situation are expressed 
through different frames.   
 In the first three chapters, I addressed the conventional approaches to using 
framing theory.  To be precise, chapter one explains that the purpose of framing is to 
produce social meaning and understanding; chapter two describes how media outlets 
engage in framing to generate versions of social reality, and compete against 
counterframes offered by critics who have a different understanding of what should 
constitute that reality; and chapter three explains how activists use framing to diagnose 
the problems they face, and prognostic framing to offer solutions to fix them.  In this 
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chapter, I explain how within-campaign variation in the gender-justice activism of 
second generation Muslim women reflects variation in strategic framing, and how the 
discursive process of campaign claims ranges from making affirmative claims to 
transformative claims.  I conceptualize a typology of gender-justice claims that 
illustrates the intersection of claims’ targets (public vs. private) and frames 
(affirmative vs. transformative).  
First, I explain that the framing dimension takes its cue from Nancy Fraser’s 
(1997) typology of justice struggles.  Specifically, I argue that activists’ claims can 
vary from using affirmative frames, which aim to “correct inequitable outcomes of 
social arrangements without disturbing the underlying framework that generates 
them,” to transformative frames, which aim to “[correct] inequitable outcomes 
precisely by restructuring the underlying generative framework” (Fraser 1997: 11).  
Next, I use three examples of gender-justice campaigns to illustrate that activists 
working on the same gender issue can vary between those who use affirmative or 
transformative frames to make their claims: 1) gender-justice in mosques, 2) gender-
justice in student leadership, and 3) gender-justice in LGBT rights.  While the first two 
cases address framing variation in the private and public spheres, respectively, the 
third case employs a relatively new form of activism to demonstrate that frames do not 
simply vary in campaigns having to deal with segregation (one of the central issues in 
the first two campaigns). Throughout these case studies, I argue that affirmative 
frames appear across both countries’ campaigns, and seem to be favored for strategic 
purposes when activists confront opposition in their struggles or lack support from the 
broader community of Muslim women.  Transformative frames, however, seem to 
only emerge in the US, suggesting that there might be American national contextual 
factors that allow activists to use frames that may be less strategic and more 
experimental in their framing.  While this chapter focuses on illustrating a typology of 
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gender-justice claims through a combination of original interview data and content 
analysis of organizational histories, missions and events, the next chapter will propose 
an account of the different national contexts and explain how they influence this 
variation in framing.   
I. FRAMING GENDER-JUSTICE CLAIMS 
In Justice Interruptus: Critical Reflections on the Post-Colonial Condition, 
Nancy Fraser explores different claims for justice and organizes them into two main 
categories: redistribution and recognition.  Redistributive claims center around 
injustices caused by political economy and are central to socialist ideas focused on the 
redistribution of wealth and resources post WWII, while the politics of recognition 
revolved around identity politics and focus on the intersection of multiple oppressions.  
Fraser argues that both of these claims are often made at one another’s expense, while 
in actuality they are inextricably intertwined and that “the project of transforming the 
deep structures of both political economy and culture appears to be the one 
overarching programmatic orientation capable of doing justice to all current struggles 
(Fraser 1997: 32).” While redistribution and recognition form the claims’ dimension, 
she also proposes that the remedies with which activists propose to rectify the 
injustices in question also vary along another dimension, from affirmative remedies to 
transformative remedies.  Fraser argues that the intersection of these two dimensions 
maps out a typology of justice struggles.   
It is the dimension between affirmative and transformative remedies that lends 
analytical traction to my examination of the variation that emerges within gender-
justice activism in the Muslim diaspora.  Fraser defines this dimension by explaining:  
Affirmative remedies…proposes to redress disrespect by 
revaluing unjustly devalued group identities, while 
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leaving intact both the content of those identities and the 
group differentiations that underlie 
them…transformative remedies, by contrast, are 
currently associated with deconstruction.  They would 
redress disrespect by transforming the underlying 
cultural-valuational structure (Fraser 1997: 24). 
She illustrates this distinction by offering the example of the exploited class.  On one 
hand, while affirmative remedies for class injustices typically include transfers, such 
as social insurance programs or public assistance programs, they do nothing to abolish 
class differences themselves; instead they institutionalize and strengthen them in order 
for the system of reallocation to work properly.  Transformative remedies, on the other 
hand, seek to destabilize the class group identity and blur the differentiation that 
constitutes class division in order to promote reciprocity and solidarity between 
originally ‘different’ groups.   
 I use this distinction between activism that reinforces group differentiation and 
activism which strives to undermine group differentiation to organize the different 
frames with which my respondents make their claims for gender-justice. I argue that 
affirmative frames reinforce differentiation between men and women and 
transformative frames undermine this differentiation by challenging traditional gender 
relations. It is worth noting that transformative frames are different from Benford and 
Snow’s (2000) frame transformation theory.  Frame transformation was discussed in 
chapter three to explain how activists adapt the practice of ijtihad (critical reasoning) 
to issues beyond the scope of domestic violence, suchas marriage norms in the 
diaspora; the transformation specifies when activists use the framing of a particular 
issue and adapt it to broader interests, expanding the scope of the original frame 
(Benford and Snow 2000). Transformative frames, alternatively, can also be 
  158 
understood as another type of innovative framing strategy, but one that is more 
concerned with deconstructing underlying structures of power and reconstructing more 
just social organization.  Mapping the intersection between the targeting dimension 
(outlined in chapters two and three) and the framing dimension that this chapter offers 










          
 
Figure 4.1: A Typology of Gender-Justice Claims 
The previous two chapters outlined activism as it occurs along the first 
dimension of our typology of gender-justice claims, from activism that targets the 
public sphere in chapter two to activism that targets the private sphere in chapter three.  
In order to demonstrate the remarkable similarity between activism emerging in both 
countries, despite the differences between British and American Muslim populations, I 
confined my analysis to type 1 and type 2 claims, or public and private affirmations—
that is, activism that tries to remedy inequities, without challenging fundamental 
gender relations. Media activists counter negative portrayals of Muslim women with 
examples of positive Muslim women role models, and anti-domestic violence activists 
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use hermeneutic strategies to argue that the Qur’an obliges husbands to treat their 
wives well.  One could argue that public transformations might frame the media’s 
underlying commercial objectification of women as the fundamental problem, or 
private transformations might frame deep-seated gender relations of a heteronormative 
household as the ultimate obstacle to gender-justice.   
 In this chapter, I engage with the framing dimension to demonstrate that 
similar campaign issues can be framed in different ways. This organization asks 
whether frames seek a superficial remedy in equal outcomes between genders or the 
long-term restructuring of gender relations themselves. Type 3 and type 4 claims are 
termed public and private transformations, respectively, meaning that they both 
challenge an existing power structure while trying to remedy gender inequalities and 
vary according to the targets (public or private) of their claims. Representative 
transformations, for instance, includes claims for female leadership in organizations, 
such as Muslim student organizations or adult civic organizations. Whereas existing 
norms in most Muslim communities in the West would argue that Islam only allows 
men to be leaders, activists making representative transformations challenge this gender 
hierarchy and argue that Muslim women should lead as well. Transformations also 
emerge in the private sphere, through reinterpretive transformations that challenge 
prevailing interpretations of leadership in mosques; interpretations of the texts are 
offered to support the idea that the Prophet himself encouraged women to be spiritual 
leaders. The following sections offer examples of campaigns that offer both 
affirmations and transformations.  
II. CASE #1: GENDER-JUSTICE IN MOSQUES 
In both Britain and the United States, women have mobilized to demand 
women’s rights in mosques. Though these campaigns usually emerge out of individual 
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women’s frustrating experiences with segregation in local community mosques, 
national groups have also taken interest in such struggles in both countries. At a basic 
level, demands in both countries overlap: women should be allowed entrance into the 
main prayer areas of mosques; women should be allowed to complete their regular 
prayers, as well as attend Friday jumma prayer services, at their mosques; and women 
should be allowed to serve on mosque leadership committees.  The similarities 
between the campaigns in the two countries continue--both British and American 
Muslim women blame the male leaders’ androcentric, primocentric interpretations of 
Islam for excluding women from active participation in mosques; both also use similar 
references to hadith that support their claim that the Prophet allowed the participation 
of women in mosques. These similarities generate affirmative frames for gender-
justice in mosques in both countries.   However, some important differences 
between the two countries’ mosque campaigns emerge as well. The most prominent 
mainstream organizations in each country diverge in their support of these campaigns, 
with the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) in the UK strongly resisting such efforts 
and the Council on American Islamic Relations (CAIR) and the Islamic Society of 
North America (ISNA) in the US endorsing them.  The issue of women’s leadership in 
mosques is also handled differently, particularly in the case of one scholar who was 
introduced in chapter three, Amina Wadud, and her distinct experience leading Friday 
prayers in both countries. This section describes how affirmative interpretations of 
women’s rights in mosques have prevailed in both countries, while a more 
transformative interpretation that encourages women to serve as imams has only 
emerged in the US. 
A. Gender-Justice in British Mosques 
In Britain in 2006, the women’s committee of a fairly mainstream organization, 
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the Muslim Public Affairs Council UK (MPACUK), mobilized around the Greater 
London area to demand entrance for women into the main prayer halls of British 
mosques. A Channel 4 News Documentary entitled, Women Only Jihad documents 
their efforts to convince local mosques to make space for women within their main 
prayer halls and on leadership committees, given that roughly 60% of Britain’s 
mosques do not allow women access to mosques at all.
95
 They have doors slammed in 
their face, and are repeatedly told by first generation male leaders to go home because 
“there is no room for women inside.” They eventually pray outside on the mosque’s 
driveway on carpets that they have brought with them, in case they need to a make a 
public spectacle to make their voices heard. When the male leaders object and try to 
force the women off the premises, the activists tell them that they are obeying Islamic 
tenets by setting up “behind the men.” The women activists are still pushed off the 
property and forced to pray on the pavement across the street.  They insist that it is 
their Islamic right to pray inside the mosque and refer to the Prophet’s orders for men 
not to turn women away when they choose to leave the home and pray in public.  One 
woman asks a man at the Ilford mosque, “Women were allowed to pray at the holy 
mosques of Mecca, Medina and Jerusalem, what’s so great about Ilford?”   When 
faced with Islamic references, the male leaders at the mosque shift gears and say that 
women in fact prefer to stay home and refrain from sitting on leadership committees. 
For obvious reasons this logic does not satisfy the women activists who have arrived 
at the mosque precisely because they want to pray inside.   
At the end of the documentary, the MPACUK women’s committee meets with 
the leadership of the MCB to discuss the altercations that their campaign caused 
outside of mosques in the Greater London area.  The first generation chairman of the 
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October 28, 2006: http://www.mpacuk.org/content/view/2927/34/.  
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MCB chastises the MPACUK activists for causing trouble and not respecting the 
schools of thought that believe women should pray at home and not in the mosque 
with men.  The activists are told, patronizingly, to perhaps “make friends with the 
elders’ wives” and see if they can improve relations in that manner.  Ultimately, the 
meeting ends in an explosive argument, with the chairman asking the activists why 
they need women to be on management committees if they are already relegated space 
on separate women’s committees?  The activists go home frustrated, disappointed at 
the resistance they faced at a meeting with “the Muslim group with all the power in 
Britain that could really make it happen if it wanted to,” and vowing not to give up 
their efforts. 
One of the lead organizers of the MPACUK’s campaign whom I interviewed 
explained that the campaign has since made little progress.  She blames the resistance 
on the obstinacy of the male, first generation leaders and, increasingly, their sons:  
The mosque is the safe haven for the first generation, 
and if someone from the outside comes along trying to 
challenge them, it's going to cause a riot, they won't be 
having it. And it wasn't just them getting their backs up, 
they were getting their monkey-grinders, their sons--
who are the second generation--who would be saying, 
'get lost, a woman's right is not here, go home!'…but it 
wasn't actually the case, so that made me even more 
passionate and it made it clear that there was no way in 
hell I was ever going to listen to any first generation 
Muslim—what they're saying is nonsense to me, they 
don't back it up with evidence…And that’s what made 
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me start studying Islam even more….That's when I 
found out you can't touch a woman, you can't hit a 
woman—it's prominent in South Asians, you know, a 
man can hit his wife, and it's quite acceptable, but in 
Islam it's not. If a man were to touch a woman, it would 
be with a feather; and if he were to hit her, it would not 
leave a mark. It's this kind of stuff that made me realize 
that Islam is fine, it's these first generation Muslims, I 
just ignore them. To this day, I still ignore my father. 
This organizer refers to the distinction between ‘culture’ and ‘religion’ that was 
discussed in the previous chapter, and stresses the importance of not allowing first 
generation leaders to impose a form of Islam that she believes they have interpreted 
through their cultural lens from another society. When pressed on the potential 
hypocrisy of stereotyping the way violence is “prominent” and “acceptable” in the 
South Asian community, while aiming to clarify similar misconceptions of Muslim 
communities, this activist avoids answering directly.  Instead, she continues to argue 
that patriarchy is common in South Asian communities, while textual Islamic 
interpretation prohibits such behavior.   
 The frustration that this young activist feels towards the first generation’s 
imposition of non-British culture on Islam becomes obvious when she complains 
about the use of Urdu in mosques.  The same feelings recurrently surfaced in 
interviews—women were angry that mosques effectively excluded Muslims who were 
born and raised in the UK and might not be fluent in their parents’ native languages 
(e.g. Urdu, Hindi, Arabic, Bengali, etc.). Both the documentary and the organizer’s 
comments above, however, testify that young, second generation men are increasingly 
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joining the ranks of their first generation fathers and continuing to keep women out of 
the mosques they attend. The journalist who reports in the documentary argues that 
this may have something to do with the fact that second generation Muslim women are 
now far outnumbering their male counterparts in education, and that these young men 
might feel that their patriarchal hold on power in the community is being challenged 
by increasing rates of educated women. 
The British campaign uses affirmative frames to challenge the inequitable 
conditions that women face in mosques—conditions ranging from being denied 
complete access to mosques to having spaces set aside for women-only prayer in 
deplorable, unhygienic conditions and no visibility of the main prayer hall. The 
campaign wants to equalize conditions for women’s participation in mosques, but 
activists still underline men and women’s distinct roles in the mosque: when male 
leaders object to their presence as ‘distracting to men,’ activists respond that they are 
not asking to pray “side by side with men” but “behind men.”
96
 In order to convince 
their opponents, the male leaders at the mosque, that their campaign for gender-justice 
will not usurp male power, female activists frame their claims by using Islamic textual 
references and proposing that women’s participation in mosques will not upset 
traditional gender relations between male and female worshippers.  
Moreover, the activist’s comments above regarding domestic violence were 
quite common in fellow-organizers’ justification of the ‘proper’ understanding of 
violence against women in Islam.  While the activist acknowledges the injustice of 
violence against women, her remarks only redresses the disrespect of being gravely 
injured by something heavier than a feather or by something that leaves a mark.  These 
provisions ultimately fail in challenging the fundamental injustice of men using 
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physical force to punish women, or the power relations underlining a man’s 
prerogative to discipline a woman. Given that more transformative interpretations 
exist (and are quite widely known in these activist communities) regarding the issue of 
domestic violence, such as the analysis presented in chapter three on the Arabic word 
daraba, it is telling that British activists continue to use affirmative frames (Abdullah 
2007; Wadud 2006; Barlas 2002). In view of the argument offered above, that activists 
turn to affirmative frames to appease their opposition in mosque campaigns, it is likely 
that affirmative frames are also strategically used to persuade male opposition from 
not opposing activism against violence in family relations. 
B. Gender-Justice in American Mosques 
In the United States, the campaign for women’s rights in mosques that receives 
support from CAIR and ISNA also subscribes to affirmative frames of women’s rights 
in mosques.  A survey called the Mosque Study Project, co-sponsored by these two 
organizations (in addition to a private Islamic ministry and the Islamic Circle of North 
America) conducted the largest study of mosques in America in 2000 by randomly 
sampling 416 mosques across the U.S. The study’s results showed that 75% of the 
mosques’ participants were male, 19% did not offer any programs for women, 31% 
still prevented women from sitting on their executive boards, 53% reported regular 
participants over the age of 36, and the practice of women praying behind partitions of 
some sort was increasing (from 52% in 1994 to 66% in 2000) (Bagby, Perl, and 
Froehle 2001).  
Women in Islam, the oldest Muslim women’s human rights organization in New 
York City, decided to take up this issue of women’s discrimination in mosques 
throughout the country and started a campaign to ‘reclaim sacred space.’  They 
published a report called Women Friendly Mosques and Community Centers: Working 
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Together to Reclaim Our Heritage, which outlines the problems facing women in 
Muslim communities throughout the US (relying on qualitative interviews conducted 
by an organization that co-authored the report, Islamic Social Services Associations, in 
2001).  The report then makes specific suggestions for mosques to better adhere to the 
Prophet Muhammad’s example regarding gender relations in the mosque.  In reading 
this report closely, not only are there are several similarities between the American 
Muslim campaign for women’s rights in mosques and their British counterparts 
(particularly regarding the form of discrimination they want to eliminate and the 
reasons the activists believe the discrimination occurs), but Women in Islam’s 
campaign also subscribes to a similarly affirmative interpretation of the Prophet’s 
teachings and women’s role in the mosques.   
First, the report makes clear that the campaign would like women to be admitted 
into mosques’ main areas and encouraged to take part in mosques’ leadership 
committees. The authors invoke historical examples, similar to the reinterpretive 
activism outlined in chapter three, to argue that women’s presence in mosques’ main 
space was not only common during the Prophet’s lifetime and immediately afterwards, 
but also vital to gender-justice rulings made during public debates held in mosques:  
Sharing the main prayer hall allowed women to fully 
engage in public debate and influence decisions 
affecting their lives and the life of the community. For 
example, when the second Caliph Umar bin al-Khatab 
wanted to put a cap on dowry, he was challenged by a 
woman, who stood up in the middle of the masjid and 
pointed out that his proposed policy violated Islamic 
law. He conceded and the proposed policy was never 
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carried out (Khairan 2001: 7).   
The report argues that allowing women to participate in mosque life would be an 
example of proper Islamic behavior and mosque leaders should strive to emulate the 
Prophet’s example. The authors also emphasize the important role that the mosque 
plays for Muslims in the diaspora, as it does in Britain, as a space where members can 
meet for community development purposes; excluding women from mosques would 
exclude them from community activities. 
Second, the reasons briefly outlined in the report for discrimination against 
women also harken back to their British counterparts’ distinction between culture and 
religion.  It blames first generation male leaders for alienating women who would be 
interested in participating in their local mosques and argues that “women perceive that 
the khutba (Friday sermon) must become more sensitive to the language and culture of 
North America and are not balanced in their context. Gender issues, when addressed in 
the khutba, must be discussed in ways that highlight the differences between culture 
and religion and recognize the diversity of Muslim women’s experience” (Khairain 
2001: 11). Just as the British Muslim activists described above were frustrated at the 
dominance of foreign languages in mosques, American Muslim women also felt that 
sermons should be delivered in a language (English) that is accessible to youth and 
women in their communities.  When I interviewed the executive director of Women in 
Islam, Aisha Al-Adawiya, she further stressed the importance of “distinguish[ing] 
between cultural practices that have nothing to with Islam and Islamic principles 
themselves.”  
Finally, the report also invokes the Prophet’s sermons that address women and 
men differentially in the mosques to prove that women were at least allowed inside of 
the mosques to pray during the Prophet’s lifetime: 
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His guidelines about where women stand relative to men 
during prayer (in rows behind) indicate that his practice 
was for women and men to pray in the same room. Out 
of his compassion for women and children, the Prophet, 
peace be upon him, would shorten his prayer when he 
heard a child crying. After the compulsory prayers, he 
would remain seated for a few moments along with the 
men in congregation, to allow women to exit the masjid 
first. (Khairan 2007: 8). 
Yet, in no uncertain terms, the report makes clear that “[they] do not advocate that 
women lead a mixed gender congregation in prayer at a masjid” (Khairan 2007: 13). 
Though the rest of the report argues the importance of having women in leadership 
positions on committees and as vocal participants in their communities, the campaign 
stops short of fundamentally challenging the gendered roles of leadership in prayer.   
 When pressed further about the campaign’s position on the leadership of mixed-
gender congregations, Al-Adawiya says: 
Unlike Amina Wadud and Asra Nomani, we do not advocate for 
women leading Friday prayers…[Amina Wadud]’s the only 
scholar that I know who argues that women are allowed to do that 
because of the one story during the Prophet’s time where a 
woman was allowed to lead prayer, and I have to weigh that 
knowledge with the knowledge from every other scholar I’ve 
read… I also want to make clear that we understand that real 
change only happens from within, and I always reference the 
Civil Rights Movement. There were laws passed in this country 
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that said you couldn’t discriminate, everybody could drink out of 
the same fountain, you could vote…but how was that 
implemented and how does it continue to be implemented? It 
doesn’t just happen because a law is passed.  So we feel that our 
approach has been that if we address this issue internally, using 
our own references of the Qur’an and the Prophetic traditions, and 
not to refer to the creation of the feminist movement…When we 
do that, we find that those communities that might be more 
resistant, you have an opening now to discuss what the challenges 
are. You know, ask what sources say women can’t come to the 
mosque or that they have to be in a separate room? And then it 
becomes a conversation about what references people are using… 
and we have the scholarly sources to counter them. It’s beautiful, 
unfolding, and I think it’s more lasting that way. 
In these comments, it is clear that Al-Adawiya uses an affirmative frame to 
underline fundamental differences between men and women for strategic purposes.  
Unlike the opposition that her British counterparts face in male leaders, and the 
affirmative frames they use to appease this resistance, Al-Adawiya suggests that she 
does not want to alienate support from the broader community of American Muslim 
women by using frames that are unfamiliar to their realities.  By advocating a less 
antagonistic interpretation that refrains from alienating the majority of a conservative 
community (particularly the predominantly male, first generation leadership of 
mosques, but also the women who have avoided involvement thus far), she suggests 
that she can gain more support for ultimately pursuing more sustainable change in the 
community.   
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C. Transformative Frames in American Mosques 
Whereas affirmative frames for gender-justice in mosques appear in both Britain 
and the US, transformative frames emerge distinctly in the US. The women that Al-
Adawiya cites in relation to her disapproval of women leading mixed-congregations in 
prayer, Amina Wadud and Asra Nomani, are two American Muslim women who have 
pursued a more transformative interpretation of women’s rights in mosques. Amina 
Wadud was introduced in chapter three as one of the pre-eminent American Muslim 
Islamic scholars.  Asra Nomani, a former Wall Street Journal reporter, began a 
campaign in 2003 for women’s rights to pray in the main hall in mosques after she 
was told to enter her own hometown mosque in Morgantown, West Virginia through 
the back entrance and told to pray in a balcony for women where they could not see 
the main prayer area. While many other activists agreed with the rights to equal 
entrance and room to pray within the main prayer hall, many withdrew their support 
from Nomani’s campaign when she organized an event in New York City in 2005 
where she invited Wadud to lead a mixed-gender congregation in Friday prayers.
97
  
Many activists, such as those who constitute Women in Islam’s campaign, believed 
women leading men in prayer to be blasphemous, unnecessarily divisive and 
counterproductive to gaining broader women’s rights in mosques. 
 Though the event was divisive and fellow Muslims accused her of creating a 
media event out of an internal community issue (such as Al-Adawiya herself in a later 
section of our interview), Nomani maintains that it was a necessary public 
demonstration of the reinterpretation that Muslim women must execute to actually 
change how Muslims themselves think about women’s leadership:  
From a media point of view, it was very intentional on 
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my part to have a public debate and a public campaign 
because that’s how I think you’re going to change 
images and actually push ideas. So if you have a private 
prayer, like some people who said it shouldn’t have been 
such a public thing… Well, that’s great, but that may be 
transformative for the few hundred people who are 
there, but it’s not a seat change in society.  
Nomani is not interested in interpreting the Qur’an or hadith in an affirmative manner, 
as the activists from both Britain and America described above.  She is interested in 
circulating a transformative interpretation that contends that if women are truly equal 
in the eyes of Allah and the Prophet even allowed a woman to lead prayer during his 
lifetime, women with the requisite scholarly background today should be allowed--
even encouraged--to lead prayer as well.  Nomani alludes to the story of Umm 
Waraqa, who was one of the Prophet’s companions, well-trained in the Qur’an and 
told by the Prophet to lead prayers “in her area;” interpretations still dispute whether 
her area meant her private household or the public space, yet it is clear that she was 
held in esteem even as the imam of her clan (Ahmed 1992).  
 The transformative frame of women’s rights in mosques appears in Wadud’s 
own Islamic scholarship.  As an Islamic studies scholar and the author of a gendered 
interpretation of the Qur’an called Qur’an and Woman: Rereading the Sacred Text 
from a Woman’s Perspective, Wadud argues that it is important to not only restrict 
scholarship to an examination of history for precedent, but that interpretation should 
also draw precedent from current knowledge and development (Wadud 2006; 1999). 
Wadud’s interpretation of women’s rights in Islam are placed with Nomani’s at the 
transformative end of our spectrum because of her use of tawhid, the unicity of Allah, 
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which she defines as “the foundational idea… of an Islamic ethical rationale for 
reciprocal relations between women and men in all aspects of society: familial, 
political, and spiritual functions, roles, and contexts.” (Wadud 2006: 168)  She uses 
this concept to argue that we must understand gender relations in Islam as relying on 
the tawhidic paradigm:   
[The belief that] constructs a metaphysical triangle… between 
each of three elements [as] equally essential: Allah, creator of 
all; one human being (in this case, we will say female); and 
another human being (in this case, we will say male).  Because 
Allah is creator, however, and not a thing, the function of Allah 
in this triad is as the tension that holds the other two on a 
horizontal line of constant equality.  Both are of equal 
significance and neither can be above the other because the 
divine function establishes their reciprocal relationship.  If 
human beings really are horizontally equal, independent, and 
mutually co-dependent, each has the same potential for 
performing any social, religious, political, or economic task. 
(Wadud 2006: 168) 
In this interpretation the two individuals (in this case a man and a woman) are 
constructed as equals, with the differentiation between one another blurred by the 
divine relationship that serves as the third, facilitating point in the triangular 
relationship.  If women were assumed to be inferior to men, one could imagine more 
of a linear construction, where the woman’s relationship to Allah is mediated through 
the man’s; yet, in this tawhidic paradigm, both are equal and Wadud interprets this to 
imply their equal potential in participating in society--leadership in mosques included.   
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Though Wadud’s transformative interpretation has existed in her scholarship for 
quite some time, she became an especially controversial figure in the global Muslim 
community in 2005, when she was invited by Nomani to lead the mixed-gender 
congregation in Friday prayers.  Though she had already led a mixed-congregation in 
a private prayer service in South Africa in 1994, this event garnered more attention 
because it was public and the media was invited for the reasons that Nomani mentions 
above.  Wadud herself was displeased with the event’s organization and the media’s 
behavior during the service categorically refuses to give interviews to anyone 
inquiring about the event.  A year later, in Inside the Gender Jihad, she describes how 
the content of her sermon (a sermon in which she emphasized gender inclusiveness, 
the tawhidic paradigm, and even referred to Allah by interchangeably using masculine 
and feminine pronouns) should have been the focus of media attention, whereas all she 
felt they saw was the physical presence of a woman at the head of the congregation 
(Wadud 2006).   
The event was heavily guarded because of threats that organizers received in the 
lead up to the service, so protesters who still showed up to claim Wadud and the 
organizers were defaming Islam were held at bay outside.  One of the most common 
criticisms levied at the organizers was that the presence of women in the mosque 
would distract men’s attention away from God and anything that interrupted that 
relationship could not be permitted in the mosque.  Wadud counters this criticism with 
her own personal experience leading the prayers and being faced with hoards of 
cameras as she raised her attention to Mecca at the end of the prayer:  
[As] I made my silent prayer of intent and raised my head 
with my hands at the sides of my face to recite… I was 
shocked to find cameras and journalists directly in front of 
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me! This was not where I wanted to direct my prayer.  As I 
struggled with this surprising distraction… I was facing the 
reality that Allah is present in all ways, at all times, and in all 
places, and all I needed to do was to look with the eyes of my 
heart and turn my prayer back on track: an act of worship 
toward Allah.  When those who claim a tradition of authority 
to prevent women from standing in front of men because the 
men might get distracted, it is the responsibility of the men, 
prior to the prayer, to consent and then to respond through 
consciousness of the act of worship and not the incidents of 
form. So…I took self-responsibility at that moment to 
remember what the prayer represents… and the cameras and 
the media disappeared before my heart and no longer 
presented a distraction to my eyes. 
Wadud believes that a sense of self-responsibility not only neutralizes the 
‘distraction’ argument, but that it should prevent members of the community with 
traditional authority from misusing interpretation to their advantage.  Interpretation is 
an important tool to Wadud, because it allows Muslims to adapt Islam to current 
contexts, as the original spirit of the religion intended.  Her transformative version 
asks Muslims to fundamentally challenge interpretations that support certain power 
relations and the irresponsible practice of Islam--instead of facilitating a divine 
relationship with God--while affirmative interpretations might in fact contribute to 
sustaining them.  
The same transformative frame has not emerged in Britain, as is demonstrated 
by a direct comparison in which Wadud was invited to Oxford, England in 2008 by a 
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male Islamic scholar who asked her to lead a mixed-congregation in Friday prayers, 
just as she had done in New York City three years ealier.  The event was very poorly 
attended, with far fewer than the hundred or so people who attended in New York, and 
generated a considerable amount of internal criticism from within the female activist 
community. The vast majority (~90%) of my respondents disapproved of the prayer 
service and felt that someone from outside the community was imposing her concerns 
on the British Muslim community.  Respondents recurrently argued that British 
Muslims “didn’t want” to argue that women should be able to lead men in prayer and 
the Wadud/American Muslim campaign was not representative of their struggle for 
women’s rights in mosques.  The lead organizer from MPACUK, in describing the 
nature of the campaign’s demands, made clear: “it’s not that we want women imams 
or anything--we just want to be able to pray in the mosque!” The journalist narrating 
the documentary about MPACUK’s campaign, Tazeen Ahmad, further underlines the 
affirmative frame of women’s leadership in mosques: “One thing I do know is that a 
woman can’t be an imam, and that’s because she can’t do an essential part of the job, 
which is lead men in prayers.”  She then interviews a female Islamic scholar who has 
the same scholarly background as many male imams and asks whether female and 
male imams can play the same role; the female scholar answers that the role of morally 
guiding and counseling community members can be the same, but that they should 
indeed be gender-segregated: “Yes, I could lead women in study circles [or] I could 
have educational circles, where you can teach women their rights so they can 
challenge men.” British Islamic scholars and activists may believe that women’s 
participation should be encouraged and validated in British mosques, yet they stop 
short of arguing a transformative frame that says women should be allowed to lead 
mixed-congregations.   
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III. CASE #2: GENDER-JUSTICE IN STUDENT LEADERSHIP 
In all of my interviews with student activists, women credited their university 
student organizations with the development of their Muslim political identity. The vast 
majority of respondents voluntarily brought up the terrorist attacks of both 9/11 and 
7/7 in Britain, and at least the former in America, arguing that the attacks served as 
catalysts in encouraging these young women to learn more about the faith that they 
allegedly shared with the perpetrators.  One American Muslim respondent who was a 
sophomore in college in 2001 explained:  
September 11 was an awful tragedy and everyone said 
that those guys did it because of Islam, and I didn’t 
know much about my religion, just what my parents had 
taught me growing up. So to answer everyone’s 
questions, and because I was curious myself, I started 
reading about Islam and educating myself. That’s when I 
found out what it said about women’s rights.  
This theme recurred frequently in interviews in both countries, and most respondents 
admitted to seeking out some Muslim student support network during their time at 
university (with some even recounting high school Muslim student associations in the 
United States).   
While women in both countries claim to have experienced a drive to learn about 
their religion, after the terrorist attacks, that propelled them into being political 
activists, the political context in which their identity as Muslim women activists 
developed diverged. In the United States, the Muslim Student Associations (MSA) 
were typically celebrated as multicultural ‘ethnic’ interest groups--hosting Eid dinners, 
joining minority-coalitions and hosting panels and seminars on ‘Muslim’ topics.  In 
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Britain, the Islamic Student Organizing Committee (ISOCs) hosted dinners and 
‘awareness’ events regarding Muslim topics as well, but they were also the focus of 
state scrutiny and the well-known target of security profiling.98 Students in Britain 
described a more contentious relationship with the state, where the latter focused its 
concerns about ‘homegrown terrorism’ on Muslims organizing at universities. The fact 
that the 7/7 attackers were second generation Muslims and not foreigners as they were 
in the 9/11 attacks in the US, meant that the state was now suspicious of Muslim youth 
organizing for political purposes—while some organizations were primarily charitable 
or social organizations, some were suspected of promoting anti-West opinions and 
prioritizing their religious identity above their national British identity.
99
 One of the 
ISOC organizers I interviewed in London explained how upset the Muslim student 
population was over recent state proposals that would require professors to report 
“suspicious behavior by Muslim students.”
100
 Students were furious that their 
relationships with teachers would be tainted by distrust and “spying,” making it even 
less likely that Muslim students would voice opinions or willingly participate in 
university activities. The British activists recounted their relationship with their 
government from a much more defensive position than their American counterparts. 
When asked how these university student organizations dealt with two prominent 
gender issues within their groups--segregation at organization events and female 
leadership--the experience between the two country’s student activists also diverged. 
A. Gender-Justice in British Muslim Student Organizations 
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In Britain, ISOCs are the local chapters of the Muslim student organizations that 
come together to form a national organization called the Federation of Student Islamic 
Societies (FOSIS), which was founded in 1962 to coordinate existing ISOCs.  I spoke 
to local female ISOC organizers from a number of universities in London, 
Manchester, and Birmingham, as well as female organizers working for FOSIS in 
London, and learned that gender relations in these student organizations 
overwhelmingly perpetuated an affirmative interpretation of how men and women 
should treat one another in meetings and at their events.  For instance, when I inquired 
about a recent poll that was published in London called Islam on Campus: A Survey of 
UK Student Opinions and its consistent references to the concept of ‘free mixing,’ my 
respondents overwhelming argued that their young male counterparts felt much more 
strongly about retaining gender segregation, and women most often just let them 
enforce such rules.   
‘Free mixing’ in the UK refers to idea that men and women are allowed to 
associate or integrate freely; its challengers argue Islam frowns upon such interaction, 
deriving evidence from hadith that described how the Prophet’s wives were kept 
physically separate from the rest of society, using veils or curtains.  It is also the same 
hadith that is used to advocate veiling, as was discussed in detail in chapter two. In the 
case of free mixing, the logic is the same: if women must be kept separate, then they 
must not integrate with men.  Examples of gender segregation can range from separate 
seating for men and women on either side of an aisle, to a more extreme form that 
allows men to voice their opinions freely in a meeting, yet requires women to write 
their comments down on a piece of paper and submit it to the ‘Head Brother’ to read 
outloud on their behalf.
101
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Sister’ is the leader of the women’s committee or subgroup; usually ‘Head Sister’ also 
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The poll reported that a significant number of young Muslim men and women 
were against free mixing in general, which surprised a number of respondents.  
According to these activists, they knew of gender segregation existing at student 
events but they believed women were less in favor of the segregation than they were 
willing to challenge the male leadership.  One activist found the results so surprising 
that she challenged the poll’s methods: “[It] really makes me wonder what sort of 
women were being interviewed here? Certainly not the women I've come across…they 
don't usually have an issue and it's usually men who find it very uncomfortable to 
mix.”  Even though these results surprised many respondents and some expressed 
disapproval of the practice of gender segregation, only a minority of women said that 
they would challenge rules that forbid free mixing, with the vast majority arguing 
some derivation of the logic: “it’s just the way it’s done.”  
British activists seem to use affirmative frames of gender segregation—frames 
that a) underline the difference between men and women by keeping them in 
physically distinct space, b) assigns the male group with distinct ‘privileges’ members 
earn by simply being male.  One of the additional privileges that males benefit from 
these frames is the automatic appointment of ‘Head Brothers’ as Presidents of the 
ISOCs.  While the Head Brother is elected by the men, and the ‘Head Sister’ is elected 
to represent a women’s committee or subgroup, the Head Brother also represents the 
entire organization as President, while the Head Sister is made his subordinate as Vice 
President.  
When I asked about gender segregation in leadership positions, activists became 
more apologetic, in contrast to their reactions to questions about free mixing.  A 
national student organizer with FOSIS argues that women were doing more important 
                                                                                                                                       
serves as the Vice President, subordinate to the exclusively male President (‘Head 
Brother’).  
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work, even if they were not on the executive committee:  
FOSIS [has] certain committees that are headed by girls 
as well [but] a lot of people point to the executive 
committee…Honestly I don’t think the executive 
committee is important. Regional committees are where 
the important work is happening and they’re headed by 
sisters as well…but some local ISOC male leaders 
would feel uncomfortable talking to a female on the 
executive board, so it’s just more practical.   
She believes it is more important that women’s contributions to the community are not 
devalued, and leadership becomes more of a symbolic, logistical contribution. By 
supporting this androcentric organizational structure (that uses men as the point of 
reference and underlines separating women out as a ‘different group’), these activists 
underscore an affirmative frame of leadership in Islam.  They frame women’s rights in 
a way that redresses disrespect (“Regional committees are where the important work 
is happening and they’re headed by girls” [emphasis added]), but they do not 
challenge the structural inequality that limits women to a subordinate position in 
leadership. 
B. Gender-Justice in American Muslim Student Organizations 
In the United States, in contrast, all student activists used transformative frames 
when discussing gender segregation in participation and leadership. They argued that 
gender equality in leadership was no longer an important struggle for Muslim Student 
Associations (MSA) in America, with one activist claiming “it hasn’t been an issue for 
a long time.” MSA is a national organization that has both regional coalitions and 
local chapters by the same name.  MSA National was founded in 1963 at a conference 
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of Muslim students from across the United States and Canada. Since then, it has 
served at the center of a largely decentralized organization, trying to encourage 
horizontal networking among its federal chapters, but allowing them great discretion 
over their individual activities.   
In contrast to the state of female leadership in ISOCs and on the executive 
committee of FOSIS in Britain, MSA chapters and MSA National have both had 
female presidents. I interviewed two of the past MSA National female presidents and 
asked how female leadership was handled in their organization.  The first female 
president (2004) argued that she was well respected and her leadership was not 
contested. She admitted that there were MSAs who still struggled with the idea of 
female leadership, but she believed it happened because of the “conflation between the 
religious role and administrative role,” where the leader’s potential responsibility in 
leading prayers caused debate over whether women could lead a mixed-congregation 
in prayer (a controversy I discuss above).   
This conversation about the association’s occasional struggle with female 
leadership eventually reminded the same student activist that she had experienced 
trouble herself before becoming MSA National’s president:  
Actually you just reminded me, but in my MSA this 
happened. At Florida State University, I was incredibly active 
and my second year I was nominated to become the president 
of the school’s MSA. And I specifically remember this, 
because it was pretty crazy: we had this Salafi group of 
international students, and when they saw that I was the only 
person nominated… they nominated a guy who was Nigerian, 
straight up from Nigeria…[he] wasn’t active in the MSA at 
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all, but they wanted a male and they just mobilized enough 
votes to get him in… The same thing had happened two years 
before me, and [the female candidate] actually won, but they 
had done the same thing to her.  That year they actually 
brought in a ton of guys from the local mosque who never 
come to meetings or anything just so that they’d have votes to 
get her out… Anyway, my second year this guy was 
president, even though my [girl]friend and I were running the 
entire organization. 
The tension between the international Muslim students and the second generation 
Muslim students that this activist described was by no means an exception.  Four other 
women I interviewed remembered similar stories from their own university experience 
at schools across the country and then recounted tales of their friends’ experiences and 
stories they had heard second-hand. One woman from Miami described having to start 
an alternative Muslim student organization, because a group of male Wahabi foreign 
students from Saudi Arabia had commandeered the MSA and excluded women from 
participating at meetings or voting for leadership.  She proudly describes how she was 
joined by other women from the original organization and they formed a group where 
women were active participants and she served as its first president. She believed her 
organization symbolized a generational divide, given that they were joined by some of 
their second generation male peers who were also disillusioned with the foreign 
students’ leadership.  She noted, however, that while some second generation men 
joined her alternative organization, some others became active in the Wahabi group 
and even started organizing with the radical Islamic group, Hizbut Tehrir.   
 The challenges to gender equality, however, seem to be largely restricted to 
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conflicting beliefs between foreign and American Muslim students.  For the most part, 
American MSAs seem to have incorporated more women into their leadership ranks 
and activists were surprised to hear that their British counterparts were not leaders in 
ISOCs. The MSA National also uses a more transformative frame of women’s 
leadership rights than its British counterpart, FOSIS.  While the FOSIS representative 
argued that leadership titles mattered less than activists’ substantive work, a female 
MSA National president thought that having a woman in such a high-profile position 
at the national level helps women on the local level: “I’ve visited campuses and local 
chapters and had sisters come up to me and say that they feel they can speak up more 
and the brothers take them more seriously because they see a woman as the Head 
president now.” By fundamentally challenging the assumption that men should be the 
ultimate leaders, these female presidents apply a transformative frame to gender-
justice in student organizations that claim women’s equal membership should translate 
into equal leadership as well.  
 
IV. CASE # 3: GENDER-JUSTICE IN LGBT ORGANIZATIONS 
Lest we think that the two cases above might simply demonstrate that 
transformative frames only emerge in the US in regards to female leadership, I 
examine a campaign that concentrates on a different topic entirely: gender-justice for 
the Muslim LGBT community in both countries.  As the last chapter discussed 
activism surrounding domestic violence and family law, and the heteronormative 
position of how a woman’s sexuality should be regulated in the private sphere, this 
section examines another debate over sexuality in the Muslim diaspora to see if 
activists differ in their interpretations by national context.  The ‘management’ of 
homosexuality in Muslim communities might be one such topic; though there is 
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incredibly scarce empirical data on this community, there is enough research to 
suggest that LGBT Muslims are engaged in an interpretive project that has some 
notable similarities to the non-LGBT women activists I discuss in the rest of my 
dissertation.   
Homosexuality is largely considered rejected by Islam, based on popular 
understanding of the Story of Lut (similar to the Story of Lot in Christianity).  In the 
story, Allah disapproves of the Cities of the Plains’ looting, idolatry, and lawless 
behavior and sends Lut as a prophet to the town to warn them to behave in honorable 
and just ways. The townspeople do not heed Lut’s warnings and mock him for his 
teachings so Allah sends angels down to Earth to destroy the town.  Lut takes the 
strangers in as his guests, compassionately feeding and sheltering those in need; but 
the town’s men arrive in hostility at Lut’s house, demanding that the strangers be 
turned over so that they may ‘solicit102’ their guests. Lut refuses, even offering his 
own daughters instead, yet the crowd persists. The visitors interject, reveal to Lut that 
they are messengers and tell him to leave immediately with his family, and never look 
back, in order to be saved from the destruction that they would visit upon the rest of 
the town.  Lut flees with his wife and two daughters, though only Lut and his 
daughters escape safely, since the wife looks back and turns into a pillar of salt (Jamal 
2001). Popular understandings interpret the homosexual intentions of the towns’ men 
as the sin that brings destruction upon the town. 
There are two types of LGBT Muslim activism that have emerged in the West 
around protecting LGBT individuals from the condemnation, exclusion and sometimes 
fatal violence they face in the Muslim community for coming out.  The first type 
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guests. 
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mobilizes behind the Muslim identity and emphasizes that LGBT individuals can be 
just as devoted to Allah--they are minorities, but ultimately “they were made by 
Allah,” and Allah is infallible, so how could they be wrong?  The second type of 
activism speaks more to the interests of this chapter, because it uses hermeneutics as 
an interpretive strategy to claim that the Qur’an never actually condemns 
homosexuality in the Story of Lut (or anywhere else in the text, for that matter).  Since 
my field research does not include any self-declared LGBT Muslim individuals, I 
cannot provide qualitative evidence that there are interpretive differences between 
British and American LGBT Muslims, but the history and evolution of activist 
organizations and discourse in both countries around homosexuality in Islam suggests 
that, were we able to conduct more research, we might expect similar outcomes as the 
two cases discussed above 
The basic interpretive strategy that LGBT Muslims in both communities seem to 
use problematizes the assumption that the sin responsible for the town’s destruction is 
necessarily homosexuality.  Analyzing the town’s history, a more contextual reading 
suggests that Allah was more disapproving of the selfishness, greed, and inhospitality 
running rampant in town.  Scott Kugle, an American convert and former professor of 
Islamic Studies, argues that it would be more logical if these traits were the reason for 
the town’s destruction, because women and children were also destroyed by Allah; if 
Allah had meant to punish individuals for their homosexual intentions, then he would 
have saved those who had no part in such behavior (Kugle 2003).   
Kugle uses this hermeneutic strategy to argue that anti-gay interpretations of 
Islam are in fact misinterpretations of Islamic texts, taken out of context. Kugle calls 
this type of interpretive strategy ‘semantic analysis’ because it looks at clusters of 
words as they are physically placed next to each other, but he argues that there is 
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another interpretive strategy as well: thematic analysis.  This strategy looks at the 
Qur’an as a collection of motifs and themes that cannot be read in a linear format, and 
seeks to situate themes in context to the other locations where their mention appears in 
the Qur’an (Kugle 2003). Kugle’s approach is joined by Amreen Jamal’s (2001) 
analysis of the Story of Lut for gay rights specifically, and with the reinterpretive 
scholarship of Amina Wadud (2006) and Asma Barlas (2002) on gender issues 
broadly speaking, as described in detail in chapter three. 
Kugle provides evidence for his argument by locating comparable passages in 
the Qur’an that purposely demonstrate a sense of absurdity in interpreting the Story of 
Lut as an anti-gay narrative.  He presents the story of the prophet Salih as an example: 
Salih was sent by Allah to the People of Thamud to tell them that a certain camel had 
been made sacred, meaning they should care for the animal, allow it to wander freely, 
and eat and drink on anyone’s land.  The camel was meant to symbolically represent 
the weak and vulnerable members of society—if people could care for the camel, they 
would demonstrate their ability to care for members at the margins of their society.  
But the townspeople ridiculed Salih (like the people of Lut), slaughtered the camel, 
and then Allah destroyed the town with an earthquake and ‘choking clouds.’ Kugle 
contends that anyone who takes this story to mean that the people of Thamud were 
punished for hating camels would be sorely missing the point.  Similarly, he argues, 
homosexual behavior is not at the core of the Story of Lut, but violent rape and 
inhospitality are at real fault.   
This hermeneutic interpretive strategy has a transformative air to it because its 
tries to use contextualization to challenge fundamental assumptions about the Qur’an’s 
mandates.  A transformative frame becomes particularly evident when Kugle argues 
that Islamic societies have historically accepted and condoned homosexual behavior 
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(before there was even a term for it in the West, in fact).  This not only justifies 
homosexual behavior by saying it ‘must be tolerated since there is no punishment 
outlined to deter its practice,’ but it goes one step further to suggest that 
heterosexuality should no longer be assumed as the point of reference in the text or 
Islamic traditions. The differentiation between genders is interpreted as a 
deconstructable idea, as gender relations are blurred and demoted from being 
necessary truths.  
Even if this scholarly interpretation qualifies as transformative by our criteria, 
how do activists organizing behind LGBT identities interpret the topic of 
homosexuality in Islam? There is evidence that suggests some American activists 
might be slightly more likely to follow transformative interpretive strategies than 
British activists.  In 1997, a gay American Muslim male named Faisal Alam had a 
near mental breakdown trying to reconcile his faith and sexual identities; while he was 
recovering he decided to reach out over the internet and seek out others who might be 
having the same difficulties. People responded immediately and a support network 
was born over a confidential listserv. The listserv grew into an organization called the 
Al-fatiha Foundation103, which eventually developed the capacity to host international 
conferences for LBGT Muslims.   
In 1998, the Al-Fatiha Foundation traveled to London to organize an event for 
British LGBT Muslims and a gay Muslim named Adnan Ali, who had fled his home in 
Pakistan for fear of being persecuted for his sexuality, decided to found its British 
chapter (Al-fatiha UK).  Under Ali’s leadership, the British organization seemed to 
operate as its American counterpart—it provided support through networking online 
and resources describing the hermeneutic-based scholarship discussed above; its 
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members avoided apologizing for being both gay and Muslim; and they complained 
about traditional views that heavily regulated sexuality. Eventually, however, the Al-
fatiha UK chapter evolved into Imaan, a new organization that still aimed to serve as a 
support network for British LGBT Muslims, but one that framed gender-justice and 
homosexuality differently.  Imaan developed a reputation for arguing that open and 
prideful behavior is contrary to Islam and that one cannot be proud of one’s sexuality 
in Islam.
104
  The organization was taken over by LBT Muslim women who, in contrast 
to Alam and Ali’s ‘proud and out’ stance in public, show up at British pride marches 
in niqab (full face and body veil), arguing that the British homosexual community 
should adopt more modest behavior.  While members of the American Al-Fatiha 
Foundation disguise their identities at Gay Pride marches, activists argue that this 
happens because they are concerned for their safety, not their modesty.
105
  Because 
there is a remarkably limited amount of empirical research (with the exception of 
Andrew KT Yip (2004; 2005; 2006; 2008) in the UK who conducted the first large 
sample quantitative and qualitative study of LGBT Muslims in the West), it is hard to 
draw conclusions about the different frames that LGBT Muslim activists use in the US 
and UK.  However, the analysis above suggests that activists’ interpretations of 
sexuality might be slightly more transformatively inclined on the American side 
because of its tendency to embrace sexuality in a way that challenges tradition and 
counters heteronormative assumptions in the Qur’an.  Further research would 
obviously be needed to discuss this particular form of activism and its parallels to the 
types of gender-justice activism that I discuss elsewhere in this dissertation, though 
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such questions are beyond the scope of this chapter.  
 
V. CONCLUSION 
These three cases have demonstrated that while gender-justice activists in both 
Britain and the US may employ affirmative frames in their campaigns, transformative 
frames seem to emerge exclusively among American Muslim activists.  Given the 
similarities between the two countries’ activists, what might account for the variation 
in the use of transformative frames?  
One explanation could be the disparity in socio-economic standing between 
British Muslims and their American counterparts.  The lower rates of education and 
employment among British Muslims might mean that British Muslim women activists 
are more socio-economically vulnerable and unable to afford alienating themselves 
from their family and community support networks.  My research findings suggest, 
however, that this is an unlikely explanation, because respondents’ affirmative frames 
do not correlate with lower income or educational levels.  The following statements 
that employ affirmative frames of gender-justice issues were all articulated by highly 
educated, middle-class activists: 
I thought to myself, ‘God is not unjust’ and that’s when I 
started exploring, not as in I want to practice it, but just that I 
wanted to know Islam’s viewpoint is on it. That’s when I 
found out that Islam gives women more rights than it gives a 
man—we have more freedom, we have more respect. To an 
extent, we’re quite spoiled, because we don’t have to wake up 
in the morning at five am and go pray sunrise prayers—we can 
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just do whatever we want and pray at home. We don’t have the 
same obligations. --Teacher, 25, UK 
 
Sometimes I think people don’t have the full understanding so 
they think ok my husband has the right to do this to me, do that 
to me. Which is true, you know, because as Muslim women, 
the Muslim man has a certain amount of authority over the 
Muslim woman, but that’s not to say that we’re not equal or 
it’s not balanced, because if you tallied up the rights of a man 
and the rights of a woman in two columns, they’d be equal, 
just in different proportions. Ultimately the tally would be the 
same… it’s like for example, a woman can bear children but a 
man can’t.  Physiologically, we have certain rights that a man 
doesn’t… In god’s eyes, we’re equal.  
--Council-worker, 27, UK 
 
For instance, you look at inheritance and you say, yeah, ok, it’s 
not equal, it’s not the same, men are being told well you get 2 
portions and a woman gets 1. And you think, well, that’s really 
unfair. But then when you look at the context of the society 
that that is being revealed to, what women are supposed to 
have within that society, whatever their assets are they’re 
supposed to have complete freedom over it. And a man has 
legal obligations to look after all the women in his family, so 
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his wife, his mother, his sisters, whatever it is. Whatever he 
gets through inheritance must be used, obviously the 
proportion would vary, but must be used for the women, 
whereas the woman can do what they like. So if a father passes 
away and he’s told to pass on 2/3 to his son and 1/3 to his 
daughter, it’s likely because the son will be using more to look 
after the daughter and the mother and whoever’s left.  --PhD 
student/Lawyer, 29, UK 
If it is not a matter of class composition or socio-economic mobility, another 
explanation might point to the different composition of each country’s Muslim 
community: perhaps immigrants tend towards the affirmative frames, whereas 
indigenous Black Muslims in the US skew gender-justice activism toward the 
transformative end of the frame spectrum? Scholars studying African-American Islam 
in the US suggest that this is an unlikely phenomenon as well.  Sherman Jackson 
(2005) describes the Black Muslim population in the States as being largely Salafi, 
because of the way Salafi Islam’s “staunchly ‘protestant’ approach resonates with the 
generality of Blackamerican Muslims.” He admits that this marriage between Muslim 
radical conservatism and Black Religion can often lead to liabilities, “particularly 
regarding issues affecting women” (Jackson 2005:54).  This does not suggest that all 
Black Muslims are conservative on gender issues; in fact, a number of Black Muslim 
women are leading gender-justice struggles just like those of second generation 
Muslim women. It does, however, indicate that the Black Muslim community does not 
naturally tend towards the transformative end of interpreting women’s rights in Islam. 
 The next chapter will discuss alternative explanations in more detail, but it 
should be noted that if individual level variables do not seem to influence the variation 
in frames, then it seems likely that there are other national context variables at work. I 
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will next explore this notion in detail, by examining each state’s distinct historical 
relationship with religion, religious freedom, and individual rights. These divergent 
histories have helped create dissimilar political opportunity structures, or a set of 
institutional arrangements, that either empower (in the case of America) or impede (in 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE BRITISH STATE’S ENTANGLEMENTS WITH RELIGIOUS 
COMMUNITIES 
 
 I started off this dissertation by explaining that my research confirms two main 
levels of argument.  First, despite the remarkable differences across the Muslim 
communities of Britain and the US, we see a similar population of second generation 
women from these communities who mobilize for gender-justice issues by employing 
similar activist strategies; the differences across the two groups of women’s socio-
economic socialization alone make the similarity in activist strategies that much more 
striking. But within these similar strategies, as we saw in the previous chapter, there is 
still diversity. The ways in which activists frame these campaigns vary from women 
who want to rectify gender inequality, yet still underline difference between men and 
women, to women who aim to rectify gender inequality precisely by challenging the 
underlying system of gender relations.  And, notably, we notice the latter frames 
emerging exclusively in the United States. Given all the other similarities between 
both British and American second generation Muslim women’s activism, why don’t 
we see the same in Britain? 
 It is this variation that generates my second level of argument, and forms the 
basis of this chapter. I argue that the variation between the American and British 
Muslim women’s different experiences with transformative frames is due to the 
fundamental differences in each country’s set of institutional arrangements concerning 
religious freedom.  I claim that the historic role of religion in Britain effectively 
disenfranchizes British Muslim women from experimenting with transformative 
frames, while in America a strong Constitutional cultural tradition that emphasizes 
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individual rights (particularly the right to religious freedom) enables the religious 
activism of some of their American counterparts.  
 The historic role of religion in Britain has made the state suspicious of 
religious leadership, while its role in America has encouraged the state to try and 
refrain from intervening in religious community affairs as much as possible. While 
this chapter demonstrates that the British state’s reservations trace back to its historical 
relationship with the Church of England, I focus on the impact these doubts have had 
on the state’s contemporary relationship with its Muslim religious leadership. The 
British state has tried to limit the radicalizing effects of Islamic clerics on British 
Muslims—particularly young British Muslims—by engaging in a set of institutional 
arrangements I call religious corporatism, where the state chooses ‘moderate’ 
Muslims to represent the Muslim community and tries to regulate the Muslim identity 
through these appointments.  Because these leaders are almost exclusively male, this 
system effectively edges Muslim women out of constructing the Muslim identity in 
Britain.   
 Jonathan Laurence (2010) offers the theory of religious corporatism, arguing 
that the state chooses this approach as “a mechanism for securing a community’s 
respect for state authority” (149).  Ironically, however, my research suggests that this 
approach de-legitimizes the state in the eyes of many Muslim women leaders.  A close 
analysis of the councils that Laurence includes in his argument reveals that the Muslim 
interlocutors appointed by the state are predominantly first generation males.  Second 
generation women leaders are effectively ignored in relations with the state, while 
their elder males are allowed to construct an androcentric, primocentric Muslim 
identity—not only for the public, but to also represent the community’s interests to the 
state.  These brokered relationships turn elder male leaders into formidable 
representatives of the Muslim community, while women activists and their gender-
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justice claims find little support. In order to avoid both alienating potential support 
from women in the broader British Muslim community and obstructive opposition 
from male leaders, activists frame their gender-justice claims without challenging the 
underlying system of gender relations.   
 But how does a state make the decision to engage in or refrain from a system 
of religious corporatism? I argue that each state’s distinct approach to handling 
religious diversity stems from the historical role religion has played in each country’s 
national narrative. The British state’s distrust of religious authorities leads it to 
implement a system where it believes it is in command of religious identities, 
precisely by choosing who gets to represent religious communities. The American 
state, in comparison, attaches great importance to its Constitution’s first amendment 
rights to religious freedom and minority protections and refrains from lionizing certain 
religious leaders as representatives of the Muslim community.  Instead, Muslim 
organizations and activists are left to compete in the public limelight, allowing more 
individual renegades to voice their transformative frames (even if many still turn to 
affirmative ones).  The American state’s deferential relationship towards religious 
freedom, and reluctance to intervene in religious affairs, creates a political opportunity 
structure that enables transformative frames for gender-justice claims to emerge 
among second generation women’s activism in the American Muslim community.  In 
this chapter I argue that the British set of institutional arrangements stemming from a 
deep distrust of religion does not allow the same political opportunity structure to 
emerge for its British Muslim women activists.  
 Before beginning my argument, I engage with a pair of alternative 
explanations for the variation in frames within activists—class stratification and 
feminist cultural traditions that vary between the two countries.  I demonstrate that 
neither explanation satisfactorily rationalizes the variation, but I draw on the idea of 
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distinct cultural traditions to investigate how the different emphasis placed on 
individualism and equal rights in the American national narrative might affect its 
activists’ actions.   
 Next, in order to demonstrate the British state’s ultimate desire to regulate 
religious communities, I first conduct a discourse analysis of the British debates to 
abolish blasphemy law.  A close examination of these debates confirms that the state 
repealed these laws neither out of deference to non-Christian communities (who were 
not protected by the laws) nor out of regard for the freedom of expression, but to assert 
the state’s rightful role in maintaining public order and its independence from 
religious authorities.  Whereas laws against (Christian) religious offense were initially 
developed to maintain public order in a society where the Church constituted the 
social fabric, the contemporary British state now tries to define public order itself; this 
public order also involves regulating religious representation.   
 Accordingly, I next provide a brief, but comprehensive, review of Laurence’s 
(2010) argument that several European states have similarly turned to a system of 
religious corporatism to assert control over its growing Muslim communities. While 
Laurence argues that this approach invests the state with additional authority and 
perceived control in the state-religion model, I explain how this approach only further 
delegitimizes the state in the eyes of Muslims by imposing who will represent the 
Muslim community.  I demonstrate that second generation Muslim women activists 
distrust the state because of the exclusive relationships it brokers with select male 
interlocutors from their community, and this leads them to strategically fight to 
reclaim Islam using less divisive affirmative frames for their gender-justice claims.   
 Finally, for the sake of comparison, I examine how the American state 
approaches the right to religious freedom, made most evident through the recent 
controversy over whether an Islamic community center and mosque should be built 
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near the site of the September 11, 2010 attacks in New York City.  This episode also 
centers on the idea of offense, but in contrast to the British debate that asked whether 
religious communities should be protected from offense on religious grounds, the 
American debate asks whether the right to religious freedom can be restricted if its 
religious practice offends others.  I ultimately argue that the American state’s position 
on religious freedom and commitment to individual rights constructs a political 
opportunity structure that is more conducive to American Muslim women’s religious 
activism than the British state makes available to their British counterparts.  
I. ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS 
 Given that this chapter attempts to explain the difference in frames that emerge 
among activists in America and those that emerge in Britain, it might be useful to first 
engage with two alternative explanations for this variation and explain why they, 
alone, are not satisfactory.  First, differences between each country’s Muslim 
populations are often ascribed to the variation in class composition that I mentioned in 
my first chapter.  Given that the predominantly working class composition of the 
British Muslim community was different enough from the largely middle class 
composition of the American Muslim community to categorize the two groups as 
different systems in my research design, it makes sense that we should interrogate 
whether this divergence in socio-economic status is responsible for the diverse frames 
that emerge among activists.  Nonetheless, I was unable to detect any class 
stratification in the frames that emerged in either Britain or America.  Such an 
explanation might theoretically expect working class activists to use affirmative 
frames for three reasons: 1) lower levels of education might not generate the critical 
thinking that produces transformative frames; 2) working class activists might be more 
likely to live in joint family households, where they feel less comfortable challenging 
underlying gender relations; or 3) perhaps working class activists will use affirmative 
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frames so as not to alienate women in the community who might be similarly 
restricted by these SES circumstances.  
 In both countries, however, I failed to uncover correlations between class and 
frame usage.  In fact, both middle and working class activists in the two countries not 
only found affirmative frames appealing in their own campaigns, but also resisted 
examples of transformative frames that I inquired about in our interviews.  At the end 
of chapter four, I briefly mention that lower levels of education and employment do 
not correlate with either affirmative or transformative frames.  In fact, the vast 
majority of my respondents were well-educated, meaning that lower levels of 
education could not be at fault for choosing affirmative frames. 
 To be clear, the transformative frames that I observed amongst American 
Muslim activists were employed by women from a mixture of class backgrounds as 
well.  For instance, Nomani’s campaign to integrate mosque leadership was strongly 
resisted by upper-middle class Muslim women in the Morgantown community, as 
depicted by the Mosque in Morgantown documentary.  A gathering of women watched 
the controversy’s news coverage and engaged in a conversation on camera where they 
accused Nomani of being out of touch with the community and misunderstanding 
what true gender equality means in mosques. What is more, the American Muslim 
Islamic scholar who employs transformative frames to lead mixed-gender 
congregations in prayer, Amina Wadud, is herself from a working class background 
(see chapter four).  
 Additionally, the joint family living situation is common across class status, as 
the second generation in Muslim immigrant families in both countries often lives with 
their parents until marriage—and, even then, often move into the husband’s family 
home after marriage.  The majority of activists in both countries also commute to local 
universities for higher education, while living at home.  Living situations, therefore, 
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seem to have little to do with class stratification in this community.  Activists do, 
however, mention that they did not want to alienate women in the broader Muslim 
community by conveying gender-justice claims in a way that was ‘too unfamiliar’ or 
failed to relate to their daily concerns (see below).  In this sense, affirmative frames 
were used regardless of activists’ class background, in order to attract the support of 
women who were not gender-justice activists themselves. I will discuss this strategic 
approach further below. 
 A second alternative explanation proposes that the difference in cultural 
traditions between the feminist movement in the United States and its counterpart in 
Western Europe explains why American women’s rights activists would be more 
likely to employ transformative frames than British women’s rights activists.  In a 
volume of essays comparing the feminist movement in the United States and Western 
Europe, feminist scholars argue that American public opinion emphasizes the role of 
individual effort in rectifying gender equality (Katzenstein and Mueller 1987; 
Hastings and Hastings 1986).  Contributors make the claim that mainstream feminism 
in the US is fundamentally liberal in its tenets and is less hesitant than its European 
counterparts to find allies ‘within the system.’ American feminists focus on 
individualism and equal rights and have used political opportunity structures to even 
ally with political parties and institutionalize the struggle for women’s rights (Costain 
and Costain 1987).  American Muslim women’s rights activists, then, might 
experiment with transformative frames that emphasize equality between the genders 
because the American feminist movement demonstrates a strong cultural tradition of 
autonomy and equal rights and endow women’s rights activists with confidence. 
 Yet, this logic falls short for two main reasons. First, the American liberal 
feminist movement is not transformative in the way that my respondents employ 
transformative frames—namely, it is known to underline the differences between the 
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genders, precisely in order to rectify inequality by inserting women into traditionally 
male-only institutions; challenging the underlying structure of gender relations was 
instead attributed to America’s radical feminists.  Second, my respondents largely 
resist any association with either country’s mainstream feminist movement. As I 
demonstrated in chapter three, respondents feel that the Western tradition of feminism 
is orientalist and a less appealing framework for women’s rights than the Islamic 
tradition. It is unlikely, then, that the select American Muslim feminists who employ 
transformative frames to make gender-justice claims derive their ideas from the 
American feminist movement.  
 It might be possible that American Muslim activists could unconsciously 
derive ideas from American mainstream feminists, despite their forthright disregard 
for the movement; however, a piece by another contributor to the same volume 
compares feminism in the United States and Germany and holds promise for a better 
explanation.  Myra Marx Ferree examines the different historical experiences that 
have given different directions to the feminist movement in each country and 
concludes that feminists in the United States focus “on shaping a definition of equality 
that is consistent with the prevailing liberal conceptualization of equality as identical 
rights” (Ferree 1987: 189).  She argues that American feminists of the nineteenth 
century founded their arguments for women’s access to education, property and other 
rights on the liberal premises embodied in the Declaration of Independence.   
 Ferree’s argument implies that there might be a cultural tradition dating further 
back than the advent of American mainstream feminism that not only gave birth to 
mainstream feminists themselves, but also might be responsible for influencing the 
American Muslim women activists who experiment with transformative frames. The 
dominant American political tradition, as Ferree argues, is classical liberalism, which 
emphasizes self-determination and individual rights.  These political ideas are 
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embedded in the country’s founding documents and imply that a Constitutional 
narrative of American history might influence its various activists and the frames they 
use to make their claims.  
 This chapter makes the claim that a number of American Muslim women’s 
rights activists employ transformative frames to make gender-justice claims because 
they have a different historical narrative and national context to appeal to in their 
struggles.  While it must be made clear that not all American activists employ 
transformative frames, it is notable that none of the transformative framing I observed 
emerged among British activists’ campaigns.  In order to make sense of this disparity, 
I portray the American Constitutional narrative as a ‘toolkit’ from which feminists can 
select elements they believe will help their claims. 
 Anne Swidler proposes the idea that culture forms a ‘toolkit’ or cultural 
repertoire of habits, skills and styles from which people construct strategies of action 
(Swidler 1986).  While traditional sociological treatments of culture assume it shapes 
action by determining how people value things around them, leading them to act by 
means that obtain those ends, Swidler believes that culture can actually have a more 
direct causal role in shaping action because it provides individuals with a certain set of 
capacities which they can selectively use to act in ways they believe might lead to 
ends they desire.  
 I argue that the American Constitutional narrative constitutes this toolkit or 
cultural repertoire from which activists can select an emphasis on equal rights and 
individualism to make gender-justice claims through transformative frames.  
According to Ferree, it is likely that American mainstream feminists also draw from 
the same toolkit.  Swidler is careful to note, however—and I concur—that just as 
culture should be understood as a heterogeneous, dynamic term (see chapter three), it 
should be clear that not all individuals select the same capacities from their toolkit.  
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She clarifies: “A culture is not a unified system that pushed action in a consistent 
direction. Rather it is more like a ‘tool kit’ or repertoire from which actors select 
differing pieces for constructing lines of action” (Swidler 1986: 276).   This 
qualification helps explains why some American Muslim activists experiment with 
transformative frames while others continue to employ affirmative frames—the former 
are those women who reach into their American toolkit and select aspects of the 
Constitutional narrative that emphasizes equal rights and individualism; the latter 
derive their gender-justice claims primarily from their religious foundation, making 
their frames similar to those of their British counterparts.  
 The implications of Swidler’s research advise scholars to pay closer attention 
to the interaction of culture and social structure.  For instance, do certain historical 
junctures or sets of cultural symbols give rise to certain strategies of action more than 
others?  This chapter takes its cue from this question, as I argue that the historical 
American Constitutional narrative leads to a set of institutional arrangements that 
respect individual rights and the right to religious freedom; it is this interaction 
between culture and social structure that, in turn, enables religious activists in the US 
to experiment with transformative frames while the absence of such a cultural tradition 
in Britain leads to a more restrictive set of institutional arrangements.  
 
II.  BRITAIN’S STATE-CHURCH MODEL 
 The British state’s relationship with the Church of England dates back to 
Reformation, when King Henry VIII severed relations with the Roman Catholic 
Church because the Pope repeatedly refused to annul Henry’s marriage to his first 
wife, Catherine of Aragon, so that he could remarry and try for a male heir. Henry 
passed the Act of Succession and then the Act of Supremacy in 1534, ensuring that the 
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monarch of England would be the supreme head of the new Church of England.
106
  As 
the established church, the Church of England enjoys the exclusive law-making 
privilege of twenty-six seats for bishops, including the two Archbishops of Canterbury 
and York, in the House of Lords.  The Church of England was also the only religion 
protected under Britain’s blasphemy law until they were ultimately repealed in 2008. 
This section first briefly explains why blasphemy law were established in the 16
th
 
century.  Next I move on to a close examination of the parliamentary debates to 
abolish blasphemy law to demonstrate that the state wanted to repeal the laws to assert 
its control over religious authorities.  
 
A. Blasphemy law 
 Scholars who study the history of blasphemy law in Britain argue that they 
were established to protect offense against the Church of England because to offend 
the Church was to threaten the very moral fabric of society (Nash 2008, 1999; Jones 
1990).  In the seventeenth century Lord Hale famously argued that blasphemy law 
preserved civil order: “To say, religion is a cheat, is to dissolve all those obligations 
whereby the civil societies are preserved, and that Christianity is parcel of the Laws of 
England; and therefore to reproach the Christian religion is to speak in subversion of 
the law.”
107
  Civil order was based on religion—Christianity in particular—so a 
critical view of religion implied subversive tendencies towards the state as well. 
Blasphemy was considered a challenge to all forms of authority, and, as David Nash 
(2008) argues: “the State and its relationship with established religion became fused in 
a partnership that guaranteed respect for religion and the monarch/prince” (Nash 2008: 
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440).  Individuals who were brought up on charges of blasphemy were effectively 
brought up on charges of sedition.  
 Two common challenges were repeatedly raised against the blasphemy law.  
Though some legislators still argued that “the Christian religion holds a special place 
in the social and Constitutional fabric of the nation” and must be guarded from offense 
because “the protection of society is achieved by ensuring that the Christian religion is 
treated with respect,” many critics argued that the blasphemy law explicitly 
discriminated against Britain’s non-Christian faith communities.  One faith 
community, they argued, could not be subject to more protections than others.  
Religious leaders from non-Christian communities, particularly Muslim leaders, 
petitioned for the extension of the laws to protect all individuals from offense on 
religious grounds.  
 The second challenge was made by secularist advocates, as well as the 
European Commission on Human Rights, and argued that blasphemy law violated 
liberal rights to the freedom of expression; as a member of the Council of Europe, of 
which the ECHR is a part, Britain was periodically reminded that it could not be a 
champion of human rights around the world with such laws on their own books.  In 
spite of both of these legitimate criticisms, however, the state chose to repeal the law 
based on the primary argument that blasphemy law was irrelevant, because they had 
been ‘abrogated through disuse.’  The last public prosecution invoking the law was 
made in 1922 and the last private case was taken in 1977; yet, if preventing blaspheme 
was so crucial to preserving public order, critics asked, then why were cases so far and 
few between?  
 
B. Challenging Blasphemy law  
  205 
 In 1989, the controversy over Salman Rushdie’s Satanic Verses shone a 
spotlight on the privileged relationship between the state and the Church of England 
that the blasphemy law’s critics had already questioned for some time.  Some Muslim 
male community leaders found the book to be blasphemous to the Islamic faith, for a 
variety of reasons, and called for the book to be banned. They were joined by some 
Muslim leaders in the Middle East—most prominently by the Supreme Leader of Iran, 
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who issued a fatwa on Rushdie.  While the majority of 
Muslims in Britain refrained from taking a public stance on the book, a number were 
enraged enough to take to the streets, burning copies of the novel.
108
  The frenzy 
eventually even led to an attempt at a private blasphemy prosecution.  In R v Chief 
Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate ex parte Choudhury (1991), a Mr. Choudury 
asked the court to expand the blasphemy law to protect religious offense against Islam. 
Choudury accused the state of discrimination against minority faiths and of partiality 
towards those of the Christian faith. The court ruled that the blasphemy law could not 
be expanded to other faiths, not because it held the Church of England in such high 
esteem—the ruling, in fact, admits that the current laws discriminate against minority 
faiths—but because it ruled that the logistics alone of incorporating more faith 
communities would be impractical. 
109
 
 Muslim leaders were asking to expand the blasphemy law because they 
fundamentally supported a continuation of the privileged relationship between 
religious communities and the state (Hellyer 2007; Koenig 2005).  A continued link 
between the Church and state meant that the government would continue to recognize 
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religion as an important identity, and was, after all, better than the secularist 
multiculturalism option of not recognizing the positive role of religion in the public 
sphere (Modood 1994).  But Muslim leaders interpreted this ruling as the state’s 
blatant nepotism towards Christianity, at the expense of minority communities. 
 In fact, however, the manner in which the blasphemy law were repealed in 
2008 substantiates the government’s disdain for its institutionalized relationship with 
religion, including the Church.  The debates over adding a clause abolishing the 
blasphemy law occurred in the House of Lords in March 2008, in the House of 
Commons in May later that year, and quickly received the Royal Assent which 
recorded the law to history.
110
  Opponents of abolition in both parliamentary debates 
argued that it would send anti-Christian signals to a majority-Christian society already 
made vulnerable by growing religious diversity, which they equated with pursuing the 
disestablishment of the Church of England. Although the amendment’s proponents 
repeatedly said that they were neither anti-Christian, nor trying to accomplish the 
disestablishment of the Church, the state does, in fact, seem to have made an attempt 
at disestablishment—if disestablishment is taken to mean that the state is considered to 
be the ultimate authority maintaining public order, and is no longer dependent on the 
Church to do so. 
 A discourse analysis of the debates reveals that proponents generally relied on 
three main arguments.  First, proponents argued that international norms frowned upon 
Britain’s enduring blasphemy law. As a signatory to a number of international 
conventions, they argued, the UK had to acknowledge that blasphemy law marred 
“what is otherwise an excellent record on combating discrimination and promoting 
human rights.”
111
  The UN special rapporteur on freedom of religion specifically 
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expressed concern at the continued existence of blasphemy law in Britain, and 
questioned whether these restrictive laws undermined the country’s position to 
criticize discriminatory laws in other countries. A Liberal Democrat proponent argued 
that a letter he wrote to the media to argue that the Sudanese Government’s blasphemy 
law was unjust, in relation to the “teddy bear” case in 2007, was undermined by this 




 The blasphemy law is discriminatory, according to the European Court of 
Human Rights, but the discrimination is suffered by those who wish to use their right 
to freedom of expression.  Discrimination against non-Christian minority communities 
is only mentioned in passing, by proponents who want to drive home the idea that 
such laws are outdated in an increasingly diverse, multicultural society.  Not a single 
member of either the House of Lords or Commons mentions that discrimination 
against minority faiths could be solved by simply expanding the law to cover other 
religions as well—this is surprising considering opponents of abolition were joined by 
Muslim leaders’ who supported the continuation of blasphemy law if they it was 
expanded to cover Islam.   
 Taken as a whole, the international norm argument appeared to be the weakest 
argument put forth by proponents, because, ultimately, opponents repeatedly argued 
that they were not convinced by international law.  When a proponent cited the 
example of the United States to argue that maintaining a single state Church would not 
help cohesiveness, claiming “religious life flourishes far more in the United States, 
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and some say that it is no accident that that country has no state Church,” an opponent 
countered by deriding international examples: “He may be right, but it is also not an 
accident that people who wanted that went to the US, and that people who did not 
stayed here… We have to remember our culture, tapestry and traditions and not just 
those of other countries.”
113
 
 The second and third arguments for abolition more accurately portrayed the 
state’s desire to establish control over public order.  The second argument proponents 
made argued that the laws had long been abandoned in any case and that their 
continuation undermined the state’s efficacy and reputation.  Both members who 
introduced the amendment on their respective parliamentary floors argued that “the 
law has fallen into disuse and therefore runs the risk of bringing the law as a whole 
into disrespute.”
114
 To support their case, they explained that no public prosecutions 
had been brought since 1922 and the last private prosecution was a case in 1977.  One 
member argued that the sprawling gaps between uses proved the irrelevance of the 
laws—“There was hardly a rash of prosecutions before 1922. I have been able to find 
only two cases. The first was in 1676… hard on the heels of that event, there was one 
in 1841… it was 80 years before the law was invoked again…when we say that the 
law has fallen into disuse, perhaps we should really say that the law has never been 
found to be usable.”
115
  
 In response, however, conservatives argued that the failure to employ the laws 
was due to the scarcity of political will to use them, not due to any failure in the laws 
themselves. One member argued “there is a distinction between what is usable and 
what is used” and blamed the government for failing to acknowledge the significance 
of these laws in maintaining an orderly society. Given that proponents indicated that 
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the lack of political will spanned the last three decades (denoting a lack of will across 
different party governments), it may be precisely the lack of political will to enforce 
blasphemy law that proves their irrelevance to contemporary societal interests. 
 On July 11, 2002 a rowdy protest calling for the abolition of the blasphemy 
law, gathered thousands of people for a reading of James Kirkup's poem, The Love 
that Dares To Speak Its Name on the steps of Trafalgar Square in London. Activists 
chose this day because it was the 25
th
 anniversary of Gay News magazine’s conviction 
for publishing the same poem—the last private prosecution in 1977.  Activists even 
directly challenged the state in its protest propaganda, yelling for police to “arrest us 
or abolish the blasphemy law!”
116
 Yet, despite the fact that the poem portrays Jesus 
Christ engaged in graphically detailed homosexual acts with his subordinate, and 
Christian activists called for the state to prosecute the readers for religious offense, the 
state refrained from action. One of the lead activists, Peter Tatchell, declared it was a 
good day for free speech rights: “We have won an important victory for free speech 
and the right to protest…No one was arrested. The police didn’t even take our names 
and addresses. The blasphemy law is now a dead letter. If the authorities are not 
prepared to enforce the law, they should abolish it.”
117
  While his dreams of abolition 
would take another six years to realize, the Trafalgar incident signals that the state was 
indeed lacking in political will to protect the Church of England from offense.  And if 
the political will to execute a certain law was missing, the law simply served as an 
empty threat that undermined the state’s authority in keeping public order. 
 The third reason that proponents gave for abolition also concerned the state’s 
reputation and perceived efficacy.  Proponents argued that new legislation protected 
individuals on grounds of religion and belief, in an all-inclusive way that did not 
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discriminate against non-Christian faiths, and made blasphemy law redundant.  This 
reason stands out as the state’s chief argument not only because it is referenced most 
in the debates, but also because it demonstrates a temporal justification for why the 
laws are finally repealed in 2008.  Baroness Andrews, when introducing the 
amendment in the House of Lords, explained that debates over abolition had taken 
place in parliament for the past 22 years, but that “the opportunity has been taken in 
this Bill, because it was appropriate and timely to do so.” The timeliness to which she 
refers was the political opportunity structure created by the accumulation of new 
legislation that addresses religious identity.  
 Religious identity was not traditionally incorporated into legislation addressing 
race relations.  Unlike the US Civil Rights Act of 1964 which names religion 
alongside race as identity groups that form ‘protected classes,’ qualifying members of 
those groups to protection from discrimination, religion was not automatically 
considered alongside race in Britain. Instead, it took years of lobbying the state, much 
like the controversy over blasphemy law during the Rushdie affair, to persuade the 
state that offense against religious identity was just as important as offense against 
racial or ethnic identities.  Ultimately, existing legislation did not recognize the 
religious identity until September 11, 2001 convinced British politicians that the 
Muslim identity was not one they could continue to ignore.  The Anti-terrorism, Crime 
and Security Act of 2001 was introduced immediately after the attacks, and one of the 
measures replaced ‘racially-aggravated offenses” with “racially or religiously 
aggravated offenses” in some parts of criminal law,
118
 perhaps suggesting that state 
efforts to counter terrorist activity would not enable religious profiling of the Muslim 
community (though expanding police powers demonstrated otherwise).   
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 In addition to this security legislation, legislation against discrimination in the 
provisions of goods, facilities and services was amended to include discrimination on 
the grounds of religious belief.  While the Race Employment Equality (Religion or 
Belief) Regulations of 2003 makes it illegal to discriminate against a person on the 
grounds of religious belief in the areas of employment or vocational training, the Race 
Relations Act 1976 had only made it unlawful to discriminate against a person in the 
provision of goods, facilities, and services in the area of public functions on the 
grounds of their race. Though the RRA included protection against discrimination on 
grounds of color, race, nationality and racial or ethnic origin, religious belief was not 
included.  Subsequent case-law even extended this protection to Jews and Sikhs, 
recognizing them as specific ethnic groups, but religious groups such as Christians and 
Muslims were still excluded.
119
 Finally in 2007, the Equality Act was amended to 
extend protection on the grounds of religion and belief to provision of goods, facilities 
and services, the disposal and management of premises, in education and in the 
exercise of public functions.
120
 
 The new legislation deemed most important by proponents of abolition was the 
Racial and Religious Hatred Act of 2006, which legislated against inciting hatred 
against a person on the grounds of their religious belief.  This act not only underscored 
the two prior legislative extensions to religious identity, but it also secured the support 
of key religious leaders with the Church of England. Kay Goodall (2007) explains that 
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this legislation is the culmination of six attempts in Parliament since the mid 1990s to 
make incitement to religious hatred unlawful. 
Goodall addresses what could be called the ‘racialization’ of religion, in describing the 
contemporary efforts to expand incitement to racial hatred legislation in Britain to 
include incitement to religious hatred.  She admits that religion and race have been 
treated differently for some reasonable reasons: “Race, for most people, most of the 
time, is indeed clear and fixed.  Religious affiliation, in contrast, is often less easily 
discerned by others and is not immutable” (97).  However, she argues, religion often 
does the work of social organizing that race performs: “Religion, too, needs to be 
understood both as faith and as social category—as a way of marking out groups.  In 
Scotland and Northern Ireland, sectarian conflict is between two groups who use 
religion mostly as a social category: it is not a battle of faith between devout 
believers” (98). Given that ‘Muslim’ has become a term of abuse in Britain, and is 
often used as shorthand for ‘non-white,’ anti-Muslim sentiment can indeed be 
interpreted as racist. 
   Goodall concludes, however, that the legislation requires such a high 
threshold—particularly the proof of ‘intention’ to incite hatred—that it renders the 
legislation practically useless and unenforceable. Her analysis suggests the state 
pursues the legislation for symbolic measures, rather than effective protective 
purposes.  Yet the same government in 2008 refers to the Act as the main reason 
blasphemy law should be abolished. Proponents of abolition recurrently referred to the 
redundancy created by both laws, and the more expansive protection that the Act 
provided to non-Christians as well. Baroness Andrews, while introducing the 
amendment, argues that the incitement legislation “recognizes a more complex and 
diverse society, which respects those of faith and those of none.”
121
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 The central role of the testimony given by Archbishops sitting in the House of 
Lords, however, indicates that the state was more strategically interested in winning 
their support than using the legislation to protect people on the grounds of their 
religious belief.  The Archbishops of Canterbury and York wrote a joint letter to the 
Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government, which was repeatedly 
cited by proponents, saying: “Having signalled [sic] for more than 20 years that the 
blasphemy law could, in the right context, be abolished, the Church is not going to 
oppose abolition now, provided we can be assured that provisions are in place to 
afford the necessary protection to individuals and to society.”
122
 The incitement 
legislation was precisely what the religious leaders cited as their assurance that people 
of religious belief would be protected. Proponents finally had support from crucial 
allies to abolish laws that they believed undermined the state’s authority.  
 The 2008 debates represent the state’s opportunistic attempt to abolish 
blasphemy law at a particular moment in time when blasphemy law had fallen out of 
use and new legislation had made it redundant.  The new legislation also convinced 
leaders with the Church of England to finally give abolition their legislative ‘blessing’ 
or support.  Historically, the state had allied wth the Church to establish stability and 
eventually even built institutions based on Christian values because they reflected the 
interests of the vast share of society. The main purpose behind blasphemy law had 
been to maintain order, as defined by the Christian faith.  Even the Archbishops’ letter 
admitted that “the real purpose of the offences is the preservation of society from civil 
strife, rather than the protection of the divine or any particular religious beliefs” in a 
society whose fabric was “formed through the operation of the Christian faith.”123  
But now it had become clear that the government wanted to replace the laws that 
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continued its entanglement with the Church of England with legislation that allowed 
the government control over defining public order. Proponents of the new incitement 
legislation had never really intended to protect religion itself, which was revealed 
beyond a doubt by a Liberal Democrat’s testimony in the Commons:  
 
We in the House worked hard to narrowly defeat the 
Government to ensure that the religious hatred laws did 
not protect opinion or religion, but only, in clear and 
narrow cases, individuals from incitement to hatred. I 
did not for one moment think that those laws would be 





Though the MP claims that proponents of abolition did not want the incitement 
legislation to represent state interests in protecting religion, the Labour government 
strategically allowed religious leaders to believe the new legislation would protect 
people from religious offense so that the bishops would, ironically, support the 
abolition of laws that bound the state to the Church of England. 
     
III. BRITAIN’S STATE-MOSQUE MODEL 
 The British state’s aim to assert control over religious leadership is not 
confined to the Church of England. With a growing Muslim population and increasing 
concerns about religious clerics’ abilities to radicalize British Muslim youth, the state 
is concerned about regulating the Muslim community as well. A forthcoming analysis 
of State-Islamic relations in Western Europe, written by Jonathan Laurence (2010), 
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argues that various Western European states institutionalize Islam Councils to regulate 
the developing Muslim identity in their countries.  In Laurence’s story, instead of 
abolishing blasphemy law, the state institutionalizes what he calls Islam Councils. 
These councils range from formal commissions to more informal advisory groups, but 
their purpose is the same: they advise the government on Muslim community needs. 
Ironically, while abolishing blasphemy law arguably disestablished the 
institutionalization of Christianity, Islam Councils practically institutionalize Islam.   
This section first describes Laurence’s theory and then moves on to argue that his 
critical oversight of Muslim women prevents him from understanding how the state 
has, in reality, delegitimized its authority among leaders of the British Muslim 
community.  
A. Religious Corporatism 
 Laurence argues that a system of religious corporatism actually reflects a 
stronger state, and should not be misunderstood as the state caving to religious 
community interests. Laurence effectively applies neo-corporatist theory to the 
pressing problem many Western European countries face: when countries opened their 
countries to Muslim migrants in 1960s-1970s, expecting migrants to return home, a 
series of economic shocks in the 1970s convinced migrants to stay and petition to send 
for their relatives, creating family reunification legislation. Now that the migrants’ 
children are coming of age and we are beginning to see the second generation (and 
even third-generation in some places) participate politically, Western European 
countries must learn how to incorporate a growing community that organizes behind a 
Muslim religious identity into state-religion models that were historically based on the 
state’s relationship with Christianity. 
 Whereas other scholars treat this entanglement as an indicator of the state’s 
weakness and a dangerous signal that religious systems could control politics, 
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Laurence believes that the state deliberately uses accommodation policies as a 
“mechanism for securing a community’s respect for state authority” (149). Although 
by recognizing group difference the state reconstitutes the very group borders that it 
seeks to dissolve with the rights of liberal citizenship, Laurence argues that the state 
does this deliberately and its “public recognition for these and other interest groups 
can be seen as a moral response to the representative insufficiency of parliament in the 
modern state” (161).   
 The state wants to establish public order, and reigning in religious identities 
that could challenge individuals’ loyalty to the state is seen as a crucial step in the 
process. Laurence cites Rousseau’s argument in Social Contract that religious duties 
might interfere with loyalty to the state. Both majority and minority religions are 
worrisome, because Rousseau believed that “at every turn they await an opportunity to 
usurp state sovereignty.”  If the state was to remain sovereign, it would have to 
regulate religion.  But, just as blasphemy law were only abolished once Christian 
religious leaders believed the state was acting in the religion’s interests, the state uses 
the Islamic Councils to regulate the Muslim identity under the guise of seeking their 
input in government affairs.  
 Laurence does a remarkable job of finding similarities across five Western 
European countries’ approaches to accommodating growing Muslim diversity. He 
explains how the countries followed very similar pathways to managing their relations 
with Islam, breaking down the evolution of these relations into two stages: first, there 
was Embassy Islam, an approach where the state favored foreign governments of 
Muslim majority populations and allowed them to control their diaspora populations 
in the West to a considerable extent.  As Laurence notes, this is a less relevant 
approach in Britain because the majority of its Muslims are Pakistani migrants, and 
Pakistan was the not the sort of Islamic-controlled state that Embassy Islam involved. 
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In any case, as it became clear that Muslim migrants were not going to return home, 
the role of foreign governments in state-Islam relations became less desirable and the 
various states moved on from Embassy Islam. 
 The second stage, Political Islam, is where the British case rejoins Laurence’s 
argument. Political Islam was made up of Muslim federations that focused on 
domestic affairs and conducted themselves in English, which the state took as an 
indication that they were serious about settling in the West.  At first, these 
organizations’ leaders still exhibited what Laurence calls an “old country” mentality 
that is “reminiscent of the tensions between government-sponsored religion and 
Islamist political parties in North Africa and Turkey…[and the leaders were] 
confrontational with public authorities and made maximalist demands for religious 
accommodation in the public sphere” (252).  Eventually, however, these federations 
demonstrated more of a willingness to cooperate with state-Islam consultations, 
because they felt the influence they could exert through being included in state-
consultations would be greater than protesting or lobbying from the outside.  
 Laurence argues that European states went through two phases of state-Islam 
consultations. The first phase in Britain formed the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) 
in 1997 to serve as the single interlocutor for the government.  The organization was 
allegedly founded as the result of several years of broad consultation with over 250 
British Muslim organizations, and was even planned as an improvement upon the UK 
Action Committee on Islamic Affairs—a group that was made of Muslim diplomats 
and professionals to represent Muslim interests after the Rushdie affair in 1989 
(Laurence 2010: 214).  The government’s heavy involvement in the group’s formation 
and with the organization’s agenda is evidenced by press reports of leaked memos. 
125
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This first-phase proved untenable as the group’s members could never agree amongst 
themselves and members of the broader Muslim community began to doubt the 
group’s independence from the state.  
 After the September 11, 2001 attacks, followed by the attacks in Madrid and 
London, the British state felt a new sense of urgency to try the state-Islam consultative 
approach again. The second attempt tried the neo-corporatist model once more and 
tried to make it appear as though the representatives were chosen by the Muslim 
community itself:   
The Home Office asked the four leading Muslim 
organizations to help constitute the founding 
membership of "Preventing Extremism Together" in the 
weeks after the London bombings of July 7, 2005… 
After some jockeying by participants and internal 
confusion regarding the board’s hierarchy, the Home 
Office established a steering committee for the Mosques 
and Imams National Advisory Board. 
Other scholars argue that the process of convening this consultative group was more 
complicated than Laurence’s account.  Jonathan Birt (2006) explains that some 
members thought the process was “tokenistic” from the beginning, saying that the 
state had rushed the process through the holidays and pre-empted their work with a 
“raft of measures…completely counter to reducing alienation and extremism.”
126
 The 
Preventing Extremism Together (PET) taskforce produced a report in November 2005 
that argued the key solution to tackling extremism was to first battle a series of issues 
that disproportionately affected the Muslim community in Britain, particularly 
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inequality, discrimination, deprivation and foreign policy.  However, Arun Kundnani 
(2009) argues that by April 2007 the government had launched its official Prevent 
program, with the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG), and 
effectively ignored the recommendations made by the taskforce.  Instead of addressing 
systemic problems plaguing the Muslim communities, the state opted to pursue 
terrorists, protect infrastructure, prepare emergency response services, and prevent 
people from becoming terrorists.  
 The government reasoned that “communities stop terrorism” and shifted the 
responsibility for solving problems in the Muslim community to Muslims themselves. 
The Preventing Violent Extremism Pathfinder Fund was set up so that the DCLG 
could delegate funds to local organizations and authorities who aimed to tackle 
radicalism in their communities. While the original PET taskforce made thirty-seven 
recommendations, only three initiatives were taken up by government and two of these 
were concerned with training ‘good imams’ that would encourage concepts of civic 
religion among British Muslims (Birt 2006: 701). The rest of the taskforce’s 
recommendations were consigned to mere concerns, instead of priorities.  
 While Laurence demonstrates that the leaders of federations have adapted their 
behavior to the neo-corporatist political opportunity structure, moderating their 
demands and trading in obstructionist positions for more pragmatic stances, my 
research suggests that not all Muslim leaders have responded favorably to the state’s 
approach—particularly Muslim women leaders. The state’s main challenge in 
organizing religious corporatist arrangements is who will represent the Muslim 
community, and the state overwhelming chooses first generation male leaders for 
these negotiations.  Muslim women, in fact, are nowhere to be found throughout 
Laurence’s analysis.  The key element that he overlooks in his entire argument is the 
fact that the state’s approach to religious corporatism definitionally excludes women, 
  220 
as long as it uses consultations to justify training imams and monitoring mosques, 
given that chapter four explains that female imams have not emerged in Britain. If, as 
Laurence argues, “the commonality of these State-Islam consultations is that they are 
held with the delegates of prayer spaces, large mosques and Islamic religious 
federations,” then the interlocutors the state works with are exclusively male.  
B. Incorporating Women Under a Securitization Agenda 
 In Britain’s case, while Muslim women activists were not pleased when the 
state began brokering exclusive relationships with male leaders in their community 
with the advent of the MCB in 1997, the state’s securitization agenda after September 
11, 2001 only worsened their situation. Now instead of the state explicitly ignoring 
Muslim women, activists explained how they were insincerely courted by the state to 
be token representatives of the Muslim community. Katherine Brown (2008) looks at 
the impact of the state’s securitization agenda on women’s participation in mosques 
and argues that this state agenda actually undermines its efficacy in the Muslim 
community: “the British Government’s instrumental use of the gender issue is likely to 
have negative ramifications in the long run for women’s rights by undermining certain 
‘progressive’ groups within the Muslim community. Specifically in policy terms, it is 
also likely to undermine current counter-radicalisation [sic] activities” (Brown 2008: 
472-3).   
 The campaign for women’s rights in mosques, which I describe in some detail 
in the previous chapter, is a good example. Brown argues that the state’s securitizaton 
agenda, post September 11, 2001—which intensified after the arrest of Richard Reid 
and the July 7, 2005 London bombings—focused on the mosque as a site of 
socialization in the Muslim community.
127
 Laurence similarly argues that the state’s 
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religious corporatist approach not only believed that religious leaders in mosques were 
natural brokers, but it also tried to train selected leaders as representatives of the 
community.  It is clear in Brown’s story that Muslim women activists believe that the 
state is at fault in brokering these relationships with men, at the expense of Muslim 
women. She cites one activist from the Women’s Resource Centre who explains how 
women were excluded from the table:  
From our own experience, we really had to fight to be 
involved, they don’t automatically consider us, they 
usually go to the male-led religious groups.  Women’s 
groups have little funding, no premises, the men tend to 
have the Mosques, they are automatically considered, 
which I think is really discriminatory, so the 
Government is guilty of this itself.
128
 
 When the state’s strategy finally turned to women, it tried to expand religious 
corporatism to include women representatives of the Muslim community.  First, the 
approach tried to insert women into mosques as ‘deradicalizing’ agents of a sort.  
Second, the state formed an advisory group of women, similar to Islam Councils, with 
the main agenda of exposing and exterminating extremism in their families and 
communities.  Both the state and Muslim groups supported the idea that women 
perform a distinctive role in their families and faith communities.  Baroness Uddin 
stated: “Muslim women have a vital role to play in public life and their participation 
has always been prominent in Islamic history.  Encouraging the role of British Muslim 
women as a source of moral authority through their influence within families and 
communities is a key to unlocking the disenfranchisement and disillusion of Muslim 
                                                                                                                                       
argues that the state has constructed the image of the ‘good imam’ to help manage 
Muslim diversity. 
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youth in the UK” (as cited in Brown 2008: 481).  The state began to equate the 
presence of women in mosques with the deradicalization of Muslim youth, so it began 
to promote mosque reform that called for reduced foreign influence on staff and the 
integration of women. Mosques that failed to comply risked being closed down 
(Brown 2008: 480).   
 As the previous chapter notes, women activists run into resistance from their 
first generation male elders, or babas, as Brown refers to them.  Male leaders see the 
mosque as their distinctive space, a unique position from which they can lead their 
regional communities.  Brown explains that “it is likely that those who run mosques 
will see this campaign as part of a wider strategy to undermine traditional authority 
structures rather than as an ‘Islamic’ protest against cultural innovations” (486).  In 
interfering in with the women’s campaign, the state makes it more difficult for women 
to gain access to spaces led by increasingly defensive and insecure male leaders.  
 A greater concern to women activists, however, is how the state’s approach to 
religious corporatism effectively undermines their authenticity and credibility among 
other Muslim women.  This concern is precisely why British Muslim women activists 
use exclusively affirmative frames in their gender-justice campaign.  In terms of the 
campaign for women’s rights in mosques, Brown explains that “as the campaign 
becomes increasingly associated with the government agenda of integration and 
counter-radicalization it loses credibility and authenticity in Muslim communities 
because it is no longer about ‘Islamic’ injunctions and identities” (486).  The 
credibility that activists want to maintain with the larger community of Muslim 
women depends on their ability to relate the campaign to women’s routine lives. When 
asked how she felt about Amina Wadud leading Friday prayers, a 23 year old activist 
from Lancastershire disapproved of her approach.  She thought it was “too 
confrontational and away from what women are familiar with… Muslim women 
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leaders need to keep common Muslim women in mind and not force them out of their 
comfort zones too quickly, because there will only be backlash and it will be 
counterproductive.” The state damaged activists’ credibility within their communities, 
making women turn to prudent frames for gender-justice, but efforts did not stop with 
mosque reform. Soon the state decided to take its approach to religious corporatism 
one step further and set up an advisory group of Muslim women.  Paradoxically, what 
Laurence argues is supposed to be the state’s strategy to assert control and win respect 
from the community only backfired and undermined the state’s authority within the 
larger community of Muslim women.   
C. National Muslim Women’s Advisory Group 
 Encouraging women’s participation in mosques did not work like the 
government wanted it to—the state faced resistance from Muslim males and even 
females for interfering in communal affairs. In January 2008, the Secretary of State for 
the Department for Communities and Local Government, Hazel Blears, launched the 
National Muslim Women’s Advisory Group (NMWAG).
129
  For all intents and 
purposes, the group fits Laurence’s criteria for an ‘Islam Council,’ as a group that the 
state established because of its religious corporatist approach, except that this group 
was comprised exclusively of Muslim women—19 prominent Muslim women 
activists from across the country, to be precise.  
 The group was launched with PVE funds to advise the government on how to 
tackle extremism.  The state agenda for the advisory group specifically asked these 
women to be on guard and report problems and the suspicious behavior of young 
males in their communities. The department went so far as to organize training 
modules that hired actors to play disturbed young men, and taught women in the 
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community through role playing workshops how to engage with such scenarios.  
 When I interviewed women who sat on the advisory group, a minority of 
women praised the state for finally reaching out to Muslim women. One group 
member credits the government with highlighting Muslim women’s voices in diverse 
political debates, effectively expanding its religious corporatist model to include 
women as well:  
We have access…we go into the House of Lords and 
House of Commons, we speak to the Prime Minister… 
this is what Britain has done for Muslim 
women….They’ve literally put Muslim women in 
leadership positions, where they speak to ministers 
around issues of media, education, about employment, 
their concerns about foreign policy, they’ve spoken to 
the Foreign Secretary about Gaza, so the government 
has created that platform for Muslim women to raise 
those concerns.  
The majority of respondents I interviewed, however, argued that they had to 
commandeer the group as a platform from which they could make their opinions heard 
on state matters—from domestic social service reform to foreign policy and wars 
abroad—because Muslim women’s voices were not sufficiently represented elsewhere 
British politics. 
 Critics among fellow Muslim women activists (who had either refused to sit on 
the group or had not been invited) rose concerns about the state using the group to spy 
on Muslim communities; one activist who declined the invitation even called the 
advisory group members the state’s “puppet women.” Another activist accused the 
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group of neglecting serious concerns that Muslim women faced and being too short-
sighted to focus on any community issues beyond employment: “We felt that they’re 
not looking holistically…we also felt that they were saying the Muslim community is 
at fault and that we should sort ourselves out. No, we are citizens. We are British and 
you are our government. You are supposed to help us and support us, you have to take 
responsibility for your failures to us as well.”   
 Nonetheless, there was a consensus among members themselves that sitting on 
the group did not necessarily tie one to the government’s agenda— in a dire funding 
climate, the members’ organizations needed funds that they would split between their 
causes, and they developed three main modules independent of the state’s 
securitization agenda: 1) they would send strong women role models to speak at 
Muslim schools, 2) they would conduct political leadership training workshops for 
Muslim women who were interested in running for public office, and 3) they would 
organize progressive theology seminars that encouraged woman-friendly 
interpretations of the Qur’an and Islam. All of these modules were in their infancy at 
the time of my interviews, but their establishment indicates that activists were not 
simply willing to be co-opted by a state that had previously ignored Muslim women’s 
concerns by exclusively backing male leaders in their community.  They would 
highlight the socio-economic needs of the disproportionately disadvantaged Muslim 
women and children in their community and agreed to sit on an advisory group that 
allowed them to allocate state resources to their projects.  
 In April 2010, one of the group’s leading members, Shaista Gohir, resigned 
because she had become “disillusioned with the initiative.” In a public letter to the 
new Secretary of State of DLGC, John Denham, she explained that the group had 
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become ineffective and failed to empower Muslim women.
130
 She argues that the 
group was poorly conceived from the beginning:   
When the group was first formed, I was uncomfortable 
with the mechanisms used to select group members. We 
were handpicked by civil servants and government 
advisors which resulted in a lack of diversity and raised 
questions about our credibility. I continuously raised 
concerns about the lack of diversity of the group.
131
  
She goes on to explain that she had expressed concerns about the empowerment of 
Muslim women being “linked to the ‘prevent agenda’” and her concerns were 
repeatedly ignored.  By linking the NMWAG initiative with the ‘preventing violent 
extremism’ agenda, the state prioritizes securitization agenda at the expense of 
Muslim women’s true needs:  
Muslim women are one of the most deprived groups in 
the UK. They suffer from the highest levels of economic 
inactivity, worst health; and face discrimination on 
multiple fronts …It is clear that the government should 
be engaging with Muslim women anyway to find ways 
to ensure they have equal life chances as any other 
group. Despite initial reservations about linking Muslim 
women to the prevent agenda, I supported it in the 
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expectation that it could act as a catalyst to empower 
women attempting to tackle the many wider issues that 
impact their daily lives. Having been on the NMWAG 
for over two years, I now feel the initiative was a 
political fad. 
In my interview with Gohir in 2009, before her resignation, she had a much more 
optimistic outlook on making the most of what she already admitted seemed to be a 
flawed process:  
It’s been very slow. We should have done more, but it’s 
not the fault of the women, it’s the fault of central 
government… I think it was set up to tick a box really. 
I’m not happy about it being under the PVE… but if the 
chance is for Muslim Women to be empowered, I say 
take advantage of the opportunity… I’ll criticize the 
government if I don’t agree with it, but I don’t believe in 
criticizing the government just for the sake of criticizing 
them. Because in the end if the government thinks that 
no one appreciates the good that it does, it’ll be 
counterproductive for the Muslim community…You can 
be really far away from corridors of power and shout 
and scream, [but] are you going to make a difference or 
influence the government? The answer is no. I would 
rather get near to the corridors of power… I’m only 
going to make that difference if I engage with them and 
talk with them and get involved with them. 
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Over the last year, however, Gohir was unable to retain this hopefulness and lost faith 
in the entire initiative. In her resignation, she argued that the state should not 
centralize its relations with only a certain set of Muslim representatives—particularly 
when the representatives are hand-picked and do not represent the diversity of the 
community. She suggests that the group be disbanned and for the state to engage with 
multiple organizations instead: 
As NMWAG has failed as an initiative, they should not 
be promoted as the only or main channel that other 
government departments should engage with. I feel the 
best way forward is for all government departments to 
tap into the wide array of Muslim women’s 
organisations and individual community activists across 
the UK and engage with women with the relevant 
knowledge and expertise on the issue concerned. Such 
action will result in more Muslim women gaining access 
to decision makers and the government increasing the 
diversity of women with whom it engages with. 
Just as the state’s religious corporatist approach had originally excluded Muslim 
women by designating first generation male leaders as the representatives of the 
community, NMWAG was yet another attempt at religious corporatism that failed to 
incorporate diverse women’s voices. 
D. Muslim Women’s Contentious Relationship with the British State 
 The ramifications of combining the state’s new securitization agenda with its 
approach of religious corporatism signaled to the broader Muslim community that the 
state distrusted most Muslims as extremist threats, and only trusted a select few 
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representatives to speak for their interests. Young Muslims already only felt loose 
associations with ‘Britishness,’ but after the attacks young Muslims were put on the 
defense, with the public skeptically questioning whether someone could, in fact, be 
both British and Muslim. A prominent 23 year old student activist explained that the 
government singled out Muslims at university, asking professors to report students’ 
suspicious behavior:  
Around [the] time of the 7/7 bombings there was a lot of 
government legislation around spying. [Society X] 
addressed this issue of spying within student groups and 
university crackdowns… They also brought the Islam 
Channel which did an open discussion … it was about 
our feelings in regards to government legislation and 
how we'd feel if lecturers were spying on us. We were 
against it because how are they going to determine if 
you're an extremist? We felt like it would be 
sandbagging us--would they say you're an extremist if 
you frequented the prayer room too much? Or the way 
you dress? It would have completely ruined the 
relationship that we have with our lecturers. 
Other students in the same age bracket (those who were in university at the time of the 
London bombings) agreed that the government was singling out Muslim youth and 
making the public question whether second generation Muslims had allegiance to the 
British state. 
 When I asked respondents why they still felt it important to identify as 
Muslim, particularly in a hostile political climate that, they argue, targets this precise 
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identity, one 28 year old student activist summed it up nicely:  
I think people have snapped out this delusion [that] 
when you're born in a western society you're given this 
sort of notion that we live in a democracy and it gives 
everyone equal rights, etc. But since these 7/7 
bombings, there has been an increase in persecution, for 
example, with police stopping Muslims for no reason, 
[and] with the removal of rights and secret trials…All 
this outward attempt to suppress the identity makes us 
think, hold on why are they oppressing us? So maybe 
you look into it more. And maybe you learn that there is 
a system called Islam that does not conflict with 
democracy [and] that does not conflict with your day to 
day life, in any way whatsoever…In the end, you think 
‘I am going to prove that. I can contribute to society and 
I can be a good Muslim.’ And it might be easier to be 
part of an Islamic community then a Western 
community, because the latter is very fickle, one day 
you're incorporated in[to] it [and] the other day you're 
not. Either you're a freedom fighter or a terrorist. [But 
with Islam] your main bond is with God and God does 
not reject it you. And there's no one greater than him. So 
I think there is more security with religion then there is 
with people.   
These sentiments recurred in other interviews with the same age group--namely, the 
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disillusionment with the state’s failure to protect their interests (as Muslims, but more 
specifically as Muslim women) and the subsequent turn to Islam as an alternative 
model for women’s rights. 
 It is this disillusion with the state’s approach that make many women activists 
want to assert their independence from the state, as noted above, and use more 
unifying frames that relate to the average Muslim woman’s daily needs. Activists refer 
to Islamic teachings and scriptures to connect with women who feel attached to their 
religious identity.  Given that many Muslim women feel that the state does not support 
them or consider their needs (as evidenced by their exclusively brokered relationships 
with male leaders), they derive their rights from religious authority, instead of state 
authority. The state might believe that its religious corporatism wins the respect of 
faith communities, but a closer examination of Muslim women’s political activism 
suggests otherwise.  
 
IV. RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN STATE 
 In contrast to the contentious relationship that many British Muslim women 
activists disclose they have with their state, many American Muslim women activists 
credit the American state’s narrative of religious freedom with enabling their activism. 
This section will briefly describe the historic role of religion in the US that has 
traditionally enabled religious activism within its civic population. I will then draw on 
empirical research to explain how the American Constitutional commitment to 
religious freedom has empowered Muslim women activists to construct an American 
Islam as they see fit. Unlike Britain, where state authorities try to regulate religion 
because it fears it will challenge loyalties to British state, the US does not fear 
religious challenges and tolerates organizing in multiple communities of faith, as long 
as they abide by Constitutional rights.  The American state does not take the religious 
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corporatist approach and does not broker exclusive relationships with male 
interlocutors, which means that Muslim women activists are free to put forth their own 
representations and interpretations of the Muslim identity. Through a close 
examination of the recent global controversies involving different  states’ relationships 
with religion (specifically Islam), I suggest that the national and local levels of 
American government have thus far demonstrated a strong attachment to religious 
freedom that will not be questioned by claims of offense. Though the episodes have 
also revealed public attitudes that ask Muslims to choose between their nationality and 
faith, American state powers have, as of yet, stayed consistent in their support for 
Muslim activism. 
 
A. Religion in America 
The state’s relationship with religion in America plays an important historical 
role in social movement activism, as a wide array of reformers from the nation’s 
founders up until President Barack Obama have invoked religious language and 
principles to make political arguments for social justice.  The first colonists were 
Puritans who were so disillusioned with the corrupt Anglican Church in England that 
they fled to the New World to establish a country where they would be free to create 
their own ‘pure’ Christian community.  The religious freedom that Puritans expected 
in the new country, however, did not necessarily extend to other religious groups.  
Baptists in late 1700s’ Virginia, for example, were prohibited from practicing their 
religion and petitioned for the government to stay out of their community religious 
affairs.  Thomas Jefferson, who had just written the Declaration of Independence, 
adopted their cause as an example of religious liberty and proposed legislation that 
would expand religious liberty to all groups (Peterson and Vaughan 1988).   
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Scholars argue that a significant result of the Great Awakening—a vast 
religious revival that swept across American in the middle of the eighteenth century—
was the debate that surged in the period leading up to the country’s first Constitution 
over the merits of a free religious marketplace (Lambert 2003). Jefferson, for instance, 
argued that competition among religious interpretations was a healthy exercise of the 
right to religious liberty.  In 1776, he argued: “From the dissensions among Sects 
themselves arise necessarily a right of choosing and necessity of deliberating to which 
we will conform. But if we choose for ourselves, we must allow others to choose also, 
and so reciprocally, this establishes religious liberty” (Jefferson 1776; Papers 1:545). 
In defending the Baptist case for religious liberty, he authored the Virginia Statute for 
Religious Freedom, arguing that the state must refrain from regulating religious 
interpretations: “To suffer the civil magistrate to intrude his powers into the field of 
opinion and to restrain the profession or propagation of principles on supposition of 
their ill tendency is a dangerous fallacy which at once destroys all religious liberty, 
because he being of course judge of that tendency will make his opinions the rule of 
judgment and approve or condemn the sentiments of others only as they shall square 
with or differ from his own" (Jefferson 1779; Papers 2: 546).  
Jefferson continued to lobby at the national level for the importance of 
religious liberty and the competitive interpretations he believed it engendered. When 
the first draft of the Constitution in 1778 refrained from recognizing a state church, yet 
still failed to explicitly guarantee religious freedom, Jefferson advocated for 
legislation that would better secure individual rights—most importantly, the freedom 
of and from religion.  Eventually, in 1789, the first Bill of Rights was drafted and the 
first amendment to the Constitution in 1791 included the religious establishment 
clause. I argue that these protections for the individual interpretation of religion are 
part of the cultural repertoire or toolkit that American Muslim women activists use to 
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enable their representative and reinterpretive activism. 
 Religious minorities have continued to invoke the country’s religious founding 
in their own struggles for religious liberty throughout American history.  For instance, 
in the nineteenth century, Catholics in New York City believed that the city’s public 
schools were imposing Protestant teachings on their children.  In their defense, 
Archbishop John Hughes referred to the Constitution and argued that America was 
founded on religious liberty that either required schools to stop forcing Protestantism 
on non-Protestant children or the state to fund the establishment of non-Protestant 
dominated schools (McGreevy 2004). Though Hughes lost his initial battle with the 
city government, his Constitutional appeals set the stage for what became  the Catholic 
movement for political representation and power in New York City; moreover, in 
1842, the New York Senate passed the Maclay Bill that banned religious instruction in 
public schools (Anthrop 1990). 
 Controversial cases involving the role of religion in classrooms have continued 
to become flashpoints of the government’s stance on religious freedom.  Throughout 
these different controversies, one principle has remained consistent in the American 
narrative—more often than not, the right to religious freedom is considered paramount 
and the state endeavors to protect the freedom of faith.  In the 1960s, the Supreme 
Court ruled on the appropriate status of religion in American public schools; according 
to the court, the religious-liberty clauses of the First Amendment to the Constitution 
provide a civic framework for how religion should be handled in the classroom: 
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting 
the free exercise of…” (U.S. CONST, amend. 1).  Religious belief, it claimed, shall not 
be promoted nor inhibited in public education.  In Abington v. Schemp (1963), the 
Supreme Court further stated that there was a difference between ‘teaching about 
religion’ and ‘teaching religion’ and that religion could indeed be incorporated into 
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curriculum if it was the former, but not the latter. The Court argued:  
[I]t might well be said that one's education is not 
complete without a study of comparative religion or the 
history of religion and its relationship to the 
advancement of civilization. It certainly may be said that 
the Bible is worthy of study for its literary and historic 
qualities. Nothing we have said here indicates that such 
study of the Bible or of religion, when presented 
objectively as part of a secular program of education, 




America’s national narrative as a religious country was also invoked by racial 
minorities during the Civil Rights Movement to argue for an end to racial 
discrimination. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. repeatedly referred to the nation’s religious 
roots in his demands for justice, called the movement’s followers ‘God’s children’ and 
continuously reiterated the idea that both Christianity and the Constitution of the 
United States believed in the individual rights to equality and justice for which the 
movement struggled. In 1955 after Rosa Parks was arrested after refusing to surrender 
her seat on a bus to a white person and effectively launched a boycott, King 
underlined the idea that racial discrimination violated the nation’s religious and 
Constitutional principles: “We are not wrong in what we are doing…If we are wrong, 
the Constitution of the United States is wrong. If we are wrong, God Almighty is 
wrong.”
133
  My research suggests that new immigrant activists similarly highlight their 
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religious identity in America in order to tap into a national narrative conducive to 
religious practice.   
 The young American Muslim women activists I interviewed explained how 
growing up in a country that values religiosity enabled their activism in constructing a 
distinctly egalitarian American Muslim identity.   Some respondents emphasized the 
hyphenated nature of the identity; one 34 year old foreign aid worker, born to 
Palestinian parents, explains her impression that America appreciates multiple 
identities: 
America is a land of immigrants, unlike a lot of 
European countries, so growing up, there was this sense 
that there’s African-Americans, there’s Native 
Americans—and they all have horrible histories—but 
there was also a certain pride in their Americanness and 
their experience. So I was always excited to say I was an 
Arab-American or that I’m an American Muslim 
because that hyphen was almost a [mark] of pride… 
we’re like the new kids on the block, so I was always 
eager to present [in class] about being Muslim. 
The pride that this young woman feels due to her ‘hyphenated’ identity indicates that 
she interprets her religious identity as a mark of difference that was celebrated in the 
classroom when she was a child, instead of difference that alienated her from her 
peers.  A 29 year old media activist, born to Pakistani parents, also believes that 
hyphenated identities were a primarily positive experience:   
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I think America is more of a melting pot, where you’re 
melting [into one society], but you can still stay 
distinct—you bring your own color to it, you know?... 
So my sense is that, in America, you have these 
hyphenated identities and you can be totally Muslim and 
you can be totally American.  
This young activist does not see the two identities in conflict and finds the hyphenated 
identity to mark the different (positive) contributions that people from various 
ethnicities or religious backgrounds offer to the larger melting pot of American 
identity.   
 Respondents frequently invoke the Constitutional right to religious freedom. 
One 27 year old student leader, born to Arab Muslim parents, explains how these 
concepts are taught as part of American culture and impact how free second 
generation Muslim students feel to experiment with their religious identity:  
American culture is about individual freedom, you do 
what you want… I think that allows them to experiment 
with being religious, to put on the headscarf, [or] take it 
off… I know a lot of people who have gone through 
phases…I think it’s American culture and what 
America’s about that allows them to express themselves, 
and not feel pressure to hold back and it gives them free 
reign to be different things, like be religious… it’s 
America itself that allows for that sort of thing to 
happen. 
A 33 year old activist who works on domestic violence issues concurs about the 
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importance of individualism, religious freedom and freedom of expression; she 
strongly feels that these principles are integral components of the American 
experience and help young Muslims to acknowledge their American and Muslim 
identities, for fear of leaving something important out of their experience:  
We’re constantly pounded with this rhetoric of 
individualism and how it’s important to be unique, we 
hear this all the time--I don’t care if it’s in cartoons, or 
going to school, there’s this constant chant of being an 
individual…and we talk about religious freedom and 
freedom of expression and I think all of those come 
together, where a person can see that, ‘yes, it might not 
be popular, but if I’m ignoring my Muslim identity, I’m 
losing a sense of my self’ and the self is very important. 
And it’s very emphasized-- I don’t care what your niche 
in society is, that is the American cultural ideal--to be 
the individual and express oneself. You can’t turn that 
off. 
Respondents suggest that America’s acceptance of religion empowers them to 
construct a distinctly American Muslim identity. A 25 year old student leader, born to 
Pakistani parents, contended that the French hijab ban in 2004 could never happen in 
the US because of the different level of respect that religion receives in this country:  
I can’t ever imagine that ban happening in the US 
because the concept of accepting religious freedom, of 
equality, of respect of faith--even among my Christian 
friends, even if they don’t believe in my faith, they 
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respect that I’m a faithful person--and I feel like that 
respect… and the way you view religion here is 
different. 
It should be noted that all American Muslims do not believe that America’s religiosity 
necessarily translates into acceptance of their community. For instance, particularly 
after the 2001 terror attacks, many Muslims felt that their community’s civil liberties 
were unfairly restricted due to security concerns. A study conducted of American 
Muslim college youth, five years after the attacks, describes how certain laws enacted 
in the aftermath of the attacks suggested that being Muslim and American were not 
compatibly identities; for instance, students pointed to the PATRIOT Act, airport 
safety and security laws, visa regulations, and foreign policy decisions to go to war 
with two Muslim countries as state actions that increasingly challenged the American 
component of their identity. Instead of allowing this sense of isolation to decidedly 
cancel half of their identity, the students in the study argue that it is not only 
incumbent upon the government to reach out to the American Muslim community 
more, but it is also important for the media to stop portraying Muslims in negative, 
stereotypical images of violent men and submissive women.  Students also argue that 
it is important for Muslims themselves to break down stereotypes of what it means to 
be American and permeate mainstream society (Muedini 2009).   
 Some activists argued that the terrorist attacks shone a spotlight on the 
American Muslim community and they perceived the timing as a good opportunity to 
clarify the role of Muslims in American society.  While some activists concurred with 
the students in the study cited above that the changes in legislation threatened their 
American civil liberties and forced them to defend Islam, other activists thought it 
opened up an opportunity for many young American Muslims to ask important 
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questions of their own community and take part in constructing what they wanted to 
be the American Muslim Identity. A 27 year old student activist explained:  
I think [Muslim] institutions and organizations changed 
for the better after 9/11 because I think Muslims felt we 
were under the spotlight and it made more critics willing 
to challenge the status quo and people who were not 
happy with how things were being done, [they] felt more 
open to do something about it. Because all of a sudden 
there are open houses, or journalists coming into 
mosques… plus it kind of gave ammo to people in the 
community who wanted to reform things and wanted to 
shake things up… A lot of people started standing up, 
plus people who were apathetic, it gave them more of a 
reason…and they felt like this isn’t who our community 
is, this is not what Islam represents. And they might 
have always known that, but they felt like they needed to 
do something about it because now, after 9/11, we had 
all this media attention on the Muslim community. And 
how the Muslim community runs itself actually 
represents Islam. And if we don’t fix our own house, as 
the Muslim community, it’s also going to misrepresent 
Islam.  
Part of the ‘status quo’ that this activist refers to is the patriarchal misinterpretation of 
Islam that not only pervades media representations of Islam, but first generation 
Muslims’ interpretations of gender-justice issues as well.  The terrorist attack, in 
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essence, drew public attention to the American Muslim community and many activists 
felt that it was the catalyst to not only reclaim Islam’s position on women’s rights, but 
also stress the idea that their American and Muslim identities are compatible with one 
another. The American Muslim Identity, then, becomes reinforced as an identity that 
critically engages with ideas and challenges patriarchal cultural traditions that are 
perpetuated in the name of faith.  
 However, my research suggests that this sort of ‘reimagining’ of Islam can 
only occur amidst a set of institutional arrangements that acknowledges the 
importance of religious freedom. This system would describe a relationship between 
the state and religious communities where free market religious interpretation is 
encouraged in the latter and the state refrains from appointing certain religious 
representatives to determine the group’s needs.  In contrast, when a state takes the 
approach of religious corporatism, my research shows that it appoints first generation 
male leaders, who end up resisting women’s internal activism and effectively stifling 
their frames.  
 Recent controversies have tested different states’ commitment to religious 
freedom and liberalism. The French have definitively held liberal rights above group 
claims, although they still prevent Muslim women who choose to veil from their 
liberal right to do so.  The verdict is out on other European states, though there is 
reason to believe that Germany and the Netherlands are leaning towards the French 
model as well.  In Britain, the state has decided that group claims can be solved 
through the democratic principle of representation—as long as they appoint Muslim 
representatives, they will be able to negotiate for the community.   
 In the US, however, there have been very recent episodes that test its 
commitment to religious freedom and liberalism and, thus far, the state has succeeded 
in upholding its commitment to both.  Conflicts often arise when people claim that 
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their religious freedom has been violated because some actor has ‘offended’ them, or 
when people claim their liberty has been violated by others’ religious practice. In the 
following sections, however, I argue that upholding religious freedom and the freedom 
to offend are two sides of the same coin.  The same freedom that allows individuals to 
offend others of a particular religious persuasion also underlines the importance of 
protecting the religious freedom of the offended.  A coherent government policy that 
remains committed to the country’s liberal premise would allow these offenses to 
occur, yet allow the state to interfere only if the action against the religious group is 
deemed ‘harmful’—a measure beyond offense. I compare the conduct in the ‘Ground 
Zero mosque’ controversy to the conduct in the ‘Danish cartoons’ controversy in 2006 
to demonstrate that the state cannot make consistent judgments on ‘offense’ that 
would please all actors, so the more coherent policy would be consistent non-
intervention. 
 
B. The ‘Ground Zero Mosque’ Debate Tests  Religious Freedom in America 
 In 2010, a group called the Cordoba Initiative approached the local New York 
City government about building an Islamic community center on private property in 
lower Manhattan.  The new space would house various facilities, including libraries, 
restaurants, a culinary school, childcare services, and a 500-seat auditorium.
134
  The 
building’s proposal also included a mosque prayer space that its planners described as 
“accessible to all members and visitors of our New York community.”
135
 The center’s 
proposed location, two blocks north of the World Trade Center attacks, drew 
considerable opposition from conservative Americans who continue to argue that the 
location of an Islamic place of worship so close to ‘hallowed ground’ is a ‘slap in the 
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face’ for the families of victims who died on September 11, 2001.
136
  More recently, 
even a majority of local New Yorkers claim that they are not against building the 
mosque in principle, but still believe the specific location is ‘insensitive’ and should 
be moved.
137
  The controversy over allowing the Muslim community to build this 
community center (and its incorporated prayer space) has compelled its planners, 
American Muslims and American state powers to defend the American Muslim 
community’s right to religious freedom against such claims of ‘offense.’ 
 At a White House dinner commemorating the end of the month-long Muslim 
holiday of Ramadan in August, President Barack Obama delivered a speech on 
religious tolerance, addressing the New York City controversy and contending that the 
claims of offense could not trump Muslims’ religious freedom. In unequivocal terms, 
Obama argued that the debate over the mosque in New York could never ask the 
government to interfere with the right to religious freedom:  
As a citizen and as president, I believe that Muslims 
have the right to practice their religion as everyone else 
in this country. And that includes the right to build a 
place of worship on private property in lower 
Manhattan, in accordance with local laws and 
ordinances.  This is America and our commitment to 
religious freedom must be unshakeable.  The principle 
that people of all faiths are welcome in this country and 
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 See coverage of The New York Times poll called “New Yorkers want Islamic 
Center Moved, Poll Finds” The New York Times, September 2, 2010: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/03/nyregion/03poll.html?pagewanted=1&partner=rs
s&emc=rss.  
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that they will not be treated differently by their 





Obama emphasized the Constitutional right to religious freedom and deferred 
jurisdiction to the local New York City government—the only legal restrictions to 
building the center would be local laws and ordinances.  Some political commentators 
saw Obama’s decision to insert himself in the debate as an affirmation of American 
freedoms, with one commentator arguing that “As a Constitutional scholar, [Obama] 
felt it was important to make the point that the government should never have the 
authority to make such a discriminatory decision, because those are the very freedoms 
we're fighting to protect against enemies who attack us.”
139
   
 The next day, when President Obama responded to a reporter shouting a 
question to him about the mosque’s location, he said he would not comment on the 
‘wisdom’ of the mosque’s location.  These remarks disappointed many of the people 
who appreciated Obama’s first day’s comments, and they claimed that he was 
backtracking, ‘flip-flop’ing and trying to please his critics.
140
  Instead, I argue that 
Obama was trying to underline his position of government neutrality, by refraining 
from either endorsing or objecting to the mosque’s location, because his first day’s 
remarks had caused local politicians to undermine this impartiality.  Local leaders 
were  scrambling to take a position on the mosque to curry the favor of their 
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constituencies, who might use their representatives’ opposition or support of the 
mosque as a litmus test for their votes in an election year.
141
   
 While it categorically recuses itself from public protests’ demands that the 
government should prevent the community center from being built, the executive 
branch is very clear that all opinions must be allowed—including, importantly, the 
opposition protests.  Both sides must remain free to try to convince the other as long 
as they abide by legal means (e.g. violence, obstruction to their freedoms, etc.).  As 
one political commentator puts it, it might be protest and public opinion that 
convinced nuns not to maintain a church next to a Nazi death camp or Walt Disney to 
back down from building an amusement park next to a Civil War battlefield.
142
 As 
long as the opposition does not violate the rights of those in support of the mosque, 
they are free to oppose the center in all their capacity. If, on one hand, they convince 
those supporting the mosque that it might be better to move it, then it is considered a 
matter of persuasive public opinion, and not coercion, intimidation or oppression.  If, 
on the other hand, the supporters of the mosque convince the opposition that they 
should build it and the protests dissolve, then this would also indicate they persuaded 
public opinion.  
 The local government to which Obama deferred legal jurisdiction agreed with 
his endorsement of religious freedom. The local planning board approved the project 
and New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg gave a public address expressing 
unambiguous support for the Muslim community’s freedom to build and enjoy the 
center.  Bloomberg delivered a speech on Governors Island in New York in August 
2010, in which he argues that the state has no role in this matter: “Whatever you may 
think of the proposed mosque and community center, lost in the heat of the debate has 




 See Chris Weigant: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/chris-weigant/obama-reframes-
mosque-deb_b_684160.html 
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been a basic question: Should government attempt to deny private citizens the right to 
build a house of worship on private property based on their particular religion.  That 
may happen in other countries, but we should never allow it to happen here.”
143
  He 
stressed that if the government tried to deny worshippers the right to build their center 
on private property, the “courts would almost certain strike it down as a violation of 
the U.S. Constitution.”
144
   
 Bloomberg invokes the nation’s founding in order to express the significance 
of the right to religious freedom: “This nation was founded on the principle that the 
government must never choose between religions or favor one over another… for that 
reason, I believe that this is an [sic] important test of the separation of church and state 
as we may see in our lifetimes… and it is critically important that we get it right.”
145
  
The Mayor draws on New York’s own history with challenges to religious freedom, 
suggesting that perhaps the first formal petition for religious freedom in the American 
colonies was waged by a group of non-Quakers in Queens in 1657 who “signed the 
Flushing Remonstrance, a petition in defense of the right of Quakers and others to 
freely practice their religion.”
146
 Bloomberg argues that religious freedom not only has 
an important part in the country’s national narrative, but also in New York in 
particular; he proudly declares that New York was where the “earliest settlers first set 
foot in New Amsterdam and where the seeds of religious tolerance were first 
planted.”
147
 Bloomberg suggests that to deny Muslims this center would be “untrue to 
the best part of ourselves and who we are as New Yorkers and Americans.”
148
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 Finally, Bloomberg also notes to be a New Yorker in today’s age, one must be 
sensitive to the values that were attacked in 2001: “The attack was an act of war, and 
our first responders defended not only our city, but our country and our constitution.  
We do not honor their lives by denying the very Constitutional rights they died 
protecting.  We honor their lives by defending those rights and the freedoms that the 
terrorists attacked.” In referencing 9/11, Bloomberg tries to co-opt what the attacks 
should represent—instead of fear mongering and religious profiling, he believes the 
attacks should make the city more committed to defending religious freedom.  
 Though he unequivocally believes that the government cannot deny private 
citizens the right to build a house of worship, it should be noted that Bloomberg does 
address the matter of sensitivity: “Of course it is fair to ask the organizers of the 
mosque to show some special sensitivity to the situation, and in fact their plan 
envisions reaching beyond their walls and building an interfaith community.”
149
 
Bloomberg does not specify whether showing sensitivity would include relocating the 
mosque.  He simply maintains that Muslims and those who deserve sensitivity because 
of 9/11 are not exclusive groups: “Muslims were among those murdered on 9/11, and 
that our Muslim neighbors grieved with us as New Yorkers and as Americans.” 
Neither Bloomberg nor Obama suggest that the protesters should desist, however, in 
keeping with the position of government neutrality; the protests would be allowed 
until they disturbed public order by breaking laws. 
 This attention to sensitivity calls to mind the debates over abolishing 
blasphemy law in Britain, because both episodes question whether people can be 
protected from ‘offense.’ While the British state first adopted its blasphemy law 
because it feared religious challenges to state authority, the protection from offense 
was indeed eventually abolished in 2008, because, as I demonstrated above, the state 
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was no longer interested in elevating religious leadership; the state instead became 
interested in preserving order through law and order legislation.  In the US, there 
seems to have been less interest in protecting people from offense (religious or 
otherwise), and there is, instead, a long historical emphasis on law and order 
legislation that safeguards individual rights.  In other words, even if state powers refer 
to ‘sensitivity’ that would mitigate potential offense, there is no actual right to 
protection from said offense.  
 Though the imam in charge of the center, Imam Feisal Abdul Rauf, draws most 
of the media coverage, his wife Daisy Khan is a prominent American Muslim 
women’s right activist who, like the other Muslim women I interviewed, tries to 
construct a distinctly egalitarian American Muslim identity. Together the two Muslim 
leaders founded the Cordoba Initiative, as well as the American Society for Muslim 
Advancement (ASMA), a New York-based non-profit organization that promotes an 
“authentic expression of Islam based on cultural and religious harmony through 
interfaith collaboration, youth and women’s empowerment, and arts and cultural 
exchange.”
150
 One of the programs for women’s empowerment is called the Women’s 
Islamic Initiative in Spirituality and Equity, which claims to “build a cohesive, global 
movement of Muslim women that will reclaim women’s rights in Islam, enabling them 
to make dignified choices and fully participate in creating just and flourishing 
societies.”
151
 These organizations may have ambitious missions, but they are local 
groups who make claims about authentic expressions of Islam.  These groups are able 
to be heard on the national level because there are no institutional arrangements in 
place in the US that prevent them from voicing their construction of the American 
Muslim identity.   This chapter has sought to demonstrate that, in contrast, Britain’s 
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institutional arrangement of religious corporatism has stifled the religious activism of 
young British Muslim women.  
 American executive leaders have taken the approach of non-intervention, 
which means that public sentiment that claims to be ‘offended’ by a mosque near the 
‘hallow’ ground cannot prevent the mosque from being built. The opponents are free 
to feel the offense and even protest against the mosque, within legal means. But the 
state will not protect a right to be protected from offense, and it will not restrict the 
principle of religious freedom. The next section looks at the Danish Cartoon Affair 
and how it triggered a very thoughtful debate on whether ‘the freedom of expression 
includes the license to offend.’ 
 
C. The Danish Cartoon Affair’s Debate 
   In October 2006, the Rosencrantz Foundation in the US hosted a debate where 
it asked notable scholars, political commentators, journalists and activists to discuss 
the resolution whether ‘freedom must include the license to offend.’  The impetus for 
the debate was the global unrest caused earlier that year by the publication of a set of 
twelve cartoons that a Danish newspaper, Jylands-Posten, purposely commissioned to 
pictoralize the Prophet Muhammad.  The cartoons set off violent riots at Danish 
embassies across the Muslim and European world, as Muslims claimed the cartoons 
‘offended’ them on religious grounds.  
 The paper’s cultural editor, Flemming Rose, publicly defended the cartoons’ 
publication as a deliberate protest against a recent spate of self-censorship cases where 
journalists and artists were increasingly fearful of confronting issues about Islam.  
Rose acknowledges that the cartoons offended some people and apologizes for their 
hurt feelings. However, he says, he “cannot apologize for [the] right to publish 
material, even offensive material. You cannot edit a newspaper if you are paralyzed by 
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worries about every possible insult.”
152
 Flemming does not argue for absolute and 
unrestricted freedom of expressions—he even says he agrees that “the freedom to 
publish things doesn’t mean you publish everything”—but he does not believe this 
right can be restricted to prevent religious offense.  He argues: “If a believer demands 
that I, as a nonbeliever, observe his taboos in the public domain, he is not asking for 
my respect, but for my submission.  And that is incompatible with a secular 
democracy.” The cartoons are known to have caused little controversy until a group of 
imams disseminated a packet of the cartoons to Muslim world, fueling anger and 
instigating violent protests against Danish embassies across the Muslim world and 
Europe. Protests demanded that the Danish government ban the newspaper and 
apologize to Muslims for allowing what they argued was grave offense.
153
   
 The Rosencrantz debate asked three people to debate each side of the 
resolution: freedom of expression should include the license to offend. One of the 
proponents arguing in favor of the resolution was Philip Gourevitch, a writer for The 
New Yorker.  Gourevitch argues that the authority to define offense is too powerful to 
cede to any authority.  He argues that those who want to restrict the license to offend 
incorrectly believe they know what would be limited and what would be allowed.  He 
says:  
 
They think all speech is a license …because most speech 
should be restricted before it is licensed. Then we 
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looks at the particular ‘nature’ of the offense.  She argues that depicting the Prophet 
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dissertation, and because the definition of harm is debatable, I operate under the 
assumption that they were claims of offense, not harm.  
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decide, okay, we’ll let this out, we’ll let that out, we’ll 
let this out, we’ll let that out. I think that that’s a very, 
very, very dangerous precipice on which they want to 
perch us. …What is to say that they will stay in charge 
of that speech? What is to say that we will not fall into 
the hands of somebody we don’t trust? What is to say 
that the message that one day seems somewhat sane, the 
next day becomes to kill, and that the people who say let 
us not kill are silenced in the name of reasonable speech 
and in the name of civilization to moderate that.   
 
One of his teammates, the literary critic and public intellectual Christopher Hitchens, 
agrees that the responsibility of deciding what constitutes offense inevitably leads to 
manipulating powers that restrict the opinions with which they do not agree.  He 
engages with the example that we are not allowed to shout fire in a crowded theatre, 
the famous restriction that people invoke when arguing that freedom of expression is 
not limitless. Hitchens traces this example back to Supreme Court Justice Oliver 
Wendell Holmes who used the example to argue that a group of Yiddish radicals could 
not hand out leaflets opposing President Wilson’s war in 1919. Hitchens argues that 
limiting freedom of speech gives incredible power to authorities to censor opinions 
with which they disagree. He argues that this power should not be handed to just 
anybody:  
 
Who will you appoint? Who will be the one who says, I 
know exactly where the limits should be, I know how 
far you can go and I know when you’ve gone too far, 
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and I’ll decide that… Those of you who know 
Areopagitica and Paine’s commentary on it will know 
that it recommends free speech in this way—not for you, 
but for the people you are listening to and the people 
whose comments you hope to hear in return, for your 
own education, for your own enlightenment and for your 
own elucidation. As Mr. Paine says, commenting on 
Milton, one of the vices of those who would repress the 
opinions of others is they make themselves prisoners of 
their own opinions, because they deny themselves the 
rights and the means of changing them…The free 
interplay of ideas is not something that those of us who 
wish to speak or unload our opinions insist upon for that 
sake, it’s because we want to hear what is said in 
response, however unwelcome it may be to us. Thus the 
defense of any one opinion or form of expression is a 
defense of all of them. 
 
In the context of the Danish cartoons controversy that triggered this debate, 
Gourevitch and Hitchens argue that the logic that censors offensive cartoons today 
could silence important, necessary dissent tomorrow.  
 Interestingly, the same Daisy Khan associated with the Park51 controversy in 
chapter five was on the team in favor of restricting the license to offend.  She argues 
that freedom of expression must be accompanied by social responsibility, and, 
essentially, that if the speech does not meet requirements of responsibility or a desire 
to “elevate the public discourse” it is useless and inflammatory: 
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So when you publish cartoons which of course are a 
form of entertainment …as a medium for conveying a 
particular message, or a speech is given by a person of 
immense power like the Pope, which further drives 
people apart and cements stereotypes, you’re using 
public discourse to malign the way an already 
marginalized community is perceived. This, my friends, 
is not in accordance with our foundational values of free 
speech. This is un-American. The point is not whether 
such things can or cannot be published. But of course, 
they are published. Who’s preventing them? The issue 
is whether there’s any wisdom in showing the prophet of 
Islam with a bomb in his turban no less. This is the sort 
of thing that furthers that familiar, yet dangerous and 
unsound argument, some Muslim men are terrorists, 
therefore, all or even most Muslim men are terrorists. 
Now this last statement is certainly something we can 
say, something that is enshrined in free speech.  But is it 
true? Is it responsible? Does it elevate the public 
discourse? Or is it simply racist, xenophobic drivel, that 
isn’t half as clever as it purports to be? 
 
In the context of the Danish cartoons affair, Khan argues that publishing the cartoons 
does not inflict some nebulous, grave harm on Muslims by depicting their Prophet (in 
fact, she argues that “this isn’t about drawing the prophet, for which there are many 
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historical precedents in traditional Muslim art”), in spite of many arguments by fellow 
Muslims to that effect.  Instead, she argues that the cartoons should not have been 
published because they insulted and marginalized a group that was already suffering 
from minority status—Khan sees the freedom to offend as the majority’s method of 
tyranny.   
 In the end, the team in favor of the license to offend overwhelmingly defeated 
their opponents—audience members even voted, 201 in favor of the proposition, 39 
against, and 1 undecided. The audience seems to have been convinced that even if 
social responsibility is important, the power to decide what’s ‘irresponsible’ is too 
dangerous to surrender.  The government must take a position of non-intervention on 
claims of offense—neither endorse nor object to freedom of expression, as long as it 
stays within legal means. Interestingly, Khan would likely agree with proponents 
today, because the government’s non-intervention policy has protected the right of the 
Cordoba Initiative to build Park51.  Even though the center’s opponents claim offense, 
the government has not intervened to prevent the center from being built.  
 I would expand upon the argument proposed by the team in favor of the license 
to offend by adding that religious freedom and the freedom to offend are two sides of 
the same coin. Arguments that claim free speech is only considered valuable if it is 
‘wise’ and ‘socially responsible’ open the door to (often religious) majorities who 
claim that minority religions are not valuable to society, and thus do not deserve 
religious liberty. It is the freedom to offend that often opens space for dissenting 
voices to speak up within groups, and, specifically relevant to my research, allows 
Muslim women to individually interpret Islam’s position on gender-justice and push 
for religious reform—even if these interpretations are initially not appreciated in either 
the public or private sphere. 
 




 Even as I write, America is caught up in a heated debate about an obscure 
pastor in Florida who threatened to burn copies of the Qur’an on the 9th anniversary of 
the September 11, 2001 attacks. Only after a personal appeal from Defense Secretary 
Robert M. Gates, who argued the burning would unnecessarily put American troops at 
risk of retaliation in the Muslim world, the pastor has ‘postponed’ the burning.  
Protests have still begun in some countries, with people angry that the US state failed 
to actually ban the burning.
154
 President Obama has, in fact, stepped in and made 
public remarks asking the pastor to think carefully about the negative repercussions 
his actions could cause; but just as he cannot stop the protests against Park51, the 
President cannot step in to stop the Qur’an burning without sacrificing America’s 
Constitutional commitment to individual rights and freedom. The freedom to burn the 
Qur’an and the freedom to build Park51 are considered part and parcel of the same 
fundamental rights to freedom. After the pastor decided to postpone the burning, 
Obama made public remarks asking for calm over the episode. He again appealed to 
principles of religious freedom and tolerance and emphasized that what set America 
apart, even during his predecessor’s regime, was that America chose to stand together 
against ‘murderers’ and ‘terrorists’ who committed the attacks, and not against 
American Muslims who also mourned the country’s loss. 
155
 
 Some say that Obama’s remarks elevated the pastor who was otherwise little-
known, and exaggerated the controversy.  Obama responded by arguing the dangers of 
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allowing images to spread in the age of internet and cause violence across the 
world.
156
 In an address to the nation, he stressed that it was important that Americans 
“don’t start turning on each other” and that America is “one nation under God… and 
you may call that God by many names, but we are one nation.”  It is difficult to say 
whether ignoring the incident would have been resulted in less controversy, but it is 
clear that Obama invokes the religious language that many social reformers called 
upon throughout American history to highlight America’s providential narrative as a 
nation that uniquely guarantees individual rights and religious liberty. 
 In point of fact, in February 2009—one of the first months of this new 
administration—a Dutch member of Parliament named Geertz Wilders was invited by 
a Republican senator to screen a film he had made called Fitna in the US Congress.
157
  
Fitna was accused of being anti-Muslim propaganda by Muslim leaders in Europe and 
Wilders was, just two weeks earlier, banned from entry into the UK when a 
conservative MP invited him to screen the film in Parliament. The incident flared up 
during my field research period in Britain, with Muslim mainstream organizations 
claiming his film offended Muslims and the British state appealing to the Racial and 
Religious Hatred Act of 2006 to ban Wilders from entry (see chapter five).  The state 
argued that Wilders’ visit was likely to incite hatred and violence and would disturb 
public order.
158
 The state’s position was eventually overruled by a court’s demands for 
more evidence of potential public harm, and Wilders was allowed to enter the UK ten 
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months later.
159
 In contrast to the media blitz that covered the Wilders’ affair in 
Britain, the issue received no attention in the American media. By the same logic 
above, perhaps if the administration had elevated the incident by making public 
remarks or trying to ban his entry like its British counterpart, there might have been 
more controversy. But, in reality, it came and went without much notice and many 
Americans are unlikely even today to know it happened.  The significance of this 
direct comparison, however, points to the American state’s position that allows 
competition in the marketplace of ideas (as opposed to British regulation), even if it 
may result in offense.  
 These recent controversies demonstrate that truly valuing religious freedom 
necessitates upholding individual rights even when they might offend others, not just 
when they are convenient and uncontroversial.  In the case of the cartoons, this 
principle means that the Danish paper had its right to publish editorial cartoons and the 
government, rightly, did not interfere.  And in the case of Park51, it is exactly this 
non-interventionist position and the idea that individuals do not have the right to be 
protected from offense that allows the center to move forward with its plans. Its 
opponents also claim offense—that building a mosque so close to a national tragedy 
caused by Muslim extremists is a ‘slap in the face’ to the survivors and the loved ones 
of victims and first responders who died in 9/11 attacks. Whether or not people believe 
the location is ‘insensitive’ or in ‘bad taste’ is deemed a perfectly legitimate opinion 
that they may express through their own individual rights to freedom of expression; 
but this opinion cannot become a rights claim that tries to restrict the freedom of 
Muslims who want to build the center on private property. 
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 The scope of my research reaches out to the field of religion and politics and 
makes claims that the relationship between a state and its religious communities 
influences religious activism within its society.  If a state promotes a sense of free 
market religious interpretation by invoking a national narrative focused on individual 
rights and religious freedom, my research suggests that religious activists will be 
enabled to pursue religious reform.  If a state tries to control the religious community 
by brokering relationships with appointed representatives who stifle dissenting voices, 
the community’s less powerful members are likely to be marginalized in defining the 
group’s needs.  Just as religious minorities have used individual rights to appeal to 
protection from religious discrimination and racial minorities have used individual 
rights to appeal to protection from racial discrimination, some of my American 
Muslim respondents appeal to a cultural repertoire of individual rights to argue against 
gender discrimination in their religious community—discrimination in the public 
sphere by mainstream media representation and discrimination in the private sphere by 
male leaders’ misinterpretations of Islam’s position on gender-justice. 
 Laurence (2010) argues that a state adopts the religious corporatist approach 
because it wants to assert authority over religious communities. My research, 
however, demonstrates that the state, in fact, delegitimizes itself among Muslim 
women leaders, by appointing male leaders to the Muslim councils and advisory 
groups who do not represent women’s interests in the community.  Even when the 
British state launched the National Muslim Women’s Advisory Group, the group’s 
members were hand-picked by the state, leading to criticism from fellow Muslim 
women leaders that the group would not represent grassroots interests. The state’s 
intervention obstructs women’s gender-justice activism; community members think 
the leaders are inextricably linked with the government and male leaders feel 
threatened that their authority is in danger and resist women’s campaigns. Against this 
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backdrop, British activists are forced to strategically limit themselves to affirmative 
frames so they can make gender-justice claims that are more familiar and less 
threatening to underlying power structures. 
 The US, alternatively, has avoided appointing representatives or starting 
formal advisory groups. American Muslims are decentralized and their activism is 
enabled by the Constitutional narrative of religious freedom and individual rights. 
They make gender-justice claims as religious activists in the context of a society in 
which the government is not deeply suspicious of faith communities—if anything, it 
has, at points, taken special interest in advancing religious groups’ interests. In the 
next chapter, I offer some concluding remarks about the implications of a state’s 
position on religious freedom and liberal rights on its religious communities—namely, 
how modernity might, in fact, enable a form of heightened religiosity that challenges 
misogynistic religious interpretations and makes gender-justice claims from within the 
religious framework. 
 




 The term ‘Muslim feminism’ is considered by many to be an oxymoron.  
Despite the fact that mainstream feminism in both the UK and US has been firmly 
rooted in the secular tradition and is deeply suspicious of religiosity, my research 
demonstrates that religious women challenge the assumption that feminist arguments 
must be made from a secular perspective. Such evidence requires a restructuring of 
feminist theory that includes, instead of marginalizes, feminists of faith. 
 This conclusion will first explain why feminist theory must seriously 
reconsider its exclusion of religious women.  Though feminists have emerged in all 
five major world faiths, religion is still seen as incompatible with modernization and 
secular traditions of women’s rights. Islam, in particular, is popularly understood as a 
fundamentally misogynist religion.  I argue that, whereas modernity and religion are 
traditionally thought of as incompatible systems, modernity might in fact enable the 
religious activism I study. In order to demonstrate this compatible relationship, I will 
recapitulate my major findings on Muslim women’s activism in both countries.  
Specifically, my research makes an important contribution to the restructuring of 
feminist theory and intersectionality—Muslim women who choose to make feminist 
claims from within the Islamic faith, instead of in spite of their religion, demonstrate 
the need for intersectionality theory to reconsider the interaction between gender and 
religious identities.   Finally, I conclude with some comments about how my research 
design and findings might hold some helpful lessons about comparative political 
studies in general. 
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I. RESTRUCTURING FEMINIST THEORY 
 While Susan Moller Okin takes a more assertive stance against religion’s 
impact on women’s lives, mainstream feminist theory’s disdain for women who make 
claims for equality from within their faith tradition is, ironically, more noticeable 
through its inattention to religious women. Moreover, even when feminist theorists 
discuss intersectionality, a concept that primarily addresses the interaction between 
multiple systems of oppression, analysis focuses on systems of race, class, ethnicity, 
and—more recently—sexual orientation, but rarely religion.  Religion is portrayed as 
institutionalized male privilege that sanctions itself with divine authority and 
mainstream feminists root themselves in a secular tradition that discounts claims from 
women who insist on subscribing to such a system of belief.  
 
A. Feminism and Major World Religions 
 In reality, however, we know that feminist claims have emerged in all of the 
world’s five major world religions—Christianity, Judaism, Buddhism, Hinduism, and, 
as my research demonstrates, Islam.  Just as my findings on Muslim feminism argue 
that religious women challenge forms of institutional power by pursuing ordination as 
religious leaders, reinterpret textual sources through an egalitarian lens, and reclaim 
images of what are otherwise thought of as oppressive dress codes, the other world 
religions include similar campaigns for women’s rights led by religious women 
themselves.   
 For example, Mary Katzenstein’s (1999) work demonstrates how Christian 
feminists use ‘discursive activism’ in the West, in response to the case of the 
Episcopal/Catholic church and its refusal to ordain women, to reshape the church’s 
understandings of faith and social justice and opt to reform the institution from within, 
as opposed to exiting their religious community. Other scholars expand upon this 
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feminist contribution to institutionalized power in Christianity by reconceptualizing 
how the ‘Creator’ is referred to with masculinized language (Keller 1998; Ruether 
1983; Daly 1973).  Catherine Keller argues that “the matter of God-language and thus 
of its gender is no trivial or supernatural pursuit, but a way of encoding the gender of 
ultimate values” (Keller 1998: 226).  Whether it is in response to the masculine 
appropriation of power through ordination or the metaphor of the ‘First Person,’ 
feminists have emerged in the Christian tradition to challenge the gendered 
interpretation of authority, in a way that is similar to some Muslim feminists’ 
campaigns for imam rights.   
 Feminists have similarly emerged in the Buddhist tradition around issues of 
ordination and authority. While the female ordination of bhikkhunis (monks) is more 
widely practiced in Buddhist communities, feminist scholars and activists still fight 
against different levels of recognition, education and financial status between male 
and female monks.  Again, instead of exiting their religious community, Buddhist 
feminists turn to the scriptures and argue that the Buddha would not have allowed 
female ordination if he intended for the two genders to be unequal. 
 Hindu feminists also use scriptural references to female authority, but in the 
form of female mythological characters. Kathleen M. Erndl, for instance, focuses on 
the Hindu concept of shakti, or female power, arguing that “shaktism, with its 
theology and ritual which place a high valuation on female embodiment, is in fact 
essentially feminist” (1998: 94).  This female power is associated with life-giving 
properties and Erndl further argues that the “Hindu patriarchal impulse to subordinate 
women is rooted in the acknowledgment that women are powerful” (1998: 95). Hindu 
feminists argue that religious mythology does not subordinate women, but insecure 
males who fear the power the religion grants upon women do.   
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 The Hindu feminist strategy, similar to the reinterpretive strategy of my 
Muslim respondents, also contextualizes historical translations to include lesbian 
rights to same-sex marriage in the Hindu tradition.  One of the most popular ‘creation’ 
stories in Bengal, for instance, “tells of a child born of the divinely blessed sexual 
intercourse between two women who are co-wives, or rather co-widows…[in the] 
remaining Bengali version, the child is born beautiful and healthy and the creator god 
Brahma explains that this is because Kama, god of Love…inspired the women’s 
lovemaking” (Vanita 2004: 127-129).  Just as Muslim feminists reinterpret the 
behavior mandated during the Prophet’s lifetime that respected women’s rights as an 
indicator for Islam’s egalitarianism, Hindu feminists re-read mythology to understand 
how women’s rights to same-sex marriage were divinely sanctioned.  
 Jewish feminists question the Orthodox Jewish community’s rules against 
numerous similar restrictions on women as the Muslim community, including 
ordination, segregated prayer services, and hair covering.  In examining what they 
believe to be a cerebral religion that expects followers to adapt to their circumstances 
around them, some scholars argue that Jewish women asserted their rights to make 
themselves attractive when they transitioned from wearing veils to donning wigs 
(Bronner 1993).  Even if Jewish followers believed that headcovering was mandated 
in the Talmud, women argued that they should be free to interpret wigs as appropriate 
covering that still allows them to adapt to a society in which the practice of 
headcovering is no longer widely practiced. Similar to Muslim feminists’ 
reappropriation of veiling discussed in chapter two, some Jewish feminists embrace a 
dress code sanctioned by their faith, but feel empowered to reinterpret how it may be 
represented to the public.  
 If there is abundant evidence, then, that feminists have emerged in not only 
Islam, but all of the major world religions, why does it still surprise mainstream 
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feminists when Muslim women make rights claims from within the religious 
framework?  Leora Tanenbaum, a Jewish feminist scholar, argues that mainstream 
feminists see religion as an ‘irrational’ system of belief:  
Mainstream feminist thought hasn’t addressed religion 
all that much. I think in general, intellectuals tend to 
look down on religion because people who have faith 
are to some extent admitting that they’re not using 
reason totally in how they perceive or understand the 
world. They’re willing to suspend reason, at least in 
part. I think that makes intellectuals, feminists included, 
somewhat dismissive. I find that approach very 




The intellectual trend to which Tanenbaum refers is the secularization thesis, which 
argues that modernization results in the decreased social significance of religion; 
religion was once useful as a social ordering system, but modernization’s increased 
social differentiation, pluralism, and rationalization purportedly leads to religion’s 
decline. Religious feminism might be surprising, then, because religion itself is seen to 
be incompatible with the progress associated with modern societies, and, in this case, 
their progress towards egalitarianism 
 
B. Modernity, Religion, and My Findings 
 But are modernity and religion as fundamentally incompatible as early 
secularization scholars believed? The secularization thesis has been criticized by 
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 See “Interview with Leora Tanenbaum: Taking Back God,” February 19, 2009. 
http://girlwpen.com/?p=1521  
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scholars who argue that empirical facts challenge the prediction of religion’s decay in 
modern society.  Some scholars argue that secularization did not necessarily cause a 
decline in religious belief, but instead prompted a shift in forms of religious 
expression (Hornsby-Smith 1992), while others argue that specific political and 
historic factors such as church construction served to undermine religious belief by 
distributing far too many empty churches across a national landscape (McLeod 1992).  
And there are still other scholars who suggest that modernity might not be 
incompatible with religion, but instead might allow its followers to reinvent how their 
religion might adapt to modern circumstances. 
 My research demonstrates that this might in fact be the case for Muslim 
feminists in both the UK and US.  In order to understand how modernity might enable 
Muslim women activists to pursue representative and reinterpretive activism, I will 
recapitulate the major findings from my study. While the overarching theoretical 
contribution of my research is to restructure feminist theory to include feminists of 
faith, my research has further implications for the relationship between gender, 
religion and the state. In my introduction, I proposed three questions that would direct 
my analysis and illustrate the complicated relationship between gender, religion and 
the state that my research uncovers. In answering all of these questions, I 
demonstrated that activists take advantage of modern circumstances—whether it is 
modern advances in technology that facilitate virtual activism and communication 
through the internet, or modern displacement through immigration that provides 
second-generation activists with distance from the cultural interpretations of Islam that 
prevail in their parents’ sending countries.  
 First, I asked: Under what circumstances will Muslim women emerge as 
activists defending their religious identity to feminists rooted in a more secular 
tradition, while at the same time reclaiming how the Muslim identity has been 
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constructed in the West by their male religious contemporaries?  In essence, I 
investigated the circumstances under which Muslim women would pursue feminist 
campaigns similar to the campaigns of their sisters in other world religions.  
Accordingly, in chapter two, I demonstrate that debates over Islam’s position on 
gender-justice have historically positioned Western feminists rooted in either a 
colonial position or a secular tradition against women in Muslim communities. Islam, 
in particular, is under current scrutiny because of global political events and Muslim 
women, therefore, become notable targets because of their distinctive dress code. The 
veil is habitually used as a symbol that not only designates Muslim women apart from 
non-Muslim women, but also symbolizes Islam’s oppressive nature towards women’s 
rights. Hence, I answer the first question about Muslim women’s activism by 
exploring how media activists a) emerge to reclaim what they believe to be Islam’s 
egalitarianism, and b) reconstruct an image of the veiled Muslim woman as one of 
strength, confidence, voluntary modesty and celebrated diversity.  I suggest that this 
form of representative activism takes advantage of modernity’s technological 
developments to reclaim how veiled Muslim women are understood by the public, by 
battling for media standing in their own representation. As John Mayer notes, 
secularism can often be so doctrinaire as to force religious individuals to ‘retreat’ from 
the secular world (Mayer 1998); accordingly, my research shows that Muslim women 
choose to make claims for equality from within the religious framework, as an 
alternative to the state-based model for women’s rights in the West.   
 In chapter three I engage with an example of how women reclaim the way in 
which the Muslim identity has been commandeered by males in both British and 
American Muslim communities.  Specifically, I focus on campaigns against domestic 
violence to demonstrate how activists use hermeneutic strategies to reinterpret Islam’s 
textual teachings on just relations between men and women in private family life.  
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Activists contend that the androcentric, or male-biased, interpretations offered by male 
religious leaders are also primocentric, in that they use the first generation male as a 
point of reference and incorrectly conflate misogynist traditions from immigrant 
sending countries with Islam’s teachings. In order to divorce traditions from religious 
doctrine, Muslim women activists engage in reinterpretive activism to offer a new 
egalitarian Muslim identity in both countries that takes advantage of modernity 
through the education and scholarship that probes sacred texts for alternative 
translation.  
 Next, I asked: How do Muslim women reconcile their gender and religious 
identities when they conflict, particularly when the multicultural political project in 
Western liberal democracies might protect group rights made in the name of religion 
that violate the liberal rights of the group’s female members? If secular democracies 
are meant to protect the liberal rights of their people, despite religious group claims 
that might violate group members, then it would seem that religion and modernity are 
in conflict.  In chapters two and three, however, I sort how activists’ make claims that 
reconcile their gender and religious identities according to their arenas of discourse.  
Chapter two describes representative claims that activists make in the public sphere, 
usually engaging the media’s misrepresentation of the Muslim woman, which 
necessitates creating alternative media outlets and images. Chapter three demonstrates 
reinterpretive claims that activists make within the private sphere of Muslim 
communities themselves, which necessitates intracommunal communication that tries 
to convince fellow Muslims that misogynistic practices are the result of misinterpreted 
Islamic teachings.  In order to be a proper Muslim, activists argue to community 
members, individuals must follow egalitarian interpretations of Islam.  And it is 
modernity that allows for the reimagination and reinvention of what actually 
comprises the Muslim identity in group rights claims. I conclude that, in both public 
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and private spheres, activists emphasize the intersectional importance of their religious 
and gender identities—being a strong woman and a good Muslim are portrayed as 
fundamentally compatible qualities.  I will discuss my research’s contributions to 
intersectionality theory in more detail in the next section, when I discuss the 
restructuring of feminist theory that is needed, but my respondents’ efforts to reconcile 
their gender identities with their religious identities demonstrates that intersectionality 
analysis must include feminists of faith. 
 And, finally, I asked: How do second generation Muslim women activists 
challenge our assumptions about linear, unidirectional assimilation and the 
incorporation of diversity in Western mainstream cultures? Just as there are 
assumptions about modernity’s ‘linear’ appeal—as in, the more modern a society 
becomes, the more advanced and universally beneficial it is—assimilation faces the 
same linear expectations. Subsequent generations are expected to assimilate to the host 
society and blur minority group differences as they acclimate to majority norms.  Yet, 
my research in chapter three demonstrates that second-generation Muslim women in 
both countries challenge our assumptions about assimilation by underlining their 
minority religious identity.  As explained in my first chapter, my research expands 
upon an idea proposed by three main assimilation models—1-Portes and Zhou’s 
(1992) segmented assimilation model; 2-Alba and Nee’s (2003) model that argues the 
majority is reshaped by minority assimilation; 3- Kasinitz, Mollenkopf, Waters and 
Holdaway’s (2009) model that stress the second generation has a distinct advantage 
over native born racial and ethnic minorities: namely, that the second generation might 
in fact ‘creatively’ combine elements of the mainstream culture with aspects of their 
parental ethnic heritage in order to be upwardly mobile in society.  I find that the 
religious identity, enabled by modernity, is particularly conducive to this creative 
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reimagination of a minority identity and believe this conclusion has implications for 
future research on immigrant incorporation and the multicultural political project. 
 While recent scholarship theorizes different paths that the second generation 
can take in assimilating to the mainstream society, my research makes two important 
contributions to the current scholarship’s theoretical oversights.  First, there has thus 
far been little empirical research on the second generation that proves or disproves 
these three models, and the little that does exist largely avoids religious identity in 
discussions of racial and ethnic minorities. My findings offer second generation 
Muslim women as an important empirical example of individuals who purposely 
highlight their minority religious identity, over racial or ethnic identities, which is a 
minority identity that is often overlooked in the post-1965 assimilation literature. 
Second, assimilation theory seems to take for granted the idea that those second 
generation individuals who selectively maintain elements of their ethnic heritage 
simply preserve the heritage as it has been taught to them by their parents.  Instead, 
my findings demonstrate that it is indeed important to second generation women in 
both countries to have the ability to re-imagine their religion in a manner that is 
distinct from their parents’ interpretation.  They argue that each state’s multicultural 
project that aims to manage difference frames the immigrant minority identity in 
primocentric terms—that is, the state takes the first generation as its point of reference, 
effectively obscuring the second generation’s interests in constructing their own 
minority identity.  This may happen because the state holds similar assumptions as 
assimilation scholars about the minority identity being most salient in the first 
generation and dissolving in a linear fashion with subsequent generations; moreover, if 
ethnic culture/values continue in the second generation they will essentially be faded 
versions of those present in the first generation. Yet, as more second generation 
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American and British Muslims highlight their Muslim identities, these assumptions 
about linear and unidirectional assimilation must be further interrogated.   
 Linear assimilation was first challenged by Marcus Lee Hansen in 1938, in an 
essay he titled “The problem of the third generation immigrant.” Hansen coined the 
idea that would later be popularized by Will Herberg (1954)—namely, “what the son 
wishes to forget the grandson wishes to remember” (Hansen 1938: 7).  This theory, 
otherwise known as Hansen’s Law, tried to explain why the third generation might be 
more willing than the second generation to take pride in their ethnic past.  Second 
generation individuals, he theorized, would be weighed down by insecurities of their 
foreign parentage and would constantly strive to prove their Americanness; third 
generation individuals, however, would be secure in their Americanness and feel free 
to explore and record their heritage through the formation of associations (Hansen 
1938).  
 Because Hansen and Herberg tackled immigration during a period in the 
twentieth century when its flow had diminished because of restrictive legislation, it is 
likely that their predictions for third generation Americans were largely informed by 
the behavior of second generation immigrants who were suffering through a 
particularly strong xenophobic period. Hansen described the second generation he 
addressed: “They were subjected to the criticism and taunts of the native Americans 
and to the criticism and taunts of their elders as well…the delinquency of the second 
generation was talked about so incessantly that finally little Fritz and little Hans 
became convinced that they were not like the children from the other side of the 
tracks” (Hansen 1938: 4). It might be argued that the contemporary second generation, 
in contrast to Hansen’s second generation, does not face the same type of 
discrimination and pressure towards assimilation because of the multicultural project’s 
progress in each respective state, yet it is important to note that xenophobia remains a 
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significant social problem.  Hansen’s theory does, however, underline the importance 
of acknowledging the context of the receiving society.  In early 1900s America 
(Hansen’s context), for example, immigration legislation reflected strong public 
opinion against immigration. Starting in1965, however, immigration legislation 
changed significantly and began to open America’s borders to more immigrants.  
 My second generation respondents suggest that highlighting their religious 
identity does not necessarily separate them from mainstream society—in other words, 
in contrast to Hansen’s fears, some children of Muslim immigrants do not believe it 
necessary to abandon their religious identity to feel American or British. In both 
countries, activists voluntarily distance themselves from traditional customs of their 
parents’ sending countries, but seek to distinguish their religion from these practices. 
Instead of distancing themselves from Islam, activists are attracted to the religion and 
try to reclaim what they believe to be its original egalitarianism. While there is close 
to no research on a Muslim third generation in America and scarcely any research on 
the third generation in Britain, my research suggests that the second generation in both 
countries hastens to forge connections to their religious—not necessarily parental—
heritage that Hansen and Herberg assumed would not develop until the third 
generation.   
 As I demonstrated in chapter five, although both British and American Muslim 
women believe that they are constructing a new British or American egalitarian 
version of Islam, only in America does this attachment to a religious identity align 
with the mainstream narrative of a ‘religious country.’ This in turn reinforces the fact 
that religious activists—regardless of their particular religious beliefs—play an 
important role in American history . By situating American Muslim women activists’ 
struggle for gender equality in the context of religious reform movements throughout 
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American history, it becomes clear that my research has implications for America’s 
continued commitment to religious freedom and individual rights. Specifically, I 
suggest that the American state would be best advised to protect these liberal rights, in 
the interest of encouraging diverse voices to emerging from minority communities.  
 
C. Intersectionality Theory and the Religious Identity 
 As I discussed above, I consider one of the largest implications of my research 
to be its contribution to the feminist study of intersectionality.  Not only has 
intersectionality theory marginalized the religious identity (despite the large body of 
evidence that demonstrates women do indeed reconcile their gender and religious 
identities in all of the world’s major religions), but the literature has also been 
surprisingly silent on the question of how historical and institutional context impacts 
gender and religious identities.  Some scholars have addressed the influence national 
context might have on intersectionality theory, particularly in how identities and social 
structures might interact with one another in different ways (e.g. additively, 
multiplicatively, interactively) (Weldon 2008).  Yet, this contextual analysis stops at 
national borders and fails to make use of comparative analysis to determine how 
intersectionality might play out differently in women’s lives in different countries. 
 My research attends to this shortcoming, however, by examining the different 
role that religion plays in both countries and its consequential effect on how the 
religious identity that interacts with gender is constructed in the first place.  As my last 
chapter demonstrated, religious identity has a unique, fairly respected place in the 
American national narrative that its counterpart in Britain does not share.  
Institutionally speaking, then, if intersectionality theory is called to consider the 
religious identity’s intersection with gender, we must know more about the 
institutional context within which the religious identity has developed.  My research 
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suggests that whether that identity is stifled or enabled affects the quality of the 
activism that its interaction with gender produces. Similarly, the institutional and 
national context should be explored for the other identities that are usually taken for 
granted within intersectionality theory as well—race, class, and ethnicity are all 
constructed in particular contexts, with certain groups privileged or discriminated 
against at different moments in time. Without a deeper understanding of the 
environments that shape these group differences, the attempt to take into account the 
multiple oppressions that women face appears half-hearted.   
 
II. IMPLICATIONS FOR COMPARATIVE POLITICS STUDIES 
 While my research suggests that further research should be conducted that 
applies intersectionality theory to comparative studies across national contexts to 
investigate the institutional context behind certain identities, I also believe my study 
holds lessons for broader comparative political studies as well.  My research design 
originally sought to investigate the surprising similarities emerging among two 
Muslim populations conventionally considered to be significantly different from one 
another.  As I explored the similarities, however, I began to see notable diversity 
within activist campaigns on the same gender-justices issues, in both the public and 
private spheres.  In essence, my research design evolved into a two-level 
investigation—the first level looking at similarities and the second level examining 
differences. The results of these investigations at both levels yield interesting findings 
in political science, which suggests that political scientists might be better served, 
moving forward, if they consider how to calibrate the study of both similarity and 
difference within a singular paired comparison. In the subfield of comparative politics 
in particular, the paired comparison is a popular choice of research design, yet one that 
is often limited to either a most-similar systems design that illuminates causal 
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variables that generate different outcomes or a most-different systems design that 
outlines causal variables that produce similar outcomes.  
 In the first place, it is interesting that differences in education, employment, 
health and basically every other socio-economic indicator between the country’s two 
Muslim populations do not trump the similar grounds on which these women share 
injustice: gender and generation. It is fascinating that activists in both countries, across 
race, class, ethnic group, and education, generate similar forms of gender-justice 
claims in each country’s public and private spheres. Though it has not generated 
significant levels of transnational activism thus far, some global efforts have emerged 
on the internet and could certainly be a direction for future research on this topic.  
 In the second place, however, it is even more interesting that there is variation 
among activists who claim to be fighting the same gender-justice struggles.  The ways 
in which claims are framed vary—they are either transformative revolutionary 
challenges to underlying systems of power that lead to misinterpretations, or 
affirmative descriptive corrections to those misinterpretations without challenging the 
system that generated them. And it has been the argument of the second half of this 
dissertation that those variations are caused by different state contexts. On one hand, 
the British state essentially stifles transformative frames from emerging by placing 
obstacles in the Muslim women activists’ course by appointing male leaders to 
represent the British Muslim community.  The American state, on the other hand, 
emphasizes the importance of religious freedom as a Constitutional liberal right and 
believes that, if one respects this right, one must respect other liberal rights, such as 
free speech.  It is in this environment, where the government does not interfere in 
religious community representation and American Muslims are allowed to compete 
for their own free market representation and interpretation, that some American 
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Muslim women activists choose to try transformative frames for gender-justice claims 
within their religious framework.   
 If my analysis had simply chosen to focus on the similarity or diversity among 
British and American Muslim women activists, I would have surely missed a large 
part of the story with such a limited design.  On one hand, if I had only engaged with 
the similarities, I would have overlooked the scope of my analysis that speaks to the 
importance of the state’s relationship with its religious communities.  On the other 
hand, if I had focused on the differences, I would have missed the individual level 
variables of gender and generation that trump many other SES indicators in predicting 
the political identification processes of second generation Muslim women in the West.  
 Contemporary controversies that ask each state to determine how comfortable 
it is with allowing Muslims to be Muslims hold incredible significance to the type of 
activism that emerges among its young Muslim populations. If my dissertation 
suggests any implications for the state’s approach to questions of headscarves, 
cartoons, or mosques, it is that the more a country tries to regulate religious behavior, 
the more it effectively stifles diverse interpretations within religious communities.  
And, as my research shows, this variety sometimes contains the seeds of liberal dissent 
or religious reform within Islam that may lead to greater compatibility /convergence 
between Islamic and Western democratic values—particularly women’s rights.
  276 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
Abdullah, Keilani. (2007). “A peaceful ideal, violent realities: A study on Muslim 
 female domestic violence survivors.” In Change from within: Diverse 
 perspectives on domestic violence in  Muslim communities, eds. Maha B. 
 Alkhateeb and Salma Elkadi Abugideiri, 69-89. Great Falls, VA: Peaceful 
 Families Project. 
 
Abu-Lughod, L. (2002). “Do muslim women really need saving? anthropological 
 reflections on cultural relativism and its others.” American Anthropologist, 
 104(3), 783-790. 
 
ABU-RAS, W., GHEITH, A., & COURNOS, F. (2008). “The imam's role in mental 
 health promotion: A study at 22 mosques in New York City's Muslim 
 community.” Journal of Muslim Mental Health, 3(2), 155-176. 
 
Adler, Rachel. (1998). “Judaism.” In Alison M. Jaggar and Iris Marion Young (eds.) A 
 Companion to  Feminist Philosophy. Wiley-Blackwell. 
 
Afshar, H., Aitken, R., & Franks, M. (2005). “Feminisms, islamophobia and 
 identities.” Political Studies,  53(2), 262-283. 
 
Ahmed, L. (1992). Women and gender in Islam. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
 
Al-Hibri, A. (2002). “Qur’anic foundations of the rights of women in the twenty-first 
 century” in M. Atho Mudzhar, et.al.,(eds.), Women in Indonesian Society: 
 Access, Empowerment and Opportunity. Yogyakarta: Sunan Kalijaga Press. 
 
------- (2000). “An Introduction to Muslim Women’s Rights.” in Gisela Webb (ed.) 
 Windows of  Faith.  Syracuse: Syracuse University Press. 
 
------- (1999). “Is western patriarchal feminism good for third World/Minority 
 women?” in Cohen, J., Howard, M., & Nussbaum, M. C. (eds.) Is 
 Multiculturalism Bad for Women? Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 
Al-Johar, D. (2005). “Muslim marriages in America: Reflecting new identities.” The 
 Muslim World, 95(4), 557-574. 
 
Alba, R. D., & Nee, V. (2003). Remaking the American Mainstream. Cambridge: 
 Harvard University Press. 
 
Allen, C., Nielsen, J. S. (2002). “Summary report on islamophobia in the EU after 11 
 September 2001.” European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, & 
 University of Birmingham Centre for the Study of Islam and Christian-
 Muslim Relations. 
  277 
 
Ansolabehere, S., Behr, R. L., & Iyengar, S. (1993). The media game: American 
 politics in the  television age. Macmillan Old Tappan, NJ. 
 
Anthrop, M. E. (1990). “The controversy over school prayer.” Magazine of History, 
 5(1), 40-47. 
 
Bagby, I. A. W., Perl, P. M., Froehle, B.(2001). The mosque in america, a national 
 portrait: A report from the mosque study project Council on American-
 Islamic Relations. Council on American-Islamic Relations, & Hartford 
 Institute for Religious Research. 
 
Banaszak, L. A., Beckwith, K., & Rucht, D. (2003). Women's movements facing the 
 reconfigured state. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Barazangi, N. H. (2004). “Understanding Muslim women's self-identity and resistance 
 to feminism and participatory action research.” Traveling Companions: 
 Feminism, Teaching, and Action Research, 21-39. 
 
-------- (2004). Women identity and the Qur’an. Gainesville: University of Florida 
 Press. 
 
Barlas, A. (2002). Believing women. Islam: Unreading Patriarchal Interpretations of 
 the Qur’an.Austin: University of Texas Press. 
 
Benford, R. D., & Snow, D. A. (2000). “Framing processes and social movements: An 
 overview and assessment.” Annual Review of Sociology, 26(1), 611-639. 
 
Birt, Y. (2009). “Islamophobia in the construction of British Muslim identity politics” 
 in Peter E. Hopkins and Richard Gale (eds.) Muslims in Britain: Race, Place 
 and Identities. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 210-227. 
 
Brown, Katherine. (2008). “The Promise and Perils of Women’s Participation in UK 
 Mosques: The  Impact of Securitization Agendas on Identity, Gender and 
 Community” The British Journal of  Politics & International Relations, 10(3): 
 472-491.  
 
Byng, M. D. (2010). “Symbolically Muslim: Media, hijab, and the west.” Critical 
 Sociology, 36(1), 109. 
  
Cohen, J., Howard, M., & Nussbaum, M. C. (eds.) (1999). Is multiculturalism bad for 
 women? Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 
Coleman, D. L. (2001). “Culture, cloaked in mens rea.” South Atlantic Quarterly, 
 100(4), 981. 
  278 
 
Cooke, M. (2007). “The Muslimwoman.” Contemporary Islam, 1(2), 139-154. 
 
Costain, A. N., & Costain, W. D. (1987). “Strategy and tactics of the Women’s 
 movement in the United States: The role of political parties.” The Women’s 
 Movements of the United States and  Western Europe. Philadelphia: Temply 
 University Press.  
 
Crenshaw, K. (1989). “Demarginalizing the intersection of race and sex: A black 
 feminist critique of antidiscrimination doctrine, feminist theory and antiracist 
 politics.” University of Chicago Legal Forum, 139. 
 
------- (1991). “Mapping the margins: Intersectionality, identity politics, and violence 
 against women of color.” Stanford Law Review, 43(6), 1241-1299. 
 
Davary, B. (2009). “Miss Elsa and the veil: Honor, shame, and identity negotiations.” 
 Journal of Feminist Studies in Religion, 25(2), 47-66. 
 
Elman, R. A. (2003). “Refuge in reconfigured states: Shelter movements in the United 
 States, Britain,and Sweden.” Women’s Movements Facing the Reconfigured 
 State, 94–113. 
 
Erndl, Kathleen. (2000). "Is Shakti Empowering For Women? Reflections on 
 Feminism and the Hindu Goddess." In Alf Hiltebeitel and Kathleen M Erndl 
 (eds.) Is the Goddess a Feminist? New York: NYU Press. 
 
Esposito, J. L. I. (1988). The straight path. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Ferree, M. M. (2002). Shaping abortion discourse: Democracy and the public sphere 
 in Germany and the United States. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
------ (1987). “Equality and Autonomy: Feminist Politics in the United States and 
 West Germany” in Mary Katzenstein and Carol McClurg Mueller (eds), 
 Women’s Movements of Western Europe and the United States. Philadelphia: 
 Temple University Press. 
 
Figueroa, P. (2004). “Diversity and citizenship education in England,” in James A. 
 Banks (ed.) Diversity and Citizenship Education: Global Perspectives. San 
 Francisco: Jossey-Bass/Wiley. 
 
---------(1999). “Multiculturalism and anti-racism in a new era: A critical review.” 
 Race Ethnicity and Education, 2(2), 281-302. 
 
Fish, S. (1997). “Boutique multiculturalism, or why liberals are incapable of thinking 
 about hate speech.” Critical Inquiry, 378-395. 
  279 
 
Fraser, N. (1997). Justice interruptus: Critical reflections on the" postsocialist" 
 condition. London: Routledge Press. 
 
Gamson, W., Croteau, D., Hoynes, W., & Sasson, T. (1992). “Media images and the 
 social construction of reality.” Annual Review of Sociology, 18, 373-393. 
 
Gamson, W. & Wolsfeld, G. (1993). “Media and movements: A transactional 
 analysis.” Annals of the American Journal of Political and Social Science, 528, 
 114-125. 
 
Gangoli, G., & Chantler, K. (2009). “Protecting victims of forced marriage: Is age a 
 protective factor?” Feminist Legal Studies, 17(3), 267-288. 
 
Gans, H. (1973). Introduction to Sandberg, N., Ethnic Identity and Assimilation: The 
 Polish Community. New York: Praeger. 
 
George, A. L., & Bennett, A. (2005). Case studies and theory development in the 
 social sciences. Cambrdige: The MIT Press. 
 
Gillborn, D. (2005). “Education policy as an act of white supremacy: Whiteness, 
 critical race theory and education reform.” Journal of Education Policy, 20(4), 
 485-505. 
 
Glazer, N. (1998). We are all multiculturalists now. Cambridge: Harvard University 
 Press. 
 
Goodall, K. (2007). “Incitement to religious hatred: All talk and no substance?” The 
 Modern Law Review, 70(1), 89-113. 
 
Gordon, M. M. (1964). Assimilation in American life: The role of race, religion, and 
 national origins. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Gottschalk, P., & Greenberg, G. (2008). Islamophobia: Making Muslims the enemy. 
 New York: Rowman & Littlefield Pub Inc. 
 
Haddad, Y. Y. (2007). “The post-9/11 hijab as icon.” Sociology of Religion, 68(3): 
 253. 
 
Haddad, Y. Y., & Ricks, R. S. (2009). “Claiming space in America’s pluralism: 
 Muslims enter the political maelstrom.” in Abdulkader Sinno (ed.) Muslims in 
 Western Politics. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.  
 
Hallaq, W. B. (1984). “Considerations on the function and character of Sunn! legal 
 theory.” Journal of the American Oriental Society, 104(4), 679-689. 
  280 
 
Hansen, M. L. (1938). “The Problem of the Third Generation Immigrant.” Rock 
 Island, IL: Augustana Historical Society. 
 
Hansen, R. (2000). Citizenship and immigration in post-war Britain: The institutional 
 origins of a multicultural nation. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Hastings, E. and P. Hastings. (1986). Index to International Public Opinion, 1984-85. 
 Westport, CT:  Greenwood Press. 
 
Hayashi, B. M. (2004). Democratizing the enemy: The Japanese American internment. 
 Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 
Hellyer, H. A. (2007). :British Muslims: Past, present and future.” Muslim World. 
 97(2), 225. 
 
Herberg, W. (1954) Protestant, Catholic, Jew: an essay in American sociology. New 
 York: Doubleday. 
 
Hoodfar, H. (1993). “The veil in their minds and on our heads: The persistence of 
 colonial images of Muslim women.” Resources for Feminist Research, 
 22(3/4), 5-18. 
 
Hu-DeHart, E. (1993). “The history, development, and future of ethnic studies.” Phi 
 Delta Kappan, 75(1). 
 
Huntington, S. P. (2004). “The hispanic challenge.” Foreign Policy, 141(2), 30-45. 
 
Jackson, S. A. (2005). Islam and the blackamerican: Looking toward the third 
 resurrection. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Jamal, A. A., & Naber, N. C. (2008). Race and Arab Americans before and after 9/11: 
 From invisible citizens to visible subjects. Syracuse: Syracuse University 
 Press. 
 
Janmohamed, S. Z. (2009) Love in a headscarf. London: Aurum Press Ltd. 
 
Jones, P. (1990). “Rushdie, race and religion.” Political Studies, 38(4), 687-694. 
 
Kasinitz, P., Mollenkopf, J., Waters, M., & Holdaway, J. (2008). Inheriting the city: 
 The second generation comes of age. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. 
 
Katzenstein, Mary. (1999). Faithful and Fearless. Princeton: Princeton University 
 Press. 
 
  281 
Katzenstein, M. F., & Mueller, C. M. C. (1987). The women's movements of the 
 United States and Western Europe: Consciousness, political opportunity,  and 
 public policy. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. 
  
Kivisto, P., & Rundblad, G. (2000). Multiculturalism in the United States : current 
 issues,  contemporary voices. Thousand Oaks, California: Pine Forge Press. 
 
Koenig, M. (2005). “Incorporating Muslim migrants in Western nation states–a 
 comparison of the United Kingdom, France, and Germany.” Journal of 
 International Migration and Integration, 6(2), 219-234. 
 
Kugle, S. (2003). “Sexuality, diversity and ethics in the agenda of progressive 
 Muslims.” in Omid Safi (ed) Progressive Muslims: On Justice, Gender, and 
 Pluralism. Oxford: Oneworld Publications. 
 
Kundnani, A. (2009). Spooked! How not to prevent violent extremism. London: The 
 Institute of Race Relations.  
 
Kymlicka, W. (1996). Multicultural citizenship: A liberal theory of minority rights. 
 Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Kymlicka, W., & Norman, W. (2000). Citizenship in diverse societies. Oxford: Oxford 
 University Press. 
 
Laitin, D. D., & Wildavsky, A. (1988). “Political culture and political preferences.” 
 The American Political Science Review, 82(2), 589-597. 
 
Lambert, F. (2003). The founding fathers and the place of religion in America. 
 Princeton: Princeton  University Press. 
 
Laurence, J. (Forthcoming 2010). The Partial Emancipation. Princeton: Princeton 
 University Press.  
 
------- (2009). “The corporatist antecedent of contemporary state-Islam relations.” 
European Political Science, 8(3), 301-315. 
 
Lazreg, M. (1994). The eloquence of silence: Algerian women in question. London: 
 Routledge Press. 
 
Lee, J., & Bean, F. D. (2004). “America's changing color lines: Immigration, 
 race/ethnicity, and multiracial identification.” Annual Review of Sociology. 30,  
 221-242. 
 
Leonard, K. (2005). “Introduction: Young American Muslim Identities.” The Muslim 
 World. 95 (4):  473-477. 
  282 
 
Lippmann, W. (1922). Public opinion. New York: Hartcourt, Brace and Co. 
 
Lowe, W. (2006). “Yoshikoder: An open source multilingual content analysis tool for 
 social scientists.” APSA Annual meeting: Philadelphia. 
 
Mabro, Judy. (1991). Veiled Half-Truths: Western Travellers’ Perceptions of Middle 
 Eastern Women. New Delhi: I.B. Taurus. 
 
Macdonald, M. (2006). Muslim women and the veil. Feminist Media Studies, 6(1), 7-
 23. 
 
Maira, S. (2008). “Flexible Citizenship/Flexible empire: South Asian Muslim youth in 
 post-9/11 America.” American Quarterly, 60(3), 697-720. 
 
Mayer, John. (1998). “Secularization and Cultural Diversity,” in Cultural Traditions 
 and the Idea of Secularization. Centre for Studies in Civilizations in 
 association with International Federation of  Philosophical Societies. 
 
McGreevy, J. T. (2004). Catholicism and American freedom: A history. New York: 
 WW Norton & Company. 
 
Mernissi, F. (1992). The veil and the male elite: A feminist interpretation of women's 
 rights in Islam. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Pub.Co. 
 
Mill, J. S. (1892). A System of Logic. London: Routledge. 
 
Modood, T. (2009). “Moderate secularism and multiculturalism.” Politics. 29(1), 71-
 76. 
 
-------- (2006).  “British Muslims and the politics of multiculturalism.” in Tariq 
 Modood, Anna Triandafyllidou, and Ricard Zapata-Barrero (eds). 
 Multiculturalism, Muslims and Citizenship: A European Approach. London: 
 Routledge. 
 
-------- (2003). “Muslims and the politics of difference.” Political Quarterly, 74(s1), 
 100-115. 
 
-------- (1994). “Establishment, multiculturalism and British citizenship.” Political 
Quarterly, 65(1), 53- 73. 
 
  
Modood, T., Triandafyllidou, A., & Zapata-Barrero, R. (2006). Multiculturalism, 
 Muslims and citizenship: A European approach. New York: Routledge. 
 
  283 
Mohanty, S. (2003). “The epistemic status of cultural identity.” in Linda Martin Alcoff 
 (ed.) Identities: Race, Class, Gender and Nationality. Maiden, MA: Blackwell 
 Publishing Ltd. 
 
Moon, Hellena. (2008). “Womenpriests: Radical Change or More of the Same?” 
 Journal of Feminism in Religious Studies. 24 (2).  
 
Muedini, F. (2009). “Muslim American college youth: Attitudes and responses five 
 years after 9/11.” The Muslim World, 99(1), 39-59. 
 
Nash, D. (2008). “To prostitute morality, libel religion, and undermine government: 
 Blasphemy and the strange persistence of providence in Britain since the 
 seventeenth century.” Journal of Religious History, 32(4), 439-456. 
 
--------- (1999). Blasphemy in modern Britain: 1789 to the present. Aldershot and 
 Brookfield, VT: Ashgate. 
 
Nayak, M. (2006). “Orientalism and ‘saving’ US state identity after 9/11.” 
 International Feminist Journal of Politics, 8(1), 42-61. 
 
Okin, Susan Moller. (1999). “Is multiculturalism bad for women?“ in S. M. Okin, 
 Joshua Cohen, Matthew Howard, Martha C. Nussbaum (eds.) Is 
 multiculturalism bad for women? Princeton: Princeton University Press; 7-24. 
 
Page, B. I., Shapiro, R. Y., & Dempsey, G. R. (1987). “What moves public opinion?” 
 The American  Political Science Review, 81(1), 23-43. 
 
Parekh, B. C. (2002). Rethinking multiculturalism: Cultural diversity and political 
 theory. Harvard University Press. 
 
Park, R.E. and E.W. Burgess. (1921). Introduction to the Science of Sociology. reprint, 
 Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969. 
 
Peterson, M. D., & Vaughan, R. C. (1988). The Virginia statute for religious freedom: 
 Its evolution and consequences in American history. Cambridge: Cambridge 
 University Press. 
 
Pew Global Attitudes Survey (2006). Washington, DC: Pew Research Center.  
 
Phillips, A. (2007). Multiculturalism without culture. Princton: Princeton University 
 Press. 
 
Phillips, A., & Dustin, M. (2004). “UK initiatives on forced marriage: Regulation, 
 dialogue and exit.”Political Studies, 52(3), 531-551. 
 
  284 
Pintchman, T. (2000) “Is the Hindu goddess tradition a good resource for western 
 feminism? in Alf Hiltebeitel and Kathleen M. Erndl. (eds). Is the Goddess a 
 Feminist? The Politics of South Asian Goddesses. New York: New York 
 University Press.  
 
Pollitt, K. (1999). “Whose culture.” in S. M. Okin, Joshua Cohen, Matthew Howard, 
 Martha C. Nussbaum (eds.) Is multiculturalism bad for women? Princeton: 
 Princeton University Press. 
 
Portes, A., Fernandez-Kelly, P., & Haller, W. (2009). “The adaptation of the 
 immigrant second generation in America: A theoretical overview and recent 
 evidence.” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 35(7), 1077-1104. 
 
Prothero, S. R. (2003). American Jesus: How the son of god became a national icon. 
 New York: Farrar Straus & Giroux. 
 
Przeworski, A., & Teune, H. (1970). The logic of comparative social inquiry. New 
 York: Wiley- Interscience. 
 
Rahman, F. (1965). “The concept of hadd in Islamic law.” Islamic Studies, 4, 237-251. 
 
Razack, S. (2008). Casting out: The eviction of Muslims from western law and 
 politics. University of Toronto Press. 
 
Renteln, A. D. (2005). The cultural defense. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Ryan, C. (1991). Prime time activism: Media strategies for grassroots organizing. 
 Boston: South End Press. 
 
Sabbath, R. S. (2009). Sacred tropes: Tanakh, New Restament, and Qur'an as 
 literature and culture. Boston: Brill Academic Pub. 
 
Saadawi, N. (1977). Woman and psychological conflict. Cairo: El-Mu'Assasa El-
 'Arabiya Lil-Dirassat  Wa. 
 
Sandberg, N. (1973). Ethnic Identity and Assimilation: The Polish Community. New 
 York: Praeger. 
 
Sassen, S. (1999). “Culture beyond gender.” in S. M. Okin, Joshua Cohen, Matthew 
 Howard, Martha C. Nussbaum (eds.) Is multiculturalism bad for women? 
 Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 
Scheufele, D. A. (1999). “Framing as a theory of media effects.” Journal of 
 Communication, 49(1), 103-122. 
 
  285 
Shaw, Miranda. (2000). "Is Vajrayogini a Feminist? A Tantric Buddhist Case Study." 
 In Alf Hiltebeitel and Kathleen M Erndl (eds.) Is the Goddess a Feminist? 
 New York: NYU Press. 
 
Song, M. (2009). “Is intermarriage a good indicator of integration?” Journal of Ethnic 
 and Migration Studies, 35(2), 331-348. 
 
Song, S. (2005). “Majority norms, multiculturalism, and gender equality.” American 
 Political Science Review, 99(04), 473-489. 
 
Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty. (1988). "Can the Subaltern Speak?" in Cary Nelson and 
 Larry Grossberg (eds). Marxism and the interpretation of Culture. Chicago: 
 University of Illinois Press. 
 
Stabile, S. J. (2009). “The challenges of opening a dialogue between catholic and 
 secular feminist legal theorists.” Journal of Catholic Legal Studies. 48 (2): 
 219-268. 
 
Swidler, A. (1986). “Culture in action: Symbols and strategies.” American 
 Sociological Review, 51(2), 273-286. 
 
Tarrow, S. (2010). “The strategy of paired comparison: Toward a theory of practice.” 
 Comparative  Political Studies, 43(2), 230. 
 
-------- (1998). Power in movement: Social movements and contentious politics. 
 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Tilly, C. (2003). “Political identities in changing polities.” Social Research: An 
 International Quarterly, 70(2), 605-619. 
 
Tilly, C., & Tarrow, S. (2007). Contentious politics. Boulder, Colorado: Paradigm 
 Publishers. 
 
Wadud, A. (2006). Inside the gender jihad: Women's reform in Islam. Oxford: 
 Oneworld. 
 
-------- (1999). Qur’an and woman: Rereading the sacred text from a woman's 
 perspective. Oxford: Oxford University Press, USA. 
 
Warner, W.L. and L. Srole. (1945). The Social Systems of American Ethnic Groups. 
 New Haven: Yale University Press.  
 
Wildavsky, A. (1987). “Choosing preferences by constructing institutions: A cultural 
 theory of preference formation.” The American Political Science Review, 
 81(1), 4-21. 
  286 
 
Will, K. (1995). Multicultural citizenship: A liberal theory of minority rights. New 
 York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Williams, R. H., & Vashi, G. (2007). “Hijab and American Muslim women: Creating 
 the space for autonomous selves.” Sociology of Religion, 68(3), 269. 
 
Wilson, A. (2007). “The forced marriage debate and the British state.” Race & Class, 
 49(1), 25. 
 
Wise, L. (2006). “Amr Khaled vs. Yusuf Al Qaradawi: The Danish cartoon 
 controversy and the clash of  two Islamic TV titans. Transnational 
 Broadcasting Studies: http://www.tbsjournal.com/wise.htm.  
 
Yip, A. K. T. (2008). “Researching lesbian, gay, and bisexual Christians and Muslims: 
 Some thematic reflections.” Sociological Research Online, 13(1), 5. 
 
--------- (2006). “Resurgent Islam: A sociological Approach.” British Journal of 
 Sociology, 57(3), 540- 542. 
 
--------- (2005). “Queering religious texts: An exploration of British non-heterosexual 
 Christians’ and Muslims’ strategy of constructing sexuality-affirming 
 hermeneutics.” Sociology, 39(1), 47. 
 
--------- (2004). “Negotiating space with family and kin in identity construction: The 
 narratives of  British non-heterosexual Muslims.” The Sociological Review, 
 52(3), 336-350. 
 
Zeitz, Joshua. (2007). White ethnic New York: Jews, Catholics and the shaping of 
 postwar politics. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.  
